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ABSTRACT
5 clear ’ and J distin ct 5 .
that whatever i s
In Principle X-.
what he means by
"terms that else;
stive mind" and if
hing but what is
the defining exp
ive ’ . Two quest!.
rity ' and ’distin
s ions ’present’, ’apparent ' f anc
arise j
(3 ) What, doer, Descartes near
uow Uses Descartes ascertain which of his ideas are
c 1 ear and d1stinc t?
T-'
*’
•
,
j-.'ii of i’erin o' ir.y own answers o
four con temporary viewpoints .
jij.an Gewirth points out that for Descartes
represent; they have what Gevirbh call s a direct and an
these Questions , I consul
all ideas
interpretive content. In Gewirth's view, an idea is clear
and distinct if and only if a certain relation holds between
its direct and interpretive contents. To find out whether
this relation obtains, one can use what Gewirtb calls the
method of difference.
harry Frankfurt argues that Descartes must have intended
his rule of evidence to guarantee the formal truth of e. rooco-
itions. Concentrating on the notion of clear and distinct
perception that £, Frankfurt offers an account that makes
clear and distinct perception consist in a relation between
p and an evidential basis for o.
Anthony Kenny and E. J. Ashworth are critical of Des-
cartes . Both think that Descartes is confused about clarity
and distinctness
,
and both think that, once unraveled, Des-
cartes' account makes his rule of evidence problematic.
Each of the above treatments of clarity and distinctness
in Descartes is t ~ argue , seriously flawed. Because Gewirf
h
makes claritv and distinctness consist in a relation between
direct and. interpretive contentss, he cannot pi vs; us a. satis-
factory account of simple id-
other hard, hinges to a cons
to show that Descartes would
isri1 ' if he- intends Iris rule
ter Ia I truth of clearly and
But Frankfurt 1 s argument dep
eas. Frankfurt's account, on the
adorable extent on his arguments
be guilty of "a grotesque aprioi
of evidence to guarantee the ma—
distinctly perceived concepts
.
iends on a dubious interpretation
vj.
o f .vnat Desuar tes says about inatex*i a 1 1y x*al ss ido a;-.' , Konnv ' r.
and Ashworth's views are also problematic. They rely or. a
number or arguments to defend the claim that Descartes ' account
of clarity and distinctness is confused. But none of these
arguments turns out to be convincing.
After arguing that each of the above treatments of
clarity and distinctness is seriously flawed,. I advance the
view that there are two aspects of clarity and distinctness
— analytical clarity and distinctness and representational
clarity and distinctness. Ideas have analyses or contents
;
they also represent. The analytical contents of an idea are
its 2nt?ii Intents. A person A will have an analytically clear
and distinct idea provided that A believes, for certain con-
cepts his idea entails, that his idea contains those concepts.
And A's idea will be representational ly clear and distinct
provided that his idea represents correctly, he can, in a hi-
tion, find cut whether his ideas «re both analytically and
representational ly clear and distinct and, therefore, clear
and distinct per sc
,
by using two separate, methods — the
method of difference and the method of doubt respectively.
Uavina offered an account of clarity and distinctness
in Descartes 3 behalf and having shown how Descartes can
ascertain whether his ideas are clear and distinct;, I offer
an interpretation of Descartes 1 rule of evidence, and I show
why Descartes would have though 1'; his Rule to be true.
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unless no kno /bat Li ’ ire : : 1 -
what D* * rce san ! 'clarity* nd *d 1
o ice we :now t h 1 ans an 1 . fcr* 1 nd he
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.1: i ni t i . >n o i * c 1 ari t
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,
arid 1 ?. nakes I ttl< d; fori o elucidate h :
to explicate ri view lescartes the rc&<
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.o r h 1 i ; c c ! - ; enear r, i nin . In : a . ‘t tl is dif
is my e.ffce elucidate fc 11 3 ularii
ana or si no ,
j yj i a 3.so be concerned with how Descartes as ;< r 2 -
whether ar« els x. ai d listinc Ln his r to
A • '
- chn. Fifth Replies, Doacnrroo -or-:, to it he pro-
vided in ' no ."editations a me the- fo : uccert..-
and disti ctn< . . hit: he does i 1 -1 •" *at .h
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f
o.t*t 3 or s ox the Med-
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to inter
the reader is left to his own devices.
The. following dissertation consists of ni
In the first four chapters I discuss the views
commentators who have considered the same quest
occupy me. Their views Vie Ip to define the scot
the. subject matter under consideration. In the
I develop a strategy for answering the quest! 01
and in the sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters
,
account of clarity and distinctness and of how
tained. In the ninth chapter I indicate what .
fill in some gaps that remain.
ne chapters.
0 f con tempora ry
.ions 1 1\at wi X
1
>e and limit of
1 fifth chapte
r
,
is I have raised,
. I offer my
they are ascar-
ls required to
C HAP T E R
GEWIRTH'S ACCOUNT OF CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
The Hollowing chapter in Alan Gewirth's welt documented
article ‘'Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes” ' :.s divided
into three parts — an exposition of Gewirth's do l 10 r ons of
‘clearness * and ’distinctness', an exposition or his interpret,
ation of how we ascertain whether an idea is ct o ord oh :;..inc! ..
and a criticism of his views.. In the first, vv, > -'-nr v.o
try to state Gewirth's interpretation clearly, c< fine
critical remarks to the third part where 1 cay to shor ho: his
interpretation .is fundamental iy confused. jo mak t nq i • ••.* - r
however, t do not wish to give the impress!on that
article should be lightly dismissed. On the contrary . i moor
Gewirtb has made a significant contr id no. .or toward
our underst an< 1 ig of what Desc iz t es men
; he discus
clear and distinct ideas and clear and oa.cti”'cc parcels ion
I, AP exposition OF CEWIRTH'G account
eg CLEARNESS M/D DISO INCTSESS
Gassendi ’ s cnticirm . hew rth opens
ren lading us of a criticisn Gassendi raise
Alan ( s 15 h . Cl irn 5 ai
Dvppah-v
\ Gorcic
C
] 7 .. • ' , p.j 1 1 > v re ferc * ce
s
the. text.
. p Distinctness ii Descartes
1
•
....
. _
-
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- „ rrrp-*? ) , W, 2b0~-2//.
i
.
.
- tv. New Yorj 1 uv>ok«» ,
_ Y . . : jr p] i losi <VII.I \Apnl , ' • •
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Objections . Gassendi accused Descartes of advancing a. merely
psychological criterion for acquiring knowledge (Gewirth, pp.
250-251)
. Gassendi observed that a person can be firmly con-
vinced he is clearly and distinctly perceiving when in fact
he is not. What Descartes needed
he failed to provide is a method
that is really clear and distinct
and what. Gassendi claimed
for distinguishing perception,
from perception that is only
apparently so.
Descartes responded that he had provided the required
method and that in addition he had enumerated all the principal
ideas and had distinguished the clear from the obscure-.- and
confused ones. He directed Gassendi to the place in the
Meditations where all prejudices had been discarded (Gewirth,
p. 251). Claiming that Gassendi's objection had been antici-
pated and amply treated, he desisted, from further reply.
Gewirth * s criticism erf Descartes . Playing the devil's
advocate
,
Gewirth points out that Descartes' definitions of
'clearness’ and ’distinctness 7 are. vague and open co various
interpr stations . Interpreted straightforwardly f these defin-
itions are so weak that they make every idea, clear and distinc
( Gew irth , op , 2 5 4 - 2 5 7 ) ,
Descartes cells us, that an idea x is clear if and only
if the following three conditions are s avia lave tin
( i) v l s present to the mino ,
(ii) x is open to the mind , and
(,' ii) then mind is attending to x (Gewirv.Vi , p *
But according to Gewirth, Descartes also holds the
fo .1 1 owing principles:
(PI) An idea is "all that which is in our mi nd when we
conceive a thing in whatever manner we conceive it"
(Gewirth, p. 256)
.
2
(P2* An idea is "all that which is immediately perceived
by the mind" (Gewirth, p. 255 ) „
^
(Pi) seems to entail that every idea satisfies (i ) t and (P2)
A
that every idea satisfies (iii) . a (ii) fares no better
,
accord-
ing to Gewirth. Continuing in his ostensibly critical role,
he suggests that we adopt as a straightforward interpretation
of (ii) the following:
(ii') the mind is able to recognise
„
5
But (ii 1 ) seems to follow analytically from ( p i : . Thus, every
idea, satisfies all three conditions and every idea is clea"
( Gewi rth
,
p . 256).
But is every idea likewise -distinct? Descartes says we
perc Lve di ;tir :tly when and only; fhen we perceiv< i< 1 lg but
2 c L te< ! fr i Oeuvi ; de D irtes ,
Pan • T a mery (Pci is Lee po Id Cei l L9J
references to the Adam and Tannery edition v?
by the abbreviation "AT"
,
followed by the vo
Charles Adam and
3),. I, 45. Further
ill be designated
Itune and page
itumi :
-
III, 352-393. Cited from Letter to Mersenne
.
e SO entailmento hold only
premises; that what is "in’
md that the i < 1 ' i
attending to that object.
the mind
an object
we accept the following
is "present to" the mind
on3.y if the mind is
JWhen we conceive a thi ng in a ce.rta.vn manner t 1 - recognise
Gwhat is clear. Patently the mind perceives nothing but what
it in fact perceives, and both (PI) and (P2.) seem to insure
that what the mind perceives when it perceives i.s nothing but
an idea. But as every idea is clear, it follows that the mind
perceives only where is clear and, therefore, only what .is
distinct ( Gewirth
,
p. 2b 7) .
Gew-i rt’h ! s goal . Gewirth has now discussed two criticisms
against Descartes. The first is the criticism ho attributes
to Gassendi ; the second is the criticism he develops in his
role as devil's advocate. Gassendi’s -criticism is directed
against Descarte s ’ criteri a for ascerta i n i ng c 1e r ne s s a r :
I
distinctness. On Gewirth' s interpretation
,
Gassendi is accus-
ing Descartes of providing a merely psychological criterion
for distinguishing clear and d.i stinct ideas from the obscure
and confused ones. Gewirth ' s criticism is more fundamental.
It questions whether the distinction Dev carte:- dr:, vs between,
clear and distinct ideas, on one hand , emd obscure and confuted
ideas
,
on the other, is a genuine one. Playing tr.e devil’s
advocate, Gewirth argues that it follows from straight for
reading of Descartes’ definitions of ’'clearness" and “ distinct-
ness" that all deas are c 1 e a i ' and d i 31 inc t .
ct 2. 10 is u - i vindicate Desca rtes
.
rrq do so, li'
> tasks: he must, show that the criticism lie
issend.i. c in be met and that the cri tici-sm he
it as a such and such,. If. I conceive of an object as a chair,
I recogni «e that obiect. as a chair.
7himself suggests is actually unjustified.
Complexities in the pe rceptive act. Gevirth w.i Li argue
that both Gassendi's and his own criticisms are unjustified
for fundamentally the same reason. They both fail to take
account of complexities in the idea and the perceptive act.
According to Gewirth, clearness and distinctness " are neither
intrinsic to the idea nor explicable in terms of a simple
relation between idea and perceptive act” (Gewirth, p. 258).
The same idea can be clear or obscure and distinct or confused
depending on how it is perceived. The perceiving situation
is a "viewing as" situation. What is distinctive about the
"viewing as" situation is that, the object of perception is
complex; it has both direct and interpretive contents * Gewirth
,
p. 258) .
Gewirth offers two illustrations of his point. Accord-
ing to Descartes,, sense perceptions are clear and distinct when
thev are viewed as sensations or thoughts or at sj jn.u.cy x. .k what
is helpful or harmful to the body, but the same cense percep-
tions are confused when they are vieyed as representing external
things existing outside the mind (Gewirth • p. 258,.
our ideas of thought and extension era clear arid dioirnct
er
obscure and confused depending on whet he r we view thou
gnu nuo
extension as nodes or as substances (Gewrrth, PP*
2. b.
Gewirth' s interpretation of Descartes is un attempt t:.
make sense of these examples. Although Descartes
himself: ’"ares
no explicit reference to the direct and the Anv.erp.et
a-, e
8'..•.ontonts of ideas
,
Gewi. rth maintains that’, we can make sense
of Descartes' examples only if we attribute to him the view
direct and interpretive contents (Gewirth, pp. 258, 264, 266,
and 271) . But what are the direct and interpretive contents
of our ideas?
The direct and interpretive contervts of ideas. Gewirth
does not give us a clear account of the direct and interpretive
contents of ideas, but I think we can construct an explication
of his view. Those acts of perception that can be character-
ized as clear and distinct or obscure and confused are complex.
They occur when one reflects on some content of his conscious-
ness — a sensation, a mental process, a concept, a thought.
The act of reflection involves an act of interpretation. The
interpreting relation, is dyadic, holding between an interpret-
ation and the thing interpreted. The interpretation given is
the interpretive content; what is interpreted is the direct
content
.
tike the direct content, the interpretive content is a
>ntent of consciousness. When one interprets some content
ike the d i. Tint, ot consciousness
:
:
1 i tl percept ; n
' !
fc o ee p five elem mts
9distinguished: the act of interpretation, the proposition p
produced as a result of this act," p's subject, p
' s subject
concept, and p's predicate concept. All five elements are
contents of consciousness. p's subject concept represents the
direct content but is not the direct content it represents.
The direct content is p’s subject; the interpretive content
p_"s predicate concept.
Keeping these distinctions in mind, we may now look at
the examples Gewirth gives to illustrate his distinction b. *
tween the direct and interpretive contents , He gives us i
examples: sense perceptions and the id as of thought and
extension
.
Gewirth 1 s example of sense perception . When I am in
pain and ref lect on my pain, the pain I am fee Ling become.-.
direct content. The interpretive conto at is the , rLrrp o .
1 put on the direct, content . Interpret at ions can vary depc.no *
ing on what the direct content is viewed as. If the direct
content: is viewed as a sensation, my idea of my rain is cJc.w
and distinct
,
but if I view the. fell, pain as in my foot or 1 :i.)
someth i vg e: rating in my foot, then my idea is con fused.
But what, is the idea that Gewirth thinks is clear and
distinct or obscure and confused? VJe need to distinguish thro
sense- s of * 1 - 1 T will re far to an i i a in fc 1 le fi • . s
as an idea
,
,
an .i ttea in the second ror: as an id©a 0 , avid
idea in the thj rd se;use as an idea..
.
s
An idea, is any con
o f cons c iuu.: no . . uch an terra. I dors,, areA pain T feel is
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ideas as we ord.i.nari ly understand iihem. They air© concepts
properly so called. When I reflect on my pain and judge that
pain is a sensation, the subject concept of my judgement
is an idea
. It represents my pain, an idea., but it is not
^ 1
the pain it represents. The third sense of 'idea* is the one
that takes account of Gewirth's view that ideas are complexes
containing direct and interpretive contents. When I am in
pain and judge that my pain is a sensation, I have before my
mind a complex content of consciousness — the pain I am feel-
ing and the judgement I form about my pain. As a content of
consciousness, this complex is itself an idea^, and it contains
ideas
?
the subject and predicate concepts of the judgement
formed. But it is also an idea-,, for it is a special type of
idea i : it contains direct and interpretive contents.
In a primary sense, it is ideas 3 that are clear and dis-
tinct or obscure and confused. But in a derivative sense, we
can also say that ideas
-j
and ideas., are characterized by clear-
ness and distinctness or obscurity and confusion. One’s idc.a2
— his concept — of his pain is clear and distinct just in
case his idea-, of his idea of his pain is clear and distinct
.
One's idea of his pain — his felt pain — is clear and dis-
tinct provided that his pain is the direct content of a clear
and distinct idea
^
of his pain . Ordinarily, Descartes does
not say he has a clear and distinct pain. Instead, he says
he. oerceives his pain clearly and distinctly.
One might raise the following objection to the uccou.it
11
1 am suggesting on Gewirth's behalf. Sometimes v/e make judge-
ments about things that are not or can never be present contents
of consciousness. I could make a judgement about a pain I
remember I once had. The subject of the proposition I form
would be that pain, but since the pain is not one I now feel,
it is not a content of consciousness and cannot be the direct
content of my idea^. We get around this difficulty if we
formulate our judgements carefully. What is before my mind
is a memory of a pain, and my idea is clear and distinct if I
judge that my remembrance represents a sensation. In this case
the direct content of my idea^ is not my pain but my recollec-
tion of my pain, and the interpretive content is not Sensation
but Representation Of A Sensation.
Gewirth* s examp le of the ideas of thought
Gewirth's example of the ideas of thought and extension creates
further difficulties for his distinction between the direct
and interpretive contents of ideas. Referring to a passage
in Descartes, he says. "The ideas of the modes thought and
extension ... 'can be clearly and distinctly understood if
they be viewed not as substances , or things separated from
other things, but only as modes o f things . (Gewirtb, pp
.
258 )) This isage >1 ir* ai i.i tant distinction. The
pronoun ‘'they" does not have a cie ir re tercnce . it cor io i<? foi
to the ideas of thought and extension, or it could rei:e:c to
though 1 t : ’ Lves We 3
protations
:
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(Interpretation I) We clearly and distinctly understand
our ideas of thought, and extension
only if we view these ideas as nodes
of substance.
(Interpretation II) We clearly and distinctly understand
our ideas of thought and extension only
if we view thought and extension as
modes of substance.
Gewirth does not help us to decide between Into rpvet at ions 1
and II, and I do not third' we need to decide between them..
They are compatible with each other and can be read in a way
that makes them consistent with the account X am developing
of Gewirth" s views. Drawing on the distinction I made above,
^
we can formulate two legitimate accounts in which the idea
of extension can be said to be clearly and distinctly under-
stood. On the first account one recognizes that what he is
considering is his idea.
?
of extension qua idea.,
,
and he inter-
prets his idea as a mode of spiritual substance. On the second
account one recognizes that what he is considering is his idea.,
of extension qua representation of extension. Being cautious,
he does not interpret extension as a mode o-f material substance.
Caution is required because what is interpreted for Gewirth
7
is .a direct content. And as I understand his view.
See. pp. 9-10 above.
7 See pp. 8-9 above
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tn.e direct content is always a content of consciousness. The
idea of extension is such a content, but extension itself is
not: rt is a mode of material substance.
Choosing; an interpret ive content. We can now return
to the main point of Gewirth's statement regarding the ideas
of thought, and extension. Gewirth said, "The ideas of the modes
O j- -nougat and extension
. . .
' can be clearly and distinctly
"understood if they be viewed not as— cubstances
,
or things sep-
arated from other things
,
but only as modes o£ things < , . ' .
"
if tne vague pronoun 'they refers to the ideas of thought an d.
extension qua. ideas..
,
then Gewirth's point is that we correct ly
interpret these ideas if we view them as modes of spiritual
substance, and we misinterpret them, if we view then not as modes
but as substances. If, on the other hand., ’they’ refers to
thought and extension, we can take Gewirth to mean that we
correctly interpret our ideas
o
of thought and extension when
we view these ideas as representing modes, and we misinterpret
these contents when we view them as representing substances.
Whether the direct content referred to by the pronoun 1 they ;
is tne idea of extension crua idea cr the idea of extension
1
qua id, .p. . interpretations put on the direct content can vary.
If 1 adopt one interpretive content, my idea is clear and
distinct; if I adopt another, it is obscure and confused.
Here we have an instance where it is an idea,, that is
d tc clear ind di.si But the cl e a rn< and
ness
1 this id< oi he 1 t i : -
ideas havine as their direct contents ideas 0 of thought and
extension
.
YlHXiliS: the direct content . Besides being able to give
different interpretations to a direct content
,
Gewirth thinks
we can provide different direct contents for the. same inter-
pretation. Discussing Descartes' example of the idolater who
undergoes conversion, Gewirth says that the direct content of
the idolater's idea of God changes while what the direct con-
tent is viewed as
,
namely God, remains the same. It seems to
me. that Gewirth has something like the following in mind. A
person A has an idea of a bearded old man who lives in the sky.
A judges that his idea represents God. Then A undergoes spi-
ritual enlightenment
. Now he judges that his idea of an in-
finite spiritual substance represents God. The predicate
concept the interpretive content — of A's new belief is
the same as the predicate concept of his old belief. The sub-
jects of his beliefs ~~ the direct contents -- have changed,
however. The clarity and distinctness of the idolater's idea
depends on the direct content to which the idolater applies
his interpretive content.
Gewirth 8 s definit ion s of 1 clarity 8 and 'distinctness' .
Whether we are interpreting a direct content ox supplying a
new direct content for an interpretation we already have, the
clarity and distinctness of our idea depends on whether some
* 3
special relation between the. direct and interpretive content
holds. Gewirth tells us that this special relation i. the
relation of identity (Gewirth, p. 310) . If the direct an
d
interpretive content of an idea are identical, then the idea
is clear and distinct. But Gewirth's view cannot be right.
The interpretive content is always a predicate concept, an
iaea in the second sense. Concepts are contents of conscious-
ness, but not all contents of consciousness are concepts. Yet
any content of consciousness can be a direct content. As an
earlier example showed, a pain can be a direct content of an
idea
,
but a pain is not a concept and can never be identical
"A
‘ ~
to the interpretive content, the predicate concept, that inter-
prets it.
For Gewirth, an object of consciousness becomes a direct
content when it is interpreted. 3.'t is interpreted when one
formulates a proposition p that predicates something of it.
Taken together, the interpreted content of consciousness and
the formulated proposition p constitutes an idea^ of that con-
tent of consciousness. The interpretive content of this idea.,
is p's predicate concept; the direct content £' s subject.
Since p's subject is not always a concept, Gewirth will have
problems if he tries to establish an identity between d's
subject and p's predicate concept.
Perhaps Gewirth is speaking loosely, however. Me could
have meant to establish an identity between the contents of
p * s predicate concept and the contents of p’
a concept representing the direct content
.
failed to state clearly what he intended to
language obscures an important distinction,
suppose that the entities referred to by the
sub.j e ct co
Gewirth may have
say because his
It is natural to
t erms 1 d ire ct
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content 1 and 'interpretive content' belong to the same ontolog-
ical order. But if I am interpreting Gewirth correctly, the
direct and interpretive contents can belong to different onto-
logical categories. The interpretive content is always a con-
cept, an idea^; the direct content is always a content of
consciousness which may or may not be a concept. The proper
counterpart to the interpretive content of an idea„ is not r he
3
direct content. It is, rather, the. subject concept of the
propositional
-component of the idea^. This subject concept
represents the direct content but is not the direct content
it represents.
To help us to avoid equating the interpretive content
of an idea., with the direct content, I adopt the following
convention; I will refer to the direct content of an idea
,
bv
the lower case letters "direct content" and to the subject and
predicate concepts of- the propositional component of an idea-,
by the capitalized terms 'Direct Content' and ' Interpretive
Content' respectively. Using this convention, we arrive at
the following clarification of Gewirth's definitions of
'clearness' and 'distinctness';
(Di) An idea X is clear = X's Secondary Content con-
3 — df ~
tains everything contained in X's Basic Content
(D2) An idea
^
X is distinct X's Secondary Content con-
tains only what is contained in X's Basic Content
(Dl) and (D2) introduce Gewirth's d i s tinct ion between Basic
17
and Secondary Contents. 9 In the intepretation I am giving
oi Gewi-itii s account, an idea^ is clear and distinct if and
only if the contents of the Direct and Interpretive Contents
are identical. This identity can be brought about by modify
-
ing the content of either the Direct or the Interpretive Content
The content modified is the Secondary Content; the content
remaining constant is the Basic Content.
xn the case of the idolater who undergoes conversion,
the Interpretive Content was basic. What changed was the con-
tent contained in the Direct Content. Originally the idolater
had an ide.a^ of a bearded old man who lives in the sky as the
direct content of his idea^ of God. At this stage the Direct
and the Interpretive Contents of the idolater’s idea^ were
very different, and the idolater's idea very obscure and con-
fused. But when the idolater changed the Direct Content of
his idea to the idea of an infinite spiritual substance, he
narrowed the gap between the contents of the Direct and Inter-
pretive Contents, and his idea became less obscure and confused
A problem with (Dl) ana J_D2_) . In Principle XLVI , Descartes
tells us that whatever is distinct must also be clear. (Dl)
and (D2) violate this principle. The Secondary Content of my
j dea m< iy coni tin onl} whal Ls coni aim Ln th Bas
but; not contain everything contained in the Bas ic Content
,
9
I capitalize ‘Basic Con - : *6e<
indicate that the Basic and Secondary Contents are concepts,
the subject and predicate concepts or tne pi ©positional com
ponent of an idea.
10MR I
3
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I see no way to get around this difficulty. To retain his
account of clearness and distinctness, Gewirth will simply have
to discount Descartes' remarks in Principle XLV1
.
Gewirth 1 s rep ly to his own criticism o
correct, Gewirth' s interpretation of clarity
effectively undermines his ostensible critic
f Descartes
. If
and distinctness
ism of Descartes.
This criticism was based on Gewirth'
s
arguments to show that
every idea is clearly perceived. Gewirth grants that every
idea would be clear and distinct if- conditions (i) - (iii) were
jointly sufficient, but they are not. On Gewirth' s interpret-
ation a fourth condition must be added;
(iv) the contents of x* s Basic and Secondary Contents are
identical
.
These contents need not be identical, however. Interpretations
of the direct content can vary, or the direct content assigned
an interpretation can be modified. Depending on the direct
content selected for interpretation and the interpretation sel-
ected from available alternatives, ideas 3 will or will not sat-
isfy (iv) . In his role as devil's advocate, Gewirth has argued
that, on Descartes' definitions of 'clearness' and ' distinct-
ness*
,
every idea is clear and distinct. By adding (iv), how-
ever, Gewirth shows that the criticism he has raised is one
Descartes can avoid (Gewirth, pp. 253- 260).
A problem with Gewirth 8 s account. Gewirth ' s reply to the
iticisn he gave Ln hi b' de l - Ivocat hin i on
account he gives of clearness and distinctness. But as hrs
aiscussion of Descartes' example, of pain reveals, (Dl) and (D2)
are problematic. Descartes holds that his idea of his pain
rs clear and distinct if he judges his pain to be a sensation.
On the analysis I have given in Gewirth's behalf, Descartes'
idea^ j.s clear and distinct only if the contents of the subject
cUiQ predicate concepts of his judgement are identical. But it
is plain that the contents of the concepts Pain and Sensation
are not identical. Pain is a species of sensation, and it has
features that do not belong to sensations generally. Presumably
an adequate idea representing pain would contain concepts repre -
senting those features that distinguish pain from other forms of
sensation. Sc- Pain and Sensation do not have identical contents
Gewirth could reply that Descartes 1 example of pain is
not a counterinstance to (Dl) and (D2)
.
(Dl) and (D2) give a
general account of clearness and distinctness. But when Des-
cartes says his idea of pain is clear and distinct, he does
not mean that his idea is perfectly clear and distinct. In-
stead, he means his idea is one that satisfies the minimal
requirement for clearness and distinctness. But what is this
minima1 requ i rernen t?
The minimal requirement . (Dl) and (D2) give us an ac-
count of clearness and distinctness as such. But Descartes
holds to a distinction between complete and. adequate knowledge.
Ideas can have infinite analyses which God can carry out but
which man as a result of his finitude cannot. Since one knows
a thing adequately only if he knows all its properties , God
20
alone can have adequate knowledge (Gewirth, pp. 264-2G5)
Having such knowledge
,
God can, for every idea He has, ascertain
•whether that idea is clear and distinct. To find out, I-Ie only
has to compare His analyses of the Basic and Secondary Contents.
Lacking the ability to perform such infinite analyses,
human beings must ascertain their ideas to be clear and distinct
in other ways . If I judge that my pain is ray pain, then my
idea^ of my pain is clear and distinct. To recognize it to
be so, I do not have to perform an analysis, either infinite
or finite. I recognize the Basic and Secondary Contents of
my idea, to be identical. Sven though I do not know what these
contents contain, I know that identical concepts have identical
contents so that the Secondary Content of my idea contains all
arid only what is contained in the Basic Content. Without per-
forming an analysis, I am able to recognize my idea or pain
to be clear and distinct.
Although I can always play it safe when I interpret ray
ideas, the ideas- that result from such safe interpretations
are uninteresting. If I judge that my idea of God is my idea
of God, I can be sure that my idea., of God is clear a id distinc
but such clear and distinct perception would scarcely satisfy
Descartes. He would want to know whether his idea of God as
an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent , and perfect be r- <
is clear: and distinct. Since mere inspection does not she
the Basic and Secondary Contents of this iuoa, of Goo to
identical, .Descartes will have to analyze these Contents to
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see whether the Secondary Content includes
is contained in the Basic Content. But in
suppose that an infinite analysis will be
such an analysis is needed, Descartes can
fcher has idea of God is clear and distinct
all and only what
this case we can
required, And if
never ascertain whe-
Ac chicling i_o Gewirth, however, Descartes believes we can
settle lor something less than perfect clarity and distinctness
In science we encounter knowledge that meets what Gewirth calls
the minimum requirement. Gewirth says:
In the context of science, where the concern is with the
essences of things, the connection between the two con-
tents must be necessary. The minimum requirement for
an idea to be clear, then, is that whichever content be
taken as basic, the other include what in the ueolies
is called the 'formal nature * (rat
i
object, and what in the Principle~i~~Ts caTled~the object's
'leading property, which constitutes its nature and
essence’ (Gewirth, p. 261).
Continuing, he says:
Similarly, the minimum requirement for an
distinct is that nothing contradictory to
of its object be included in it? it is in
that. Descartes defines a distinct idea as
'contains nothing other than what is clear
idea to be
the essence
this sense
one which
' (Gewirth.
P Z b i j
Although these two passages are somewhat vague,
following is a fair interpretation of Gewirth 1 s
mivi jmal clearness and distinctness: An idea of
I think the
account of
x wi 1 1 be
scientifically or minimally clear and distinct if and only if
the Secondary Content contains nothing contradictory to the
essence of %, and, for every essential feature of x, the
Secondary Content contains a concept representing that feature
11
phis interprel tion i s \ pori 1 ' y 1 < ; >le
i££2L®£®iHa and distinct percept ion beyond the min-
—— Ideas that are minimally or scientifically
clear and distinct can acquire greater clarity and distinctness.
The clarity and distinctness of ideas can be increased because
ideas possess explicit and implicit contents. When the ideas
involved are not fictitious, they contain " a system of implic-
ations” of which the mind is initially unaware (Gewdrth, pp.
265-266)
. But the mind can progressively uncover this system
o i. implications, and, by so doing, increase the clearness and
distinctness of its ideas.
Gewirth claims such increase would not be possible if
ideas did not have both direct and interpretive contents (Ge-
wirth, p. 266) , He does not defend his claim, however. Instead
he attempts to explain how the direct and the interpretive con-
tents function in the .process of increasing the clearness
and distinctness of our ideas. He says:
The ’ ide . ‘ ihich remains fixed and unchanged thr<
the process in which properties previously unknown are
discpvc • -i 'it* G tot merely the initial direct
tent
,
nee
the 1 n t e :pr< five cc >nteni . I at tl
gives. See p. 261. I think Gewirth ' s definition, could be put
more succinctly, however: An idea of x is minimally clear nod
distinct: provided that the following two conditions held:
(i ) for every essential feature of x, the Secondary Content
contains a concept representing that feature
,
and
(ii) n< c jpt cor Lned in i Secondary Content r<
sents a feature incompatible with an essential feature
of x.
Notice that the definition of minimal clearness and dis-
tinctness also violates west he scarten says in Principle XLVI
.
See pp . 17-18 above.
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with the direct content, is found to be necessarily con-
nected with the new properties, since these are found
w°
_ f necessarily connected with the initial content,
so that the mind interprets each succeFdTng”property
' tobe representative of the same object (Gewirth, p. 266).
xhis passage is problematic for two reasons: Gewirth seems to
be falling victim to the confusion of thinking it is the
Interpretive Content and the direct content that are identical
at the outset
,
and he seems to be making the follow
ing claims
:
(Cl) The initial direct content remains fixed and unchanged
throughout the process of amplification.
(C2) The initial direct content does not remain fixed and
unchanged throughout the process of amplification
(since it "undergoes obvious increase").
(C3) The interpretive content remains fixed and unchanged
throughout the process of amplification.
(C4) The interpretive, content does not remain fixed and
unchanged throughout the process of amplification.
Gewirth seems to be asserting (C4) when he says "that the mine,
interprets each succeeding property to be representative el
the same object." The interpretive content is, accordin'- to
Gewirth, the mind's interpretation of the direct content
.
h direct content i goes : n< f :
are iritt •, •• stc repr senting th >ame object , it apj
that the interpretive content hae been amplified to include
Emphas 1 s mine
.
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the additional properties. The cited passage seems to contain
two- inconsistencies
.
I erhaps v.e can give Gewirth ! s remarks a more plausible
leading. since Gewirth is trying to show us how we increase
the clearness and distinctness of ideas that meet the minimal
requirement:
,
we can assume that the following conditions
already obtain. There is an idea, of x that is minimally clear3 —
ana distinct. This idea^ has a direct; content and a proposi-
tional component containing a Direct and an Interpretive
Content. Although the direct content and the Interpretive
Content are not "equated" in the sense that they are identical,
they are equated in the sense that the conceptual contents of
the Direct and Interpretive Contents overlap in a crucial
area; both represent the essence of the direct content.
increase, the clarity and distinctness of: a minim-
id distinct idea, we begin the process with the
iterpre.tive Content used in making the idea minim-
id distinct. We can refer to these Direct and
Contents as the initial Direct and Interpretive
Contents
.
Gewirth thinks concepts can have. both explicit and impli-
cit contents . The explicit contents are the contents one init-
ially recognized to be contained in his .idea. This explicit
content may include what, we can call essential concepts
concepts representing essential features of the object of our
idea. The implicit contents of essential concepts are concepts
When we .
ally clear and
Direc t and 1 nte e.t
a lly c le a r an
Interpreti're
Gewirthrepresenting necessary features of that object,
mentions a person unschooled in geometry. This person may
have an idea of a triangle as a three-sided figure (Gewirth,
p. 265) . The concept Trilaterality is both the explicit con-
t:enr. and the essential concept of his idea. Analyzing his
essential concept, the beginning geometrician realizes that
Trilaterality entails the concept Triangularity. We can s,\/
that f. riangularity was implicitly contained in Trilateral.' ty
.
Having made an implicit content explicit, this person can add
to the explicit content of his idea of a triangle a concept
representing a necessary feature of triangles.
When the mind increases the clarity and distinctness of:
one of its ideas.,, it does so by analyzing essential concepts
contained in the initial Direct Content of its ideas The
contents of essential, concepts are themselves concepts repre-
senting necessary features of the direct content. Once reveal
these contents of essential concepts can be added to what was
previously recognized to be explicitly contained in the ini tin
Direct Content. What results is an amplified initial Direct
Content -• the subsequent Direct Content. Since the initial
Interpretive Content is a content of an idea we are assuming
to be minimally clear and distinct, this Interpretive Content
contain'! . ; th< esj >ntial - >ncepts contai l in the ; id : ; al
Direct Content. Amplified to include this new content, the
in it Lai Ii terpretive Content becomes th it
ive Content.
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Explicated in this way, Gewirth 1 s passage is not incon-
sistent in the ways suggested. When Gewirth claims paradoxi-
cally that the initial direct and Interpretive content does
and does not remain fixed, he is indicating in an enigmatic
way that there are five factors under consideration. There
is the direct content itself. Then there are the initial
Direct and Interpretive Contents and the subsequent Direct and
Interpretive Contents. In one sense the initial Direct and
Interpretive Contents do remain fixed and unchanged through-
out the. process of amplification. They are, after all, pre-
cisely the explicit contents with which we began. In another
sense, however, we can say that the initial Direct and .inter-
pretive Contents have undergone an increase, for the subsequent
Direct and Interpretive Contents are the initial Direct and
Interpretive Contents' increased to include concepts now recog-
nized to have been implicitly contained in an essential concept.
Since ideas representing necessary features of an object are
not inconsistent with essential features of that object and
since the concepts contained in essential concepts represent
necessary features, our idea remains minimal. ly clear anti dis
t.inct as its clarity and distinctness is increased.
A problem with Gewirth * s account of minimal clearness
and distinctness. Although I have labored to giro a lair
.
•
. ]
readin c of Gewirth' s account, his account remains problematic.
13 I disregard intensional problems in Gewirth' s formu.lat.ion
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He holds an idea of x to be minimally clear and distinct if
and only if the following conditions are satisfied: every
essential feature of x is represented by a concept contained
in the Secondary Content, and no concept contained in the
Secondary Content contradicts an essential feature of x (Gewirth
p. 261), This formulation guarantees that the Secondary Content
will contain concepts representing x '
5
essential properties,
but it does not guarantee that the Secondary Content will not
contain concepts expressed by predicates that are false of x.
There are an infinite array of predicates that are false of
x but consistent with the predicates denoting the esse.nee of
x. On Gewirth 1 s account of minimal clearness and distrnctiv: s
-
one can have a minimally clear and distinct idea of x even
though the contents of his idea incorrectly represent x.
Clearly Gewirth' s definition needs patching up.
A revised definition. Gewirth is talking about scient-
ific knowledge and the advancement of science when he sets
forth the minimum -'requirement and tells us how to incj ease l .,-
clarity and distinctness of minimally clear and distinct ideas
(Gewirth, p. 261). In science, he says, "the concern is with
the essences of things" (Gewirth, p. 261). Additionally,
Gewirth contends that only those ideas that are not i.j ctiunal
contain a system of implications that deduction can reveaj. „
As an example of such a nonfictions.! idea, he offers
of a triangle, which is for Descartes the idea of a
immutable nature having a determinate nature 01 essence
28
p. 265) . What mathematical demonstration is concerned to
reveal is this nature or essence (Gewirth, p. 265)
.
The con-
tingent properties that this or that triangle may happen to
possess are of no interest to the geometer. Since, for Des-
cartes, geometry and mathematics provide the model for all
disciplines properly classified as sciences, we would be in
keeping with Descartes' views if we amended Gewirth 's definition
of minimal or scientific clearness and distinctness so that
the Secondary Content contained no ideas representative of
contingent properties. Accordingly, we can say that an idea
of x is minimally clear and distinct just in case every concent
contained in the Secondary Content represents a necessary
feature of x and each essential feature of x is represented
14
by a concept contained in the Secondary Content.
II. AN EXPOSITION OF GEWIRTH' S ACCOUNT OF HOW WE
ASCERTAIN CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
Having provided his clarification of Descartes' notion
of clearness and distinctness, Gewirth moves on to discuss how
v/e ascertain whether our ideas are clear and distinct. The
main, ingredient in the process he uses is the method of dif fer-
ence
^"^.Alternative 1y we could say that the Secondary Content
contain > >thing >ressed by predicates that . falsely . descu
y. While avoiding the criticism directed against. Gewirth. s
explicit formulation, this alternativ< ould
Secondary Content to represent contingent properties. Gewirth
does not adopt this alternative, however. See Gewirth, pp.
29
method of difference Using the method of difference
we find out whether parts of ideas are necessarily or contin-
gently connected. Gewirth uses Descartes' example of the idea
of a winged horse to illustrate how the method of difference
works
- (Gewirth, pp. 269-270)
of being winged and being a
by the method of difference
,
• This idea contains the ideas
horse, ideas that can be shown
to be contingently connected.
1 can think of horses that are not winged and of winged things
that are not horses.
Gewirth' s discussion of Winged Horse suggests the
following account of the method of difference. A person A
ascertains by this method that an idea of x and an idea of y
are contingently connected if and only if A recognizes that
there is a possible world in which x exists apart from y or
y_ exists apart from x. And a person A ascertains by the method
of difference that an idea of x and an idea of y are necessar-
ily connected if and only if A recognizes that there is no
possible world in which x exists apart from v or y exists apart
from x.
It is not difficult to see how we use the method of
difference to find out whether ideas are contingently connected
A recognizes that there is a possible world in which x exists
apart from y if A conceives of such a world. It is, on the
other hand, not. so easy to see how we use the method of differ-
269-270 and Alan Gewirth, "The Cartesian Circle," The Iholo-
sophical Review, L (July. 1943) p. 371.
ence to
cannot
apart f
find out whether ideas
inspect every possible
ron v in each. If such
are necessarily connected,
world to see whether x exists
inspection were required, A
A
could not ascertain by the method of difference that his idea
of
-
is necessarily connected with his idea of y. But we can
suppose that Gewirth thinks A does not. have to inspect possible
worlds in order to recognize that there is no possible world
.L'.i which x exists apart from y„ He could construct an argu-
ment to this effect instead.
What the method of difference actually accomplishes
.
Gewirth thinks the method of difference is important because
it allows us to ascertain which of our ideas are fictional and
which are ideas of true and immutable natures, and, by the
same, process
,
which of our definitions are nominal and which
are. essential. Having- ascertained this much, we can easily
complete the. process of distinguishing the clear and distinct
from the. obscure and confused ideas. As Gewirth says-.
The question of how the clearness and distinctness of
ideas are to be ascertained is thus basically the same
as the question of how the mind, within the methodolog-
ical! context of ideas and perceptive acts, can ascertain
that its definitions of objects-, which it employs as a
basis for evaluating the clearness and distinctness of
the equating of direct and interpretive contents, are
real and not merely nominal or arbitrary (Gewirth, p.
267 ) .
This passage contains the following claim:
(C) The process by which we ascertain whether our ideas
are clear and distinct is "basically the same" as the
process by which we determine whether our definitions
are real" or essential.
Since the method of difference is the method Gewirth believes
Descartes uses to determine whether our definitions are real,.
(C) is equivelant to (O'):
( C, ) l he process by which we ascertain whether our ideas
are clear and distinct is "basically the same" as the
method of difference.
Althougn basically the same" as the method for ascertaining
clearness and distinctness, the method of difference is not
applicable to ideas ^ . As a part of the overall method for
ascertaining clearness and distinctness, however, the method
of difference can be applied to the Direct and Interpret!' e
Contents ideas 9 — of ideas o, and it can find out for us
whether these ideas
2 are fictional or whether they are ideas
of true and immutable natures.
Why the method of difference is useful. To ascertain
whether an ide
a ^
of x is clear and distinct, we need to be
able to find out whether every concept contained in the Second
ary content of our idea represents a necessary feature of x
and whether the Secondary Content contains, for every essentia
feature of x, a concept representing that feature. Although
the method of difference is a method for distinguishing fic-
tional ideas from ideas of true and immutable natures, Ge'wi
thinks the method of difference is the one we need, for the
ideas of true and immutable natures are in his view the ideas
that, rcoresent essences.
Speaking of ideas of true and immutable natures, he says:
If, then, the mind finds that it cannot deny the parts ofroe as of one another and still be true to the meaning whicheach part directly presented to it, such ideas are repre-
sentative of objects which are essentia] natures indepe0nt of the mind for their being what they are. The direct
contents of these ideas are seen as a result of this
method of difference' to represent the essence, or atleast part of the essence, of the objects which they areinterpreted as representing
... (Gewirth, p. 270).
Here Gewirth is telling us that all ideas of true and immutable
natures represent essences. But are ideas of true and immut-
able natures the only ideas that represent essences, or are
there some fictional ideas; that also represent essential
features?
Gewirth ’ s discussion of the wax example and of the idel-
ator * s idea of God suggest that he believes there are no fic-
tional essential concepts. Regarding the wax example, he says:
And only in virtue of such a reductive process [of elimin-
ating as contents of our ideas parts representing contin-
gent properties) is the resultant perceptive act clear
(as attaining the es ice of the object, in that th
content which is actually representative of the essence
of the object which it is interpreted as representing has
been made ’present and open to the attending mind’) and
distinct (as excluding everything ' other than* what is
essential) . The wax is thus ascertained to consist essen-
tially of extension and mobility, not of any peculiar
colours, sounds, and tastes; hence, at the conclusion of
the reductive process whereby the sense qualities are
removed, Descartes writes that the perception of the wax
’can be either imperfect and confused, as it was before,
or clear and distinct, as it is now, in so far as I at send
less or more t£) the things of which it consists' (Gewirth,
pp. 271-272}/
Hero Gewirth is saying that Descartes' original idea was obscure
15Emphasis mine
.
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cinci confused because it contained fictional ideas representing
wax as having contingent properties like yellowness and 'Hard-
ness. At the end of the reductive process, the idea that
emerges is still Descartes’ idea of wax, but it no longer con-
tains fictional parts. What remains is the idea of a true, and
immutable nature, an idea having as its contents the ideas of
mobility and extension. Jointly these ideas represent all and
only the essence of wax so that Descartes’ idea., when proper.).
y
$
reduced, is clear and distinct. It seems, then, that when
Descartes' idea,, contained fictional ideas, it was obscure and
confused. But when the method of difference was used to reduce
what was fictional to an idea of a. true and immutable nature,
Descartes' idea n of wax became clear and distinct.
The example of the idolater's idea of God is similar,
but here Gewirt.h is more explicit. He says:
Mot every idea which is interpreted to be representative
of God is clear and distinct. The idea will have these
qualities only if ’we do not put anything ficticious into
it, but note those things alone which ‘are really contained
in it, and which we evidently perceive to pertain to the
nature of the most perfect being' (Gewirth, p. 259).
Our idea of God is clear and distinct only if "we do not put
anything fictitious into it." And we safeguard against putting
fictitious content into our idea when we make sure that we
include in the t content ideas representing only "the nature
of the most perfect being." Hence, an idea of God is clear
and distinct only if its contents are not fictional.
Although the wax and God examples show that for Gewirth
O A
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oortk, icieas are clear ana distinct only if they contain no
fictional ideas, these examples do not show that Gewirt.h bel-
ieves all fictional ideas to represent contingent rather than
essential properties. On the other hand if Gewirth believes
there are fictional essential concepts, he neither states nor
suggests that this is so. Although Gewirth gives nv. irons
examples of ideas that are, or can be made, clear and Oislinc' -.
he never gives us an instance of a clear and distinct, idea
whose contents are fictional. Aside from the ideas of
and God, which remain obscure and confused so long as they
contain fictional contents, Gewirth 1 s examples of: clear and
distinct ideas are drawn exclusively from simple ideas and
from ideas of true and immutable natures.
By themselves, the wax and God examples support but do
not justify the conclusion that Gewirth believes the essential
concepts to be the ideas of the true and immutable natures.
On the other hand, I think it is safe to attribute this belie f
to Gewirth. For, if Gewirth does not equate the ideas of true
and immutable natures with ideas representing essential
natures, it is difficult to see why he thinks his method of
difference can help us to ascertain which of our ideas are
minimally clear and distinct.
The method Gewirth thinks Des< t ?ert
minimal clearness and distinctness. Having shown why Gewirth
thinks the method of difference helps us to ascertain which
of our concepts are essential, we can try to consLruct. a
description of the overall method Gewirth thinks Descartes
used to ascertain which of his ideas, are clear and distinct.
Gewirth says:
The reduction [of complex ideas to their simple
contents] attains this perceptual clearness and distinct-
ness because it enables the mind, within the methodolog-
ical context of ideas and perceptive acts, to 'distinguish
that which pertains to the true and immutable essence of
a thing, from that which is attributed to it only through
a fiction of the understanding.'
The contents of a fictitious idea, such as that of
a winged horse or of a triangle inscribed in a square, can
be clearly and distinctly conceived in separation from one
another, i. e. even if one part be explicitly denied of
the other, each can still be fully conceived without in
any way contradicting the signifigance which it presents
to the mind. An idea will be representative of a true
and immutable nature, then, if the connection of its
contents is necessary, not contingent, so that they cannot
be sundered by way of a 'real' distinction; 'although
one can think of the one without poying any ai tention to
the other, one cannot, however
,
deny it of that other when
one thinks of both.' 'Those ideas which do not contain
true and immutable natures, but only ficticious ones
compounded by the understanding can be divided by that
same understanding not only by abstraction, but by a
clear and distinct operation so that those which th
understanding cannot thus divide have undoubtedly not
been compounded by itself.' If, then, the mind finds the.
it cannot deny the parts of ideas of one another and v i i.l
be true to the meaning which each part directly presented
to it, such ideas are representative of objects which are
essential natures independent of the mind for being what
they arej . The direct contents of these ideas are seen,
as a result of this 'method of difference' , to represent
the essence, or at least part of the essence, of the
objects which they are interpreted as representing, so that
the direct and interpretive contents are equal to one
another ( Gewirth
,
pp. 269-270).
It seems to me that Gewirth has something like the following
in mind. A person acquires an idea., of x when he predicates
something of x. This person is saying in effect that some-
tiring he recognized as having certain properties is or repre-*
sents a such and such. The properties recognized to belong
to x constitute the direct content of his .idea, of x. This
:>
idecj.3 contains both a Direct Content representing x and an
interpretation of x. The idea, of x will be clear and distinct
.if. and only if the given interpretation fits the thing inter-
preted in the appropriate way. An interpretation that fits
represents all the essential features and only necessary fea-
tures of the thing interpreted. One gets the interpretation
to fit in one of two ways: he can modify his interpretation
or he can change what it is that he is interpreting.
To make the appropriate adjustments
,
one must carry out
a reduction on either the Direct or the Interpretive Content.
The content reduced is the Secondary Content. It is reduced
in the sense that it is altered in a way that makes it
representative of a true and immutable nature. To get the
Secondary Content properly reduced, we use the method of dif-
ference. We take the properties represented by the explicit
concepts contained in the Secondary Content, and we see whether
we can conceive of the object of the Basic Content as existing
without these properties. Properties that can be conceived
as exi£ ting ap 1 fc :r< m :h<= ob je< t of the B isi - Coi enl ; 1 =
contingent properties of that object; properties that cannot
be so conceived are necessary features of that object and
are represented by the essential concepts or concepts these
entail. Having identified those concepts that represent
necessary features, we can pare down the Secondary Content
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it contains just those concepts.
We have a difficulty, however. Although we have ascer-
tained that the Secondary Content of our idea_ of x contains3 —
only concepts representing necessary features, we have not
ascertained whether every essential feature of x is represented
by a concept the Secondary Content contains. Suppose I have
an idea^ of x that includes explicitly in its Secondary Content.
concepts representing features F
,
f and F. of x. Usinc the
~"1
~2. ~*J — J
method of difference, I find out that F and F are among x’s
necessary features but that F
^
is contingent. In finding out
this much, I have not ascertained whether F and f 9 are essen-
tial features of x, and 3. have not found out whether every
essential feature of x is represented by a concept contained
in my Secondary Content.
Gewirth seems to- assume that every essential property
of x is represented by a concept contained explicitly Lr the
Secondary Content. This assumption reveals itself in Gewirth-' s
language. He refers to the process by which the Secondary
Content is adjusted as a process of reduction . Evidently la
thinks the Secondary Content contains explicitly all the
essential concepts and may contain in addition concept-- repre-
senting contingent properties. For this reason, he thinks we
make our ideas clear and distinct when we reduce the Secondary
Content so that concepts representing contingent prep-
are eliminated. But can Gewirth assume that the Secondary
concepts
?
Content contains all th c - c s s an t i a 1 Plainly he cannot.
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II the Secondary Content of an idea,., of x always contains, for
every essential feature of x, a concept representing that
tea-cure, then, on the revised definition of minimal clearness
and distinctness, every .idea^ is clear. But this is a conclu-
sion Gewirth is anxious to avoid.
Although Gewirth does not address the difficulty I am
j.. arsing, we can suggest a direction he might pursue. He could
try to argue that it is the Basic rather than the Secondary
Content that contains in its explicit contents all the
essential concepts. I do not know how Gewirth would go about.
supporting such a claim, but if he could support it, he can
ascertain clearness and distinctness in the following way.
After having reduced the Secondary Content of his idea of y
3
until it contains only concepts representing necessary features
of x, he could carry out a similar reduction with respect to
the Basic Content of his idea. Once this reduction is comple-
ted, he will have remaining as the explicit contents of the
Basic Content only concepts representing necessary features
of x. Among these will be all the essential concepts. Although
Gewirth will not know which ones these are, he can find out.
The reduced explicit contents consist of some concepts that
1 5
are not entailed by any others that they do not entail.
Having identified these, Gewirth can now compare the explicit
contents of the reduced Basic and Secondary Contents. If the
tha
Using this formulation, we "Leave open the possibility
mutually entailed concepts represent essential features.
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Secondary Content does not have
contained in the Basic Content,
contains them all, it is clear.
all the essential concepts
it is obscure. But if it
By applying the method of difference to the Secondary
Content, we can find out whether our idea is distinct or con-
fused, and by applying the same method to both the Basic and
Secondary Content, we can find out whether our idea is clear
or obscure.
Gewirth * s account of the principal ideas
. Gewirth thinks
Descartes used his method of difference in the Meditations to
arrive at clear and distinct ideas of God, the mind, and matter
(Gewirth, p. 273) . It is these ideas Gewirth thinks Descartes
was referring to when he told Gassendi he had enumerated all
the principal ideas and distinguished the clear and distinct
from the obscure and confused ones (Gewirth, p. 273) , Once
the method of difference reveals the essential concepts con-
tained in the principal ideas, we have standards of comparison
that allow us to determine whether alternative definitions are
real or nominal ( Gewirth
r pp. 272-273) . In this way we can
within the context of ideas and the perceptive act ascertain
which of our ideas are clear and distinct.
A psychological component in Descartes f criteri on for
as certaining minimal clearness and distinctness . There is a
psychological or subjective aspect to Descartes ’ method of
difference
,
however. In the case of fictional ideas, the
mind has the ability to conceive of the parts of the idea as
40
lepresent.j.ng things that could really exist separately. But
the mind lacks this ability when it attempts conceptually to
disjoin the parts of an idea of a true and immutable nature.
Whenever tne mind uses the method of difference to achieve such
a disjunction, the logic of the idea constrains the mind to
acknowledge that the parts it seeks to disjoin are inseparable.
The method of difference is self-defeating in these cases.
Every attempt to disjoin the parts of such an idea helps to
convince uhe mind that these parts are necessarily connected.
As Gewirth says:
xhe factor determining which ideas are representative of
the essences oi various objects, and hence clear and dis-
tinct, consists in that which the ideas themselves cornuel
the mind to perceive after it has reduced them to their
elements and tried to separate and combine them in various
ways. There is, indeed, a psychological aspect of the
method, also, as is shown, for example, in Descartes'
description of intuition as 'a pure and attentive mind's
conception, so facile and distinct that there remains no
doubt concerning that, which we understand.' But this
facility and indubitableness are regarded by him as effects
ratner chan as causes of clearness and distinctness in
the logical and perceptual senses, as culminating the pro-
cess whereby the mind recognizes the contents of ideas to
be of such sort that it is unable to perceive them in any
way other than the connection before it (Gewirth, p. 2 76)
.
Although the mind ascertains whether an idea is clear and dis-
tinct or obscure and confused by determining whether the parts
of the idea can be disjoined by the mind, the ability or inabil
ity of the mind to separate the parts depends upon how the part
are connected in fact. The mind's subjective or psychological
state subsequent to its application of the. method of differ-
ence depends at least in part on the logical features of the
41
idea under consideration. In short, Descartes' method for
ascertaining which of our ideas are clear and distinct is not
j.or Gewrrth "divorced from all logical considerations" (Gev
irth, p. 253)
.
III. CRITICISM
goals* Wo now turn to a critical examination
of Gewirth’s article. Gewirth has three fundamental goals —
'"O Gxtide his own criticism of Descartes, to answer Gassendi 5
criticism on Descartes’ behalf, ' and to show how it is poss-
ible that obscure and confused ideas can be made clear and
distinct. In Gewirth' s view, we can realize these three goals
only if we subscribe to the thesis that ideas have direct and
interpretive contents. But as I want to show
,
the distinction
between direct and interpretive contents cannot accompli ish
as much as Gewirth supposes. Other distinctions need to be
introduced. Gewirth did not get clear regarding these other
distinctions, however, and as a result his interpretation
fails to achieve -che goals set for it.
Let us recall Gassendi's criticism. Gassendi objected
that Descartes had not provided a method for identifying which
•
’i
°
of our ideas are clear and distinct. As we noted earlier,
Descartes' reply was too cryptic to be convincing. Recognizing
J y See pp. 4-6 above.
"I Q
.L o .
See pp. 3~ 4 above.
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See p. 4 above.
A?
tho need j.or an elaboration of
attempted on Descartes' behalf
Descartes' reply, Gewirth
to show that Descartes had
provided the requisite method.
Gewirth’^ de fense of his distincti on between direct and
—ter^rel^ye contents. A major contention in Gewirth' s elab-
oration of Descartes' reply to Gassendi is the claim that
we must attribute to Descartes the distinction between direct
ana interpretive contents. In defense of this view, Gewirth
seems to offer two lines of justification:
(Jl) Descartes reply to Gassendi will succeed only if
Descartes recognizes a distinction between direct
and interpretive contents.
(J2) J. here is adequate textual evidence to support the
claim that Descartes did draw a distinction between
direct and interpretive contents."'’
1 do not intend to quarrel with (J2)
.
The evidence that sup-
ports it does show that Descartes believes we have ideas on
which we put interpretations. On the other hand, I do want
to show that Gewirth has not given us satisfactory grounds for
(Jl) .
(Jl) implies that Descartes' reply to Gassendi will fail
unless we attribute to Descartes a distinction between direct
and interpretive contents. Gassendi claimed Descartes had no
way to decide between conflicting claims of clear and distinct
perception . 1 1 es repli th had j
20 Se< the di ion of how the same .idea can be clear
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method for distinguishing clear and distinct from obscure and
confused ideas. Gewirth agrees that Descartes provided such
a method, but he thinks that the method functions adequately
only if Descartes makes use of a distinction between direct
and interpretive contents. But is Gewirth right?
Evidence to show that we do not need the distinction
between dire ct arid interpret ive contents in order to use the
method of difference effectively . The method of difference
functions primarily to distinguish essential from nominal
definitions on the one hand and ideas of true and immutable
. .
o 1
natures from fictional ideas on the other. The latter ideas
have contingently connected parts and are therefore not repre-
22
sentative of the essences of things. Ideas of true and
immutable natures, on the other hand, have necessarily con-
,
0 3
nected contents and arc representative of essential natures,' -
Gewirth cites the idea of a winged horse and a triangle
inscribed in a square as examples of fictional ideas. '" q
can ascertain that these ideas are. fictional simply because
we can really distinguish their parts . We can think of wings
existing apart from horses and vice versa, and we can think
of triangles that are not inscribed and of inscribed figures
and distinct or obscure and confused depending on what it is
" v iewed as”, pp . 7-8 above
.
21„See p. 30 above
.
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See p. above
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that are not triangles. Signifigantly
, in these examples the .
disjoined parts are not the direct and the inter
tents. They are rather the explicit contents of the idea'"
In his discussion of how we extend clearness and distinct
ness beyond the minimum requirement, Gewirth says: »This
variation in degree [of clearness and distinctness] reveals
another distinction, in addition to that between direct and
interpretive contents, required to give clearness and distinct-
ness a normative basis. This other distinction is between,
the explicit and implicit contents of an idea” (Gewirth, p.
/u4)
• >int out that from a si ctly j choice
ici1 vantage point an idea is precisely and exhaustive]'/
that content of which the mind is at any time aware
(Gewirth, p. 2f5)
. This content is the explicit content., nut
an idea may contain an .implicit content of which the mind .v,
not presently cognizant. Gewirth cites Descartes' example, of
a person who is unlearned in geometry. This person thinks of
a triangle as a three sided figure and does not realize that
his idea contains implicitly contents that geometrical
demonstration can reveal (Gewirth, p. 265)
'
'
: lied th ; thod of d i f s to det i rr ine
whether the ideas of a winged horse and a triangle inscribed
iii a sQUaic were r ictiona.j.
,
we simply took the contents in
present awareness — 'being winged*
,
'being a horse', 'being
45
a triangle'
,
and 'being inscribed in a square' -- and deter-
mined whether we can think of the properties represented by
these ideas as existing in separation from each other. The
contents involved in this operation were the explicit contents,
and an accurd.e description of how we determined that the ideas
in question were fictional would make no reference to direct
cr interpretive contents.
Can the same point be made with respect to ideas of
true and immutable natures? It would seem so. Consider again
the idea of a triangle. If the person unschooled in geometry
has the idea of a triangle as a three sided figure, his idea
represents a true and immutable nature because the method of
difference shows us that we cannot conceive of a triangle that
is not uhree si dec. or of a three sided figure that is not a
triangle (Gewirth, p. 2 70) . In this .instance the contents
shown to be inseparable by the method of difference are once
again the explicit contents 'being a triangle' and ’being
a three sided figure, ' and references to direct and interpret-
ive contents seem eliminable
.
Since we do not need to refer to direct and interpretive
contents to describe adequately how we ascertain which of our
ideas are fictional and which represent true and immutable
natures, we may be able to devise an account of how we ascer-
tain clearness and distinctness that does not require the
distinction between direct and interpretive contents.
A rival account. Against Gewirth 's account, we can now
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offer a rival interpretation (RI)
. According to the RI, one's
idea is clear and distinct just in case it is an idea of a true
and immutable nature. One can ascertain whether his idea
represents a true and immutable nature or essence by using the
method c£ difference. But one can effectively use this method
witnout. relying on the distinction between direct and inter-
pretive contents. Consequently, Gewirth's distinction seems
unneccesary
„
My point in putting forth the RI is not: to show that the
RI is the correct interpretation. It is, rather, to show that
the RI is an least as good, and perhaps better, than Gew : rtb ' s
interpretation so that (Jl) is false.
Gewirth thinks the wax example supports his account.
Defending his interpretation of Descartes, Gewirth argues that
Descartes 1 example of the wax requires a distinction between
direct and interpretive contents. On Gewirth's interpret ation
of the example, various sensed qualities are represented :v:
wax. Ks a result there is both a direct and an interpretive
content. Descartes applies the method of difference to these
contents to show that the wax can exist apart from all the
secondary qualities taken to be contents of the wax. Gewirth
say s
:
This "identity" of the wax throughout the changing of the 0 ,direct content, which is greatly emphasized by Descartes,*"
o r
^Gewirth misplaces a modifier here, and his statement
is misleading as a result. What Descartes emphasizes is the
identity of the wax despite the changes it undergoes. Des carte
never alludes to the direct content of. his idea.
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can be understood onljf through the interpretive aspect
2£^ doctrine of [72F—Tt"H EeSSskW i sd 'perception is help cc ant that the reductive process canbe viewed in the methodological context, as going from
accidental to essential attributes of the same object
ana not from one set of .ideas to another wholly unrelatedthereto. Tne process consists, then, in gradually divest-ing the direct content interpreted as representing a cer-tain object of the forms external' to that object, i, e
.of those qualities with whose denial the object can stillbe conceived, so that there is no necessary connectionbetween the object and those qualities. The end of theprocess comes when a direct content is attained which
survives every reductive device, remaining so long as the
object can be conceived, and without which the object can.
no longer be conceived. This direct content is hence
necessarily connected with the interpretive content wherebv
the mind L-hinks 01 the object in question, and constitutes
the essential definition of that object (Gewirth, p. 271)
dow the wax example is explained on the (RI). Gewirth
is mistaken here. Although we do need some distinction
internal to ideas and the perceptive act if we are to explain
how the wax can be conceived to be self- identical throughout
the reductive process, the distinction we need does not have
to be the distinction between direct and interpretive contents.
Gewirth has already given us two additional distinctions. In
his discussion of how we extend the clearness and distinctness
of our ideas beyond the minimal requirement, Gewirth made use
of the distinction between explicit and implicit contents and
presupposed the distinction between initial and subsequent
contents (Gewirth, pp. 264-266)
.
If we used these distinctions instead of the distinction
between direct and interpretive contents, we could ascertain
'Emphasis mine
.
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the clearness and distinctness of our idea of wax in the
following way. We could say that our i •. s of yellowness, hard-
ness, fragrance, etc. constitute the initial content of our
idea. This content might represent the essence of wax or it
might not. We must use the method of difference to find out.
Taking each part of cur idea in turn, we see whether we
can conceive or the wax existing apart from the property
represented by the constituent idea. If the represented pro
party and the wax can exist apart, we know that the property
in question is not part of the essence of wax, and we exclude
the idea representing that property from the subsequent content,
Tj.lis process continues until we are left with a subsequent
content that represents properties inseparable from wax. As
a result, our subsequent idea represents the essence of wax
and is clear and distinct, and we achieved this result with-
out reference to direct or interpretive contents,
A reply to the _(RX)_ account of the wax example « By way
of reply, Gewirth might ask how we know it is still wax of which
we are thinking when we divest the initial content of some of
its parts. He might urge that we could not know that we are
still thinking of wax throughout the reductive process unless
we had another idea of wax the interpretive content —
which, remains constant and acts as the standard against which
we measure and adjust our initial idea — the direct content.
Let us examine carefully the reply we have imagined
Gewirth to offer. Initially at t my idea of wax contains
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constituent ideas x
, * T .
-1 n-1 * Let U3 saY that at t„ I arrive
at a subsequent content x v -
•
-1" • •
'2n-l< an<3 x allege that this
subsequent content better represents the essence of wax because
an idea representing a contingent property previously believed
to be part of the essence has been removed. I make this claim
because I can eliminate x and cHn ^\ ci stl11 conceive of the thing
represented bv x ^ .
“
—
i
r
n-i as existing or, as Descartes would
say; as a complete thing
.
Gi anting that
,x
n_ 3_
represents a complete thing,
Gevj.r th could counter that if I did not know at the outset what
wax was, I could not know that the complete thing represented by
~l'""?-n-l is wax ‘ Suppose, for example, that x represents
t]jG pr°perty of raobilitY . an essential property of wax. when I
remove from my original idea, the resulting idea x^, c „., x
coulct Still represent a complete thing, but the thing repre-
sented would nor be wax. When we exchange one content repre-
sen ring a complete thing for another representing a complete
citing
,
we have no way of knowing that the complete things repre-
sented by these two contents are identical. To know this, we
a.ole to ascertain that the difference between the two
contents resulted only from a change of parts representing con-
tingent properties. But we cannot know that only contingent
features are involved unless we know the essence of the object
represented. In going from x
, ...,x to x,
,
Ii
ri ~n~l
mn.-t a vJ.e to determine that x does or does not represent
part of the essence. In short I need an .interpretive content.
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raises new problems for Gewirth
' s
If taken seriously
,
this reply may perhaps be as
damaging to Gewlrth : s interpretation as to the HI. Just how
is the fixed interpretive content in the wax example supposed
to function as the needed standard of comparison? Gewirth is
vague on this point, lie assures us that we need a fixed
interpretive content, but he does not tell us what this content
must contain.
1 k seems
-° me that we can make sense of what Gewirth is
saying only if we suppose that the interpretive content
contains the essence and that the contained essence is somehow
revealed to the mind
p rope rt ie s revea 1 e. d
discover whether x
—
n
property of
part of the
erty
.
2 7
wax. If
essence;
Then by consulting the list of essenti
to me by the interpretive content, I can
represents an essential or a contingent
x
n
' appears on the list, x represents
if not, it represents a contingent prop-
i
but nos? do we come by the analysis of the interpretive
content? There appear to be two possibilities. Either the
essential definition is just there in the interpretive content
and available when we reflect on it or the essential definition
is ascertained by some process. If the first disjunct were
correct, the interpretive contents of our ideas would be pre-
sent and open to the mind. To ascertain essential definitions,
27 I assume, of course, that x is not an impossible idea
like that of being a round square.
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the mind would only have to attend to the interpretive content
of its ideexs
.
On this view, we would not need the method of difference
m order to ascertain essential definitions, and Gewirth's and
Descartes’ emphasis on the role of the method of difference
ln acquiri:ng essential definitions would be pointless. Also,
if direct introspection of an interpretive content suffices
to reveal its essential definition, then Gassendi was just!
fied when he criticized Descartes for failing to provide an
erfeenve procedure for deciding between two philosophers who
disagree regarding an essential definition.
the only way around Gassendi’s criticism is to fall back
on the second possibility and to contend that we ascertain
essential definitions contained in the interpretive content
b Y applying some method to this content. If Gewirth adopts
this alternative, nc would have to specify what method he has
in mind. It is either the method of difference itself or some
other method. If it is some ether method, he is obliged to
tel.J us what the method is. If it is the method of difference,
he is trapped in a circle. By hypothesis, we cannot reveal
the essential definition contained in the interpretive content
unless we use the method of difference. But in using the
method of difference, we must, Gewirth tells us, have a fixed
* • 9 Qinterpretive content. This fixed content, I have argued,"' 0
must represent the essence and must in some way reveal this
o o
"
° See p „ 50 above
.
essence to us. Consequently, the method of difference cannot
reveal to us the essential definition contained in the inter-
pretive content unless we already know the definition we are
setting out to reveal.
Let me recapitulate. Against Gewirth 's interpretation,
1 have offered a rival interpretation (RI)
,
29
which did not
require the distinction between direct and interpretive con-
tents to give an account of clearness and distinctness.
According to the RI
,
an idea is clear and distinct if and only
if it is an idea of a true and immutable nature, and one can
determine whether an idea is clear and distinct by using the
metnod of difference to show that the explicit contents of the
rdea are necessarily connected. I noted that Gewirth could
counter that one cannot show that the contents of an idea are
necessarily connected unless there is a fixed interpretive
coimenu, i replied that such a fixed interpretive content
would have to contain and reveal the essential definition of
the thing in question, I then pointed out that there were
o:oj.y three possible ways to ascertain this essential definitior
Jxifcot introspection
,
the method of difference
,
or some other
method. The first approach left Descartes open to Gassendi's
criticism, the second led Gewirth in a circle, and the third
required Gewirth to show that there is a method besides the
method of difference for determining essential definitions.
2 9 See pp . 45-46 abovo
,
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Nothing in Descartes or in Gewirth's interpretation of him
uggests
, however
, that there is such a second method, and I
conclude that Gewirth's interpretation fares no better than
the El in explaining how the wax could remain self-identical
throughout the reductive process.
The failure of Gewirth’s defense of mj_. Gewirth is
faced with a dilemma here. In assessing various interpret-
ations of clearness and distinctness in Descartes, he could
be stringent and demand that a satisfactory interpretation
explain how wax remains self-identical throughout the reductive
process, or he could be lenient and not demand that interpret-
ations explain so much. If he adopts the former stance, he
wilr be forced to reject his own interpretation along with the
al
,
o.nd lie will have failed to do fend Descartes against Gas-
sendi's criticism. If, on the other hand, he adopts the latter
alternative, he removes his objection against the Rl/ 1 ' and
his defense of (Jl) collapses. Without introducing the dis-
tinction between direct and interpretive contents, the Rl
t it
seems, can account for as much as one can hope to explain
about clearness and distinctness in Descartes.
^
a
y to de cide bet':
’
e’en the ( RI
)
and Gewirth's account,
Gewirth need not accept these conclusions, however. While
admitting that his interpretation explains no better than the
Ri how wax remains self-identical throughout the reductive
30See pp. 48-49 above
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process, Gewirth could insist that his interpretation
better one. We have not
pies that Gewirth used to
as yet tested the RI against
frame his own theory in the
is the
the exam-
f i r s t
place. If Gewirth' s interpretation were,
alternative were not, able to account for
but the suggested
these, examples,
Gewirth would have good Grounds
retation over against the RI
„
lor retaining his own interp-
ITimlb Gewirth 1 s account fail s for
reader will recall that Gewirth cited
i.ng ideas of sensation, the other the
extension. In each case the idea was
simple ideas
. The
two examples, one regard-
ideas of thought and
clear and distincu or
oos cure and confused depending on the interpretation selected
According to Descartes, ideas of sensation and the idea:
of thought and extension are simple ideas, 0 *" and turns out
that simple ideas are problematic for Gewirth' s interprets ion
Spe aking o f s imp 1e s
,
Gewirth says:
Unlike composite ideas, in which it is possible to discrim-
inate from one another not only direct and interpretive
contents, but also various parts of the direct content,
the necessity of whose connection with one another in the
idea is not self-evident, the simple, natures cannot be
misinterpreted, for it is impossible to discriminate in
them a direct and an interpretive content. To think of
these simples at all is to think of them completely, and
hence clearly; similarly, their very simplicity makes it
difficult for the mind to confuse them with, i.ei interpret
them as, anything 'other' than themselves, so that thev
are perceived distinctly as well (Gewirth, pp. 268-269).
In this passage, Gewirth makes a number of dubious claims:
O T
Rules, pp . 41-42, and Princ
.
,
XI,VI 1 1 , p. 238.
(1) lho simple natures have no discriminate direct and
interpretive content.
(2) The simple natures cannot be misinterpreted.
(3) Whenever one thinks of a simple nature, the simple
idea representing that nature
.is clear.
(4) All simple ideas are distinct.
Each of these claims is false. Gewirth's own examples to
show that ideas must have direct and interpretive- contents
are counterexamples to (2). But in the quoted passage, (1)
entails (2) so that (1) .is false as well. If I have not mis-
understood what I take to be the very core of Gewirth's arti-
cle, Gewirth holds to all the following. Not only can sen-
sations be interpreted but they can have any number of inter-
pretations. furthermore, they can be misinterpreted and often
ule ' Misinterpretations can occur because one is free to seLec
cuiy interpretation whatever, and the chosen interpretation
need not contain all and only what is contained in the direct
content or all and only the essence. ^
~
Take pain as an example. When I represent pain as a
sensation, my idea of pain is clear and distinct. But my idea
need not be. clear and distinct. "If I represent pain as having
an external cause like itself, my idea becomes obscure and
3 3
confused. Like (1) and (2), (3) and (4) are false.
32See pp. 7-8 above.
-^See pp . 9-11 above.
Gewirth himself recognized the falsity of (3) and (4)
v/hen in a footnote he admits that one can have both an obscure
and confused perception of pain. He says, "When the direct
content is the basis of evaluation (as in Descartes’ example
of the clear but confused perception of pain in Princ,, I, 46),
ideas are usually clear
,
but their distinctness may coine into
34question" (Gewirth, p. 260).
Why Gewirth asserts JJL)_ - (4) . Since Gewirth' s assertion
of (1) - (4) seems to run counter to fundamental tenets he is
seeking to establish, why does he assert (1) -- (4)? The answer
seems to be this. If he does not treat simple ideas as
special cases, he thinks his analysis fails. For Gewirth,
clearness and distinctness consist in a relationship between
direct and interpretive contents and are ascertained by a method
that determies whether part s of an idea are necessarily or
contingently connected. But apparently he regards the simple
ideas as unanalysable . Because in his view they have no parts,
the method of difference is, strictly speaking, inapplicable
to them. If this method is the only method available for
ascertaining whether our ideas are clear and distinct, we could
not determine which of our simple ideas are the clear and
distinct ones. However, if (1) were true, Gewirth ' s problems
would apparently be resolved. Gewirth could argue that (1)
entails that the direct and interpretive contents of simple
34„ ,
Emphas i s mme.
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ideas are identical, so that all simple ideas are clear and
distinct
.
As we already noted earlier, however, (1) entails (2)
Additionally, the conjunction of (1) with Gewirth's definition
of clearness and distinctness entails (3) and. (4) . But as I
have shown, (
2
i , \3)
,
and (4) contradict explicit claims Gewirth
makes elsewhere in his article.
Gewirth's difficulties here derive from his insistence
on a direct and an interpretive content. He insists on this
distinction because he thinks that without it Descartes cannot
defeat Gassendi's criticism. But the claim that all ideas
have distinct direct and interpretive contents entails the
view that all ideas are complex. The only way around this
result is to allow that some ideas the simple ones •--- have
indistinguishable direct and interpretive contents. But this
is to assert (1) , and (2) - (4) follow.
That the (RI) also fails to account for simple
To highlight the difficulties with Gewirth's interpretation,
we have examined a rival interpretation, the RI . According
to this interpretation, we gain nothing by introducing the
distinction between direct and interpretive contents into
our analysis of how we ascertain which of our ideas are clear
and distinct. The method of difference by itself does as
much as Gewirth's more elaborate procedure to distinguish the
clear and distinct from the obscure and contused complex ideas.
The question is, Can the method of difference succeed vuere
5 8
Cewirth's method fails? r-m n
' can xt effectively determine which
of our simple ideas are clear and distinct?
Admittedly it cannot. However, once we are no loncer
constrained to seek for clearness and distinctness in a relation
between the direct and the interpretive contents of simp ie
and unanlyzable ideas, wo are in a better position to provide
a method tor ascertaining which of our simple ideas are clear
and distinct.
WLY.. .accoiint. fails for simple ideas, it is
! est to 1 " 1 tng back to . < i fun
. i all u
One of Descartes
'
primary objectives is to give us a method
Tor avoiding errors of judgement. Before prescribing a method
for avoiding error, however, one should understand how errors
arise. While Cewirth is correct when he points out that for
Descartes all ideas represent something, it is not true that
all errors result from misrepresentation. There are in fact
two sourcGo Oj. ei roi for Descartes -- misrepresentation and
incorrect or insufficient analysis. Gewirth's interpretation
runs afoul of simple ideas because he fails to recognize this
distinction
.
Ideas are the constituents of judgements. When the
ideas used to form a judgement are incorrectly or insufficient!
v
analyzed
,
a judgement containing them might well be false.
But even if it were true that only complex ideas are suscept-
ible to incorrect or insufficient analyses J5 so that all
35 In my view a simple idea can in a sense be incorrectly
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simple ideas are what I call 'analytically clear and distinct’,
it would not follow that all these ideas are clear and distinct
per se. Take my idea of pain. Even if this simple idea is
analytically clear and distinct, it is what I call represent-
ationaliy confused’ if, say, I represent its cause as external
my mind. ro oe clear and distinct, an idea must be both
analytically and representationally clear and distinct.
What Gewirth has given us* is a definition of represent-
ationai clearness and distinctness and a method for ascertain-
ing analytical clearness and distinctness. We also need, how-
ever,. a definition of 'analytical clearness and distinctness'
ana a method for ascertaining representational clearness and
dxstinctness
. Gewirth fails to provide these because he form-
ulates his interpretation on the basis of inadequate models.
To an ive at his definitions of 'clarity* and 'distinct-
ness', he confines his attention to what Descartes says about
simple ideas. When Descartes discusses the clarity and dis-
tinctness or obscurity and confusion in simple ideas, however,
he is almost always referring to what I call representational
clarity ana distinctness. But Gewirth fails to distinguish
between representational clarity and distinctness and clarity
and distinctness per se. As a result he thought he was giving
an account of the latter although he was really giving an
account of the former.
Since the simple ideas are the models on which Gewirth
analyzed
.
See below, pp, i 65-169
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based his account of clarity and distinctness, it is not
surprising that these ideas do not provide counterinstances
to Gewirth' s definitions. On the other hand, these ideas do
become problematic when Gewirth applies his method for ascer-
taining clearness and distinctness to them. They are problem-
atic because they differ in important respects from the models
Gewirth used to arrive at his method for ascertaining clarity
au<^ di s uxn ^ i_ne s s . lo illustrate the method of difference —
a method of analysis, Descartes took as his examples ideas that
are manifestly analyzable. He applies his method to complex
fictional ideas and to complex ideas of true and immutable
natures ideas of a winged horse and a triangle inscribed
in a square, on the one hand, and ideas of a triangle and wax,
on the otrier. Focusing attention on Descartes' favorite, exam-
ples of how we ascertain analytical clarity and distinctness,
Gewirth made the mistake of thinking that the way in which
such complex ideas are. shown to be clear and distinct is the
way in which all ideas are shown to be clear and distinct.
He did not test his belief against the simple ideas, however.
If he had, he would have realized he had made a serious mistake
On his view the method of difference shows all simple ideas
to be clear and distinct, but Gewirth .knew full well they can
be obscure or confused if misrepresented.
Failing to distinguish analytical from representational
clarity and distinctness, Gewirth tried to stretch the use of
his method of difference. Although this method was designed
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to ascertain which of oar ideas are analytically clear and
distinct, Gewirth vaguely recognised its limitations and tried
to make it do double duty by adding onto the method a super-
fluous procedure for comparing direct and interpretive contents.
But this addition does not suffice to allow us to ascertain
whether our simple ideas are clear and distinct per se
,
and
Gewirth' s attempt to vindicate Descartes from Gassendi's
criticism is, therefore, incomplete.
Although incomplete, his attempt has merit. He pointed
to a distinction that has been virtually ignored by subsequent
commentators on clarity and distinctness in Descartes. All
j.oeas are representations, and at least some ideas have analy-
ses. Gewirth *s definitions of 'clarity' and 'distinctness'
recognize the role of representation in making, ideas clear
anQ 6-stinct. And his discussion of how we ascertain clearness
and distinctness indicates the importance of the analysis of
an idea in making that idea clear and distinct. Although
Gewirth did not himself explicitly recognize the distinction
between analytical and representational clarity and distinct-
ness, he helped to make this distinction recognizable.
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C H A P T E R 11
KhNNx'S DISCUSSION OF DESCARTES’ ACCOUNT OF
CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
Cha following chapter is divided into three sections.
Xil the first two secfcims 1 consider Kenny's disenssion of
clearness and distinctness in Descartes. 1 Section I it expo-'
siCory; I review Kenny’s arguments to support his view that
Lescart.es
' account of clarity and distinctness is incoheren
.
In ! ' '
; 11
'
1 criticise Kenny’s argui snt c id
thai: Kenn
:V has not demonstrated chat Descartes is contused
abo
u
t c1 ar .1 1y and dis t in
c
tnes s
bectron III concerns Kenny's discussion of Descarte 3 ’
method tor ascertaining 'which ideas are clear and distinct.
Kenny thinks Descartes is guilty of a circularity. But
Kenny s arguments are. f as I try to show, unconvincina
.
I- EXPOSITION OF KENNY’S ACCOUNT OF
CIiEARNES AND DT STINGINESS
.At the end of his chapter “Ideas/’ Anthony Kenny considers
Descartes • account, of clearness and. distinctness
. There arc
two points to be made about the scope of Kenny's discussion.
1
in h< >ny Ke nny
,
Desc; t A Stui o i ; ' ]
(Ns1. rk : 1 < 1
:
;
r
,
,
pp . ’
1
-
,
Grices to Kenny's book will appear in the text.
O j
Ke ‘ ln
'‘ u° ascertain is the exact nature of
clearness and distinctness insofar as these are properties of
ideas such as sensations' 'Kenny, p. 121)
. lnotoad
of asking what Descartes means when he speaks of clearness and
distinctness, Kenny is asking what it is for a simple idea
to be doer ai, distinct. Second, Kenny argues that Descartes'
account 1 is incoherent (Kennv r> k • i_i
-
, p. f but the account Kenny
has in mind encompasses more than Descartes' definition of
clearness and distinctness.
Kenny says:
The fullest account of c laritv and riHiv- r i. rr0 e -given in the Principles:
'
~
'
~
' 3
The knowledge upon which a certain and inconi rove-judgement can be formed, should not alone be clearbt.- also aistmct. I term that clear which .is presentand apparent to an attentive mind, in the san w -as we assert that we see objects clearly when beingtne regarding eye, they operate upon it
v-i-J. surficient strength. But the distinct is tha-
SO
J.
prec;L3e c?nd different from all other ob-;ec.
~ 1 fc 1 COnuains Wlthin itself nothing but what is
clear, ^nen
,_
for instance, a severe pain is felt, thepercept. ion of this pain mav be very 'iLear and
•for ail that not distinct /because' idll dually coc-ruseu oy the sufferers with the obscure iudaement
that, they form upon its nature; assuming’ as they dothat something exists in the pain affected, similar
Lo tae sensation of pain of which they alone are
clearly conscious. (AT VIII, 21; HRI
,
237)"
vVe are told
,
however
,
that we may have a clear knowledge
of our sensations if we take care to include in the iudg^-
ments we form of them only that which we know to be pre-
cisely contained in our perception of them and of which
we are intimately conscious. Thus, "there is no reasonthat we should be obliged to believe that the pain, for
example, which we feel in our foot, is anything beyond our
.mind which exists in our foot." We can avoid error if
we judge that there is something, of whose nature we are
ignorant, that causes the sensation of pain in our minds
(Kenny, pp. 121- 122 )
,
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elements in Desrai-fod
n J±
r±h- Focusing on
^s^arces 1 o r01 pain, Kenny says that "there so-,-, here
2
136^ SSParate elSmentS A“ D—es. account; the pain,
P6rCePti0n ° r: the Pai«' judgement about the pain"
<Ke— 22 >-
-— viaw Descartes
_ fco
entiate between pain and the perception n t +-v01 the pain when, inMS aCCClUlt
' hS attributea th" Properties of clearness and
distinctness to the perception but not to the pain. Likewi se
,Descartes seems to distinguish oerceotion ,p p and judgement.
Judgement involves an act n f wino will; perception does not (Kennv,
p. 122) .
h£LHjL..- cuuxcism of Descartes* account. Although there
do seem to be three separate elements in Descartes' account.
Kenny argues that Descartes' account is confused because "the
perception of paw ... is not a genuine intermediary between
occurrence of pain and the judgement on pain"
.
(Kenny, p,
-L 2 3 ) , I. o illustrate. Descartes* con^nci nn t.-ueb tus o ,
. Kenny examines Des-
cartes’ answers to two questions;
(QD Can pain occur without being clearly perceived (Kenny,
p. 123)?
(Q2) Can clear and distinct perception occur without
judgement (Kenny, p, 123)?
According to Kenny, Descartes' answers to these questions are
incons istent
.
’
' S J fin in 1 :artes ’ to
.{
(2I-L Regarding (01), Kenny says:
feela
e
orc^
hand
' he [Descartes] savs that- " >u
,
s g eat pain, he haq = xr^t y nal when .a manon the other hand, he says that PercePtior. of pain"
.
of our sensations only if J W<? have - clear perceptionment about them and "^<*“efully restriot our judc-e~t° observe
” (Kenny, p . ^3)
18 3 COnditi°n most difficult
Lenny s view, Descartes seems to be cjuiltv of
hc>n ,
guil y an moons is-
- y—
. on the one hand, Descartes is telling us that
severe pains are clearly perceived. On the other hand,
CarteS ' reI"arkS“ P between out pains ^judgements about our pains seem to suoqpt,, ...f that we can have
severe pains we dr, r,rt-‘° no c iearly perceive. Acrordinu fr rnt-tutumg i.o Kennv
.
Descartes holds that we neror-nwp rceive our pains clearly only if we
carefullv rest -ri r*+-' OU* judgements about then. But Descartes
tons us that it is very dimwit to restrict our judges,
“ 3PPrOPriate severe pains are not exceptional
ln ThlS re9ard
- Descartes himself tells us that people are
apt to misjudge the origin of their pains. When such misjudge-
Anan ts occur, one’s perception of his pain i - nhc-u• -L “ Pd s obscure even
though the pain he feels is severe.
According to Kenny,. Descartes' answers to (Ql) are incon-
sistent here because there appear to be two elements in Des-
cartes' account when in fact there is only one - the occur-
J ' SnL p,:i;Lrj * ;(enny Puts his argument as follows:
-Chore seem to be two elements i n claret' • fhqf , •or perception be manifest and t-hr '
’ A
V object
be attonth vr m r . fc the perceiving facultv
^ no hhp?V. , case of Bight, such a distinction
"
r-»S-*>.(e, m die case of pain, it is illusory Des ...
he 'wc]Sr^GrS?h lS what, would be the difference between
' pcr^ep Lion o.l a manifest pain and th<= r-ioav
tho r,n-. 1n . iv -h-’T WUU ~LU o cnPe c t f e clear
jj. an obscure pain. Yet it must be possible
perception of
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to ma^e out such a difference if the «..+.•tne occurrence of a pain and i-hl
dl°tmction between
a genuine one (Kenny,, p. 124 )
’ U perception of a pain is
The pain can be manifest or not manifest; the perception o*
the pain attentive or inattentive. On the assumption that
Descartes reoards nai n tb analag°us to Sight, our idea of
parn is obscure if and only jf one n* tho - t,y 1 ° t oi e following three con-
ditions hold:
(i) we instinctively perceive a manifest pain:
(li) ”e attentive ly perceive a non-manifest pain;
(iii) we inattentively perceive a non-manifest pain.
According to Kenny, however, (i) and (ii, are not really dif-
ferent. Both are satisfied when our pain is mild and neither
“ SatlSfied When our Pain is severe. It is the mildness or
severity of our rain +-bnn .i-u-j. ,}
-
‘"rie
'
that determines whether our idea
of; pain is clear.
By introducing the attentiveness of perception into his
account: of clearness and distinctness, Descartes added, Kenny
believes, a superfluous element. If he had simply said that
"
:C ca]I that clear which is manifest, ** his answer to (Ql)
would have been unequivocal. As Kenny puts the point, "To
perceive a pain cieariy simply is to have a severe pain"
(Kenny, p. 124} .
Kenny finds in Des carte s 1 answers to Q2
.
Let us now turn to Kenny’s discussion of (Q2) . Arguing that
Descartes* comments on (Q2) are inconsistent, Kenny says:
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On the one hand, we learn f-w „posed to give our assent to tV
™
arG
^
nature so dis-that we cannot possibly doubt' If
C
f
early Perceive,21
< I, 2361. vet rl f „ tneir truth" (at VTII
whole procedure of methodic SSlS b<uuj ' does the
’
withhold one's judgementhven abont'^f56 that one canCj
-ear (Kenny, pp, 123-124) ?
ljOUt whac seems most
The method of doubt i * = ™ • ua method whereby one suspends judge-
lie c,.n suspend iudqement because
-not judgement is an act
°f 3 WU1 that iS free t0 affi™ “ d
-y what the understanding
Presents to it. Even though we have a clear perception, we
can refrain from affirming that things are as we perceive them.in claiming that we cannot possibly doubt the truth of what
we perceive, Descartes appears to be gui Ifv nf •c y j.uy o an inconsist-
ency
,
Here, again, the source of Descartes' confusion is
according to Kenny, to be found in his incoherent account of
clearness and distinctness. Descartes thinks there are three
separate elements when in .“ act there are just two. According
to Kenny
, percent i on -i - v,~+.
' p lb not <* genuine intermediary between the
pair, and the judgement on the Pain. As Kenny says:
jud ?
:
„ f * ' L 1S ko mate the correct
wSatT"'
tJ,Wha
.
t 1 feel is ca^d by I know nit
feel
-I*; so-nthino
-n'
1
?
J
-^
ccrr® c '-/ rash judgement "what I
distmii- n5; 9 i
J ‘
,y foot
*
.The difference between a
in terras
COn
:
:Usea perception is explained precise 1 -
the 'perception o“n is not distinc?7'?’9 iju<?gement *
rs confused by the sufferer* w ,* «i ,f u a i. . » i uli 1
1
1
0
ODScure iU(3cfGrnpri+*
V.;r
'
“ht
-^ maY forTn Upon its nature" (AT III 21- fp t
9
(Kenny, pp. 124-125). ' ' L ’ J/
If Descart'-es had not confused the act with the object of per-
ception, he would have given an unequivocal answer to (Q2)
.
° perceive a pain distinctly i~ t. • .
one's oain '
‘ JJdge truly aboutP m, clear and distinct perception cannot
without judgement.
‘
'
' "C“r
(02, il
Kenny ' S int6rPre
' ati0n
' DeSC«teS answers (01) and
tioL;
^ bSCaUSe hlS a™ — a- dis-
;
SS 13 lnCOherent
- tod his
-count is incoherent becau.e
‘
h
C°nfUSed 3bOUt thS dlsti
-tion between the act and th-
”
obiect of Perception. Once this contusion is eliminated,
_
lowever, a coherent definition of cle-nnarness and distinctness
" clil be attained. According to Kennv an i <y
' 1Qea is clear just
" n case at as manifest, and it is •18 dxstlnct 3 ust in case judge-
merits formed about it are true.
11 * CRITICISM OF KENNY'S ACCOUNT
OF CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
My response to Kenny's criticisms of nr Descartes* account.
0± CWrnoss and distinctness has three parts. I ,,iil try to
show
<J> uh5t bos cartes ! answers to (Ql) are consistent,
(2) that Descartes
' answers to ( 02 , are consistent, and
(3) that Kenny has failed to show that Descartes' account
o.t clearness and distinctness is incoherent.
According to Kenny, Descartes holds the
i.o 1.1owing views with respect to (Ql.) ;
(P: "Tier; a man feels great pain, he has a very clear
69
perception of pain." 2
(cj) he have a clear percent- •! on •
' 01 our sensations only if
’A7e careful ly restrict our judgement ab-mt mJ ou them and
this is a condition most difficult ^ uu iiicm to observe." 0
Together with other iir.nl i «-.• + • 4Pll-lt: Premises,* (q ) is supposed to
entail not-(p).
In P°lnt °f facfc
' Descartes asserts neither (p) nor (q) .
'p ' J ‘ s Kenny ! s paraphrase of
ip’) 11When
, for inst a-nr-no ai.ee
, a severe pain is felt, the per-
ception of this pain may_ be very clear.
.
.
."5
AH Descartes is saying here is that it is possible that a
severe pain, be clearly perceived. tea for the sake Qfw
want,,, us co assume* that there is such a clearly per-
ceived pain.
(q ) °n ' iG ° l"hei iianci
'
is Kenny’s paraphrase of a pas-
sags found in the Principles nv~ i e
• lu s passage reads as follows:
an to wiiich^e^tia^likewise
'
have^^clear kn-v
'
our perception of then -* o' . . pr “ c'-^ sej-Y contained m
scions It S, howe^f^osfdlfnSuIt T *ntimate1^ ' *condition, in regard to the' sensei al Last'
°
b
f
ervt this
everyone c f us hiw i t ' b - J-east, because we,
t-bi-ir. x /
dV
.
e juacje.a from our youth up that = i -
-L ngo ox wtu.cn we nave been accuq^ompri j..,, > " " ~
hil Se - V. P y
idea which we' hate. f^0^.rnSatl0n ' that - the
See p. 65 above.
5
See p. 63 above.
HR I
,
p. 247.
*Ibid
,
4
svSee p. 65 above,
Emphas .i s mine
.
Emphasis mine.
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On the basis of what Descartes says in thisi - - L'u passage, I do notsee how Kenny can iustifianj iably attribute (g) to Descartes. (,„states a necessary condition for havinn cl
_
. .
n vmg ear £erception
.U " 111 ^ie passage, Descartf'q
--i- +-rtts States a sufficient cond-itipn for having clear knowledge
.
Although Kenny has misinterpreted Descartes here, t
think we can crive ^ na .rf ,5 Partlal 6Xpianation for Kenny's confusion.
will refer to the passage cited above as caseuu ' c & P sage 1, and the
passage cited below as passage 2 r ,*g • Let u
- compare what Des carte:
says about clear knowledge in each of these passages.
Xl5 Pa”8a9C X
' We aCqUire clear knowledge as a result of
restricting our judgements so that they assert nothing other
than what we actually perceive. Here clear knowledge is
acquired subsequent to judgement. In passage 2, however, the
situation is reversed. Descartes says:
lives perceive all their
2J2M? U Properly. For the knowledge upon whirt'a Dtt.ei tain and inconi- rmren-f i wi ^ ~ >n_t..n
not alone be clear but* also' distinct??
^ *** formed should
Mere Descartes refers to clear and distinct knowledge as the
knowledge upon which certain and incontrovertible judgements
are based so that the clear and distinct knowledge to which
D I>,.r U.„ it. i ei.ej.ring in passage 2 antecedes judgement.
i*“ y ' ' '"'I' Kenny cites the second sentence of thispassage. See p. 03 above.
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There ^ tW° t0 inte™ Descartes 1 remarks. Wecan assume that Descartes in Passage 2 means by ' clear ar,
'
lotmct knowledge '
‘correct percent! nr, >P p ion
f or we can regard
clear and distinct i
, , .
knowledge as a fourth element to be intro-
UCea lnto Descartes' account of clearness and r , •di ^ a distinctness.
Since Kenny savs that » +-V,* 5 d "here seem to be three separate
ele.non.i_e in. Descartes' account" (Kenny n .,v u7 ' P •
,
we can si;rr ' t
that Kenny took Descartes in passage 2 to be using the terr .
'clear and distinct knowledge' and 'correct perception' synony
ou.sly. And with inqfi3 ^---on Aenny probably assumed that
be scarte s' references -> - * ^ t" cledr knowledge in passages 1 and 2
were unequivocal. When closely read, however "hese, c ti , t_n passages
show that Descartes was using the term 1 clear knowledge’ in
l-feic.. ^ oe„sM
.
-Ln passage 1, ’clear knowledge' does
noc mean 'clear perception 5 as Kenny supposes,
1V0 Cj cUTO. X 2 l T~\o c <'> j3 y f n 5 -i i
,.
,y !_ . -^-ai.es allegedly inconsistent
answers to <Q2) are as follows:
(r> “We are b*’ nat’are so disposed to give our assent to
things we clearly perceive, that we cannot possibly
doubt cf their truth.
U) One can withhold one's judgement even about what seems
most clear.
(r) is a direct quote from Descartes, and according to Kenny,
DfcSCdiues of doubt presupposes (s)
.
Jointly ( r ) and
8bee p. 6 5 above.
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^s) are supposed to enLaiJ
- a contradiction.
(r) and (s) are not incompatible howe— . , , .now«vei ( r ) does not
say that we cannot doubt the truth G p r>v.<-il °
• seems-, most clear
“ ”” ** » ” ~ M. U.~„ tm
, „«
». can urn ««oa reasons !or
,h„
clear. On the other hand, we cann-- ^„Ki.
-•..at we genuinely
clearly and distinctly perceive. 3 There - ...iUUc
- -•'> no ineon si rrmn-
•
'
'
in claiming that we r --~> rv,-x<- , - ,... c.n dotot west seems te st clear but cannot
doubt what is clear.
Regarding Dgscarteja' account of clearness and distinct-
Ue“n> s criticism of Descartes' account is in two carts.
In the first part Kenny argues that the distinction between
the pain and the perception of the pain is not genuine. In
the second part, he argues that the distinction between the
p-..option o,
. ha pain and the judgement on the pain is no.
genuine. I consider each part in turn.
2iil£. distinction between the pain and the oe-t t ...
— ES^- Ac*ordi*W to Kenny, there soar,, to be three separate
elements in Descartes’ account of clearness and distinctness:
1
-
- ccPt«ioii ol Ue sensation, and the judge-
merit on the sensation. But is there a genuine distinction
between the sensation and the perception of the sensation?
It seems as if there is. Sensations have properties perceptions
D
_
Although (r) is a direct quote from Descartes, (r) istaken out of context. It Lain coni
cartes is talking about clear and
percept- on. Taken by itself, (r) is for Descartes a falseproposition
.
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h™, „.a
„„„„„ iiqk
«, b.
„ „ ,„if„ti f„„Wam
attentive or inattentive.
As instances of sensat-ionc ^ •
' pains seem problematic for
^cartes- account, however.
-There seems to be no difference
0etWee" ^ °0CUrrenCe “d the P—ption of a pain. Descarte,
C°Ula
' ° f C°UrSe
' COUnter ‘hat the difference consists in
this: the oceurrent pain is manifest or not manifest; the
perception of the pain attentive or inattentive. !f this were
Descartes' response, he would have to be able to show that the-
re a genuine distinction between an attentively perceived
non-manifest pain and an rnattentively perceived manifest pain.
But.
...enny tells us, "Descartes nowhere suggests" what the
b j. f it_-.ien.ee would be (Kenny, p. 124}
bet us look at this criticism carefully. Kenny flunks
that we can make no sense of the distinction between an atten-
tively perceived non-manifest pain and an inattentively per-
ceived manifest pain. But Descartes' failure to
suggest what the distinction might be does not show that the
distinction is not genuine. 10 tie might be able to make sense
c-f the alleged distinction if we. could make sense of what it
,
.
p°in - Of fact, Descartes may have given the exVi i-
mean?
n
h
"nY r
?
qU
i
reS- Slnoe K“ n/i ” does
-
-o' and since Descartes does
f
J-c.enc..r.iv Wjiv.L predicates he takes to be synonymous with
uie aescnpcion Kenny required although Kenny was unable to
'
j.ecogn.i.ze Descartes' account as an explication of. relationshipdotween mani festness and attentiveness.
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is for perception to be attentive ana for Da 'n to t
_
.
r P i be manifest.
-amt. we know what we mean by 'attentive' a- ,u.t L s opposed to ' inat~
tentive Perception', ana I think we can plausibly distinguish
between a manifest pain ana a non-manifest pain. We couia, for
example, regard a manifest pain as aP m severe pain and a non-man-
ifest pain as a mild pain.-1- 1
Let us consider an example. I am watching a particularly
exciting television show, and the identity of the killer is
about to be revpgip.-i jj. j-u,*ea
- lhls vary moment, however, X feel a
mild pain somewhere in my chest, but I do not know exactly where.
1 am concerned because a friend my age has just died of a heart
attack, and I want to be sure the pain in my chest is not
symptomatic of a similar attack. As a result I divert my
attention away from the television program, and I concentrate
on my pain. It would seem appropriate to say that, in doing
kbio, I am attentively perceiving a non-manifest pain.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the pain becomes acute.
nions
,
and I remember that I had onions for dinner.
Bu t now I recoil
i eat o ,
These cons iderat.
to f ind out the
rulbbi jig mv olie^'-'
•c
v
-"
In such C caGo,
am now i na.tte.nt i
1 1 o .
.
,:‘>
-
Lnce Kenny is prepared to identify severe pain with the
c. ear icea of pain and mild pain with the obscure idea of pain, Ido n?t think he would find implausible the distinction I am
drawing
.
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m presenting the above illustration. I am not claiming
rteS "SeS tte te™S an, 1 attentive
' in
'
t
thC “ WhlCh thSy ““ " Hy e::amP 'leS
' X am trying
° E
.°
W “ that therS iS a Plausibl- '«v of making out the
distinction between 11 f ho1
- nG unclear percent
-i on «.p „incep io of a manifest pain
and the Clear Percepti°n *f “ obscure pain- so that KennVs
suggestion that „e cannot distinguish pain from the perception
Of pain is false.
_
~~ ^Heen the Eerc^ion of the pain and
~ “ -°P
- — ESin- To sh™ that there is no genuine
difference between the perception of the pain and the judgement
on the pain, Kenny focuses on the passage where Descartes
tells us that perception may be clear without being distinct.
In this passage,^ Descartes claims that the perception of pain
is not distinct because the judgement formed on the pain is
istaKon. On the basis of this claim, Kenny concludes that
"to perceive a pain, distinctly is simply to make the correct
cautious judgement 'what I feel is caused by I know not
what'.
. . „
”
The kGy Passage to 7hich kenny alludes in his ci ti< ism
13 Clcec:
- above on Page 63 above. Kenny’s way of citing
thio Uci is misleading, however. It appears that the pas-
sage m question is one unbroken portion of the Principles ..
12See p, 63 above
- See p. 67 above
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Actually Kenny is citing two separate Principle
,- afa1lf , .
^xmcipies, one
.imrned-l te y following the other. Each Pr-, • -
has ah ,. ' P ie ln th= Principlesla heading. The heading nr n • • ~
.
- ,.
g 01 Principle ® is
-What a clear
"
-re Oescartes g^."^
1003 °f ClSarneSS ' “d
' distinctness
' , but h2 does not
mention his example of pain Thl-, - .
xtvt „„ .
P l ifc example is »ed in Principle
J. e heading of this Principle reads as follows- * It
~~~~ 2£ Eiin that a perception jjav b7
SiSSE without being distinct ho- 4
.
.
,4 --r-— Eli il cam e distinct unless
~ ~
~
* Th±S headi“* expresses plainly Descarte
“
intention
. Having defined
'clearness' and
'distinctness' in
the Preceding Principle.. Descartes is moving on to consider
10.is thdi. no.! d beween clarity and distinctness. He
wan
-o
-how- by means of the example of pain that one can
have a clear but confused perception. To this end, Descartes
offej-n an argument I reconstruct as follows:
' ±J 1 ciear:' 3
.
Perceive a pain I am having. — Premise
(2) I form a false judgement about the' pain
I am having-
Premise
(-/ x dc not distinctly perceive the. pain
1 an having.
— from (2)
( 4 ) (1) and (3).
---- from (1)
, (3)
U) dOSS ! ’ 0t antail ( 3). Descartes needs the additional
premise (k)
:
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00 If I form a false judgement about what I perceive,
then I do not distinctly perceive the thing about
which I formed that judgement.
Kenny thinks (1) follows from (k)
:
(-U To perceive a rain riicHn^idistinctly is simply to judge that
the pain has a cause.
But 0:) is equivelant to (k*):
(k ) if I distinctly perceive a thing about which I form
a judgement, then I form a true judgement about what
1 perceive.
Plainly (k') does not entail (1). {k ., states a necessary- but
not a sufficient condition for distinct perception
.
15
—
nl — S£gay.lg. definitions of ' clearnes s 1 and
'distinctness • Kenny holds that a pain is clear if and only
if it .is severe and distinct if and only if judgements about
the pair, are true. He arrives at these definitions because
he thinks '--a.. per cep.ion is not a genuine, intermediary between
the pain and judgement about the pain. When we say we clearly
and distinctly perceive a pain we are having, we are saying
something about our pain and something about our judgement.
But what features of pains and judgements could function as
defining characteristics of clarity and distinctness? since
pains are severe or mild and judgements are true or false",
it seems natural to think that clarity is a function of the
i n;
On this point, see the chapter on Frankfurt, p. 92
below
‘ '
7 8
ty of the pain and distinctness a funct-i
or fal5(f .. .
i nct on of the truthsity or judgement.
Although X have argued th^r r = ,
of
-
at Renny 3 def^e of his accountOx. clearness and i^icf
Ken,y , a , „
ln°tneSS iS—incing, x have not shown
Y deflnitl°ns ° f 'Cl—
' and
'distinctness' to bedefective. Kenny stay have arrived at the right definitions
°r Ule wrony reasons. it is difficult to •Ju assess Kenny's
definitions, however. He ha«? no-f-s ot given us a genera] account
of clearness and distinctness. At the outlet K„- u.).e s enny said he
would give an account of clearness i q- 4. •o and distinctness insofar
as these are properties of "simple ideas such , . 36
Apparently he does not think he is giving us an account that
can be generalised to cover complex ideas. Yet in a later
chapter, Kenny treats his definition of 'distinctness' as if
rt is applicable to all ideas. 17 Since Kenny thinks his
account of distinctness is unrealizable, we can surmise that
h_ thinks it. is his definition of Vlsri t • .. • ,' 01 cianty that cannot be
qenerali 7.ed
— S£S®£alizin2 LzhiiYj_s account, of 'clarity 1
.
L. j. iO
C
jlI f\Gnny nrif /'’«*) - -I *>-, _ i , «
•
~ ot cid±m chat his account cf clarity
app>lieS tD r,°1T,pleX ideas
-
he claim to be giving us an
account of clearness and distinctness that is applicable to
,:
" imple ideas BUch as sensations .
" Does ho mean that he
16hce p. 63 above,
bee Section III be low
,
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thinks his account is applicable to all simple ideas? i think
not. In whac sense cen we say that a simple idea of extension
is severe or mild?
Perhaps Kenny means he is giving us an account of the
clearness and distinctness of simple ideas of sensation. Again
I think not. Regarding visual sensations, Kenny says, "There
neem to be two elements in clarity; that the object of percep-
tion be manifest and that the perceiving faculty be attentive.
In the case of sight, such a distinction is possible; in the
C3.se of: pain
, it is i 1 inormr »
1
J ° Because such a distinction
cannot be made out in the c nep v iUi case of Pam, Kenny's account of what
it is to be a clear and distinct idea of a pain does not make
use of such a distinction. But in cases where such a distin-
ction can be drawn, Kenny leaves open the possibility that
anothec account of clearness and distinctness could be given,
For ail w ' know
> KennY maY intend his account of clarity to
covgx not all simple ideas of sensation but only those for
v/hicn the distinction between a manifest object and an atten-
tive mind cannot be drawn.
In any event Kenny's definition of 'clarity* is highly
Cxj-c uns or ibed . At this point I do not want to say that Kenny's
account. j.s mistaken; it is simply incomplete. E. J. Ash-
worth's interpretation provides one way of completing Kenny's
“i p.
'uec p . 65 above.
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account. 19 Completed in this way, the account is easily
criticized, however.
Ggierallzlng Kansas account of distinctness. As I noted
m the last subsection, Kenny does treat his account of dis-
tinctness as if it is applicable to all ideas/ 0 Although
gsi.e.alizable
, this account leads in Kenny's view to a fata"'
difficulty for Descartes. If Kenny's account is right, Des-
cartes cannot without circularity ascertain which of his ideas
are distinct. As a result Kenny's account vindicates Gassendi.
Although Kenny's account may in the long run turn out
to be right, a charitable approach to a reading of Descartes
requires that we tentatively reject Kenny's account of distinct-
ness and search for another that does not produce difficulties
I a ceil for Descartes
'
philosophy
.
ill. KENNY ' 3 .01S COSS ION OP DE SCARTES 1 METHOD
FOR ASCERTAINING WHICH OF OUR IDEAS
ARE CLEAR AND DISTINCT
At the end of his chapter "Reason and Intuition," Kenny
offers a br.ee t discussion of Descartes' general rule that
whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true (Kenny,
PP* 197"199) . In this discussion Kenny argues that Descartes'
genera J. rule is inadequate. As Kenny says, "Apart from their
truth, there seems to be no criterion by which genuinely
3 9See Chapter IV below.
9 r\
See the next section.
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clear and distinct perception--’ v -1 P L°n° Can distinguished from appar-
ently clear and distinct perceptions" nyci^ CKenny, p. J9B)
‘* «"
= « o«
. „„
”*
«... »*« h, o,.„ly
tinctly perceives is true On i-h^ i° *e other hand, he seems to be
saving that he identifies his clear- q •n ° Cj-eai and distinct perceptions by
ascertaining whether what-- he. perceives s +ti / j-s true (Kenny, p. 198).
lo Re fair to Descartes, Kenny considers what other
criteria Descartes might have used in order to identify his
co-ear and distinct, perceptions. The possibilities Kenny con-
siders are as follows:
(i) £ clearly and distinctly perceives x if s is convinced
he clearly and distinctly perceives x (Kenny, p. 198);
( 11 ! £ clearly and distinctly perceives x if x has some
particular content C (Kenny, p. 198)
,
and
(iii) S clearly and distinctly perceives x if s's
perception of x is produced in accordance with some
particular method M (Kenny, p. 198)
.
Let US GXamine Kenny’ s criticism of each of these possibilities.
.E£i^cism of _(i)_. Kenny says that clear arid
distinct percep cions "cannot be distinguished by the degree
0jL conviction that they carry with them; men have died for
1 ne rake 01 ideas that they mistakenly believed to be clear
and distinct (K# iuny, p. 198)." In the Fifth Gbjcactions
,
r~0.3 send i r ai s 0 d the name criticism. 22 Descartes replied that
21.,. ,mpnds if> mine. / ‘ 2HR
,
II, 152.
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the example of men willing to die for rh ,‘ ± t eir beliefs
"proves
nothing," for » i +
... . .
n6Ver be pr°ved th£t they Clearly and1Btln0tAy PerC6iVe what th*y Pertenaciously affirm." 23
„frpDescartes is pointing out that his position is not the one
Gassendi's objection attark'~ ra.Q o
.
CkS
’ Llke Gassendi, Descartes thinks
wj is false.
Q^n\7 s ClT i -f" 1 p i c rn \
- 2£ lilL. Turning to (ii)
, Kenny argues
as follows
:
uished by“thlir content! for^houc^th^™01 be distinS"so simple that no doubt i~ -o-Ab *1 arc some tonics
seems to be none about which no
16 ab?Ut them ' th we
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> m II, 278) (Kenny, p. 198 ) , x * Posslb;ie (Mt VII,
Let as locK at this argument closely:
(1) It. seems that, whatever the content of our perception,
we can be mistaken about that content.
(•i; We cannot identify our clear c
,
-
Y '•- Co1 an «^ distinct perceptions
hy their contents.
Plainly, (1) is not the premise Kenny wants. What Kenny needs
is (I s ) :
(i'5 Whatever the content of our perception, we can be
li.i. 3 1. 'tien abouc that content.
Acco:rama to Kenny
, Descartes holds ( 1 ‘ ) . And since
a’) is supposed to entail (2), which, in turn, is supposed
to be inconsistent with (ii)
,
Kenny contends that we should
2 3tiun, II, 214
.
33
not attribute (ii) to Descartes wpf.vr-• it. lore abandoning (ii)
hov. ever
,
we need to be sure that KennY is right when he claims
that Descartes held ( 1 ').
to show that Descartes did subscribe to (.!), Kenny
adopts the following strategy. First he attempts to identify
Plausible candidates for perceptual contents about which we
’
cannot be mistaken. These, he thinks, are the propositions
Descartes regards as indubitable. Secondly, he tries to show
that Descartes believes we can be mistaken regarding even
th6Se
— Jut if <=an be rr
itanda, it would certainly seem that we can be in error rlard-
mg propositions we can doubt so that we can be mistaken about
whatever proposition we perceive.
In SUpP°rt of his case
'
Kenny discusses a passage in the
Seventh Objections where Descartes replies to Bourdin. Regard-
ing uhi.s passage, Kenny says:
though"? f?tU8 °f . thf simplest truths of mathematics?
7* Z u
S here [the Third Meditation) ore-
as "What'”,-
“aa the Eame first-order indubitability
° ' aaL * done cannot be undone," 24 in the F^st Medi-
2 A
distinguished two types of indubitability —
his d
3JCCntJ"?rder * Although Kenny dr.es not draw
;
t
• precisely, we can define first- and second-order indubitability as follows:
^
'•
'
’ 1
;
u
"’tt
der indubitable
=jf it is imposwh
7le attending to p, one doubts that pCD2) H. 1 ® second-order indubitabl
( . is ithat while attending to n but not attending to p, onedouots t '
.
and
Kenny’s discussion of the disl Li
secona-orner doubt, see Kenny, pp. 183-184.
34
tation Dsscsrts'; ^cVc .
ever I add two and three?"
1
--'
“and^hi^
6 ma go wron9 «>»n-
first-order doubt.
'
told the story „f a
Clock strike four ant said ,
a ° leeP heard the
has struck one o' clock fct times' " i
"
this example "shows tir^ a
*' * to. s cartes said that
together can be deceived." 47™
Once again, the passages are record-: i ?tl fl ' 2 8) •,tnat the impossibility of aoubt
°
7?
lf We f^ember
the impossibilitv o-' h-or t L tha salT,e thing as
may be wrong for all that (Kenny, ? 86k'
S anSWer
Kenny cites this passage to show that Descartes subscribed
to (a ). But the passage does not show this much. The exam-
pies discussed are mathematical propositions. These propos-
itions can be false even though a person cannot doubt them
when attending to them. On the other hand, mathematical
propositions are not second-order indubitable and are not the
best candidates lor being perceptual contents about, which we
cannot be mistaken. Presumably the best candidates would be
propositions that are both first- and second-order indubitable,
nut are there any such propositions?
Kenny addresses this question when he asks himself:
’’Are there any propositions at all that are exempt from second-
order doubt?” (Kenny, p. 135). Typically the cogito is regarded
as the paradigm of an i ndubitandum
. But Kenny maintains that
the ic?JltL(2 is n^t second-order indubitable (Kenny, p. 135) ,
On the other hand, there are propositions that are second-
order indubitable and are, as Kenny says, "never called into
que st ion in Descartes' system . . "(Kenny, t>. 185) .
JBmphasisn mine,
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These are the propositions "ti
ness of •,
'PreSS thC mind ' S—ious-itS own thoughts and ideas. Thus th-
' premise "Coglto"
a d the Presence of the idea of ...
"
are not challenged bv the
second-order dmiH+- ,! /vooubt (Kenny, pp . 183-186).
We have here Kenny's acknowledgement of a class of pro-portions that is both first- and second-order indubitable
question th. remai his : Can «
. iti
ing to this class be false? Descartes' reply to Bourdin in
the seventh Objections does not provide an answer, for the
proposition under discussion there — «? 3 __ s „1 — is not
second-order indubitable. On the other hand vUT”n i n / Kenny cites no
other passages in support of his claim that ncU
- at. Descartes did noi-
confuse the impossibility of doubt with the impossibility of
error, so that for all we know, Descartes did not subscribe
(1 } and did subscribe to (ii)
~ Regarding (iii)
, Kenny argues
as follows
:
for^cerfair bv^ he^oH^ -^ =aSj °annot be distinguished
'-V to one's
one
' s
'
< w
the g- n - ” u possible a om matters corporeal, 1 ' vo :
a the usand^iLsf^ifrLu^o th ‘
^eas (AT
, li:,
S
b0HKe^ny; p? $1^ TOSt WortSTt”
Ce-tainly there are those who will not clarify their ideas no
hov' many times they have read the Meditations
. But
this is entirely beside the point. Al] Kenny's example show,:-
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that one can read without profit rt doc
n
F ' T ®s tot show thatDescartes did not hold (Ui)
.
Kenny ' s dGfsi'icjp ,-,.p t-*
.
- Sl» intgreretation. After offering
particular criticisms against m(i), (11)
, and (i.U)
, Kennv arQuesin e,ense of his own view that Descartes distinguishes cleardnd dlStlnc1
- tco,!
' obscure and confused perceptions by ascertain-
ing Whether they are true. Kenny says:
j. ime and. time acrain Dpcnsvi-oo
bear all the internal 'mark- nf ldeas that ^em to
simply on the grounds tha^V clail by and distinctness
true. But if 5 man cannot ttii ? Conside r them to be
uinely clear and distbnrr
"
’wi th
1 Wn
.
Gl
' uer hls ld^as are gen-
true, then he cannot hope to avoid^rr'^K^^b61
method of restrict
-i n-r v-
'
— r j.o.i. by using the
distinctly perceives
'
(Kenny? he clearly and
Kenny's point here can be framed as a question: If Descartes
really has a method M, which functions in total independence
of questions of truth, why does Descartes frequently ascertain
hi., ideas are clear and distinct or obscure and con-
tused by appealing to whether they or some corresponding pro-
position is true or false?
At this juncture, we are not in a position to give a
dcjvinitive answer to Kenny's question, but we can give a plans-
ihle answer. M may involve a complicated procedure. To
avo i cl circul
As a i esu.lt
.
clear and d.i
is clearly a
correspondin'
“J. n
Using his general principle that whatever
Suppose, then.
07
that Descartes wants to know whether his idea i i s c ,lear and
distinct. Descartes knows that if is cleafand distinct,
thon En+1 13 trup- But suppose that Descartes realizes that
li
' t“at llCt
--n+l‘ Then Descartes knows by nodus tollens
that V1 18 °bscure or confused - He does not need to employ
-
in °rder tC arriVe at the same result although he could use
M if he chose to. Since M is always available, Descartes does
not need to ascertain that £^, is false in order to determine
that b*X iS °bScure confused. Even though it is true that
Descartes frequently ascertains that his ideas are obscure or
confused because he considers some corresponding proposition
to be false, it does not follow that Descartes is guilty of
a circularity.
Returning now to the main point of this section, we can
see that Kenny's strategy has failed. To prove that Descartes
was guilty of a circularity, Kenny attempted to show that Des-
carc.es could not have consistently held (i)
,
(ii)
,
or (ill)
While Kenny is right about (i)
,
he has failed to show that
Descartes could no-t have held (il) or (iii)
. so that for all
we Know
,
Descartes did identify his clear and distinct loans
independently of considerations of truth.
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C II A P T E R III
frank, uri s discussion of descart.es ' account
w AM D DISTINCTNESS
xn C?Gar and Distinct Perception 5 i
* l t a chapter xn
. Demons
,
-i~“’ 523 Sto Har^ Frankfurt’ s main objective is 'to ''
"ffer " s ‘ltisfact°ry interpretation of Descartes' rule of
eviaence. As formulated, this Rale is aabi^ f jt is
Clear what it is that Descartes thinks is true as a result of
betng Clearly and distinctly perceived. Frankfurt wm argue
lha.t it is clearly and distinctly perceived propositions that.
<rUe
- T° supp°rt his be will distinguish between
clearly and distinctly conceiving and clearly and distinct!.
perceiving that such and such is the case, and he will define
What
;
ie *pans by *«•«*» and distinctly conceiving an idea'
and clearly and distinctly perceiving that p. !
’
’ >rdE Rl,jDUC 'rT0N 0F ’clear and distinct concept i on’
TO Clip;At? AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION THAT f
-t g..,iis his discussion by attempting to identi f
v
the coestj cuents of clear and distinct perceptual acts. He
notes that Descartes seems to recognize two objects of clear
1
.
“ " '
' r - ' Cle* r and
. 1st i.
;
«!« Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descari-s''—
“
'
1
,'. Bobb. Meri-m cSrapShy 1^—1970 ),pp. 12 fa-145. B 113 c retei ence s to Fj
.
appear in rhe text.
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and distinct perception
- idaas! .
P- 123,. But there are ,
and PTOPOSiti°- <*™nkfurt,
is only speakillg
,
.
°' reaS°nS t0 SUPPOSe «« Descartes1 aIJeaK-in loosely, fn- i -f j r,
- objects of Clear
we cannot ,iw . sa ,
1 ” “ ~s that
.
-
a t,is factory ir^prnrQ ^-,4. •“ lnte pretation of Descartes' rui*of evidence (Prankfnrf , , le-
-cuaiiit, pp. 128-130).
i->s t" cartes r [Rule cf.,j.Q ,
,
atSS that whatever we clearly anddistinctly perceive is true If „
of ...
C°nCepts «*• among the sortslngS that are clearly and distinctly r
.
^mctl perceived, it followsh L - somo concepts are tru® a .'
' Bui
' or^marily we think that itls Propositions rather +-h=m ^an concepts thst r* ^ *- >>. . -1 --iai can De said to be1 1 U6 or fgl C£i 01
- As a result Descartes seems guilty of a i , ...
gurstic confusion (Frankfurt, p. 123 ).
Arga,
-ng ir Descartes ’ defense, however Pr„r vc..• k » A an^j. arr points
out i.hat. DsFcaitpo'
' ° distinguishes between wh-t he r - nn calls mater' a)
and formal falsity.
f°
iDte
f
out that it is only j„
can be found Y TCalled < " formal f^yin ideas — raate^il) f* k ly ls ““other kind ol "
Is not a thing ty when they represent wi\-o
there can be a thin?- • • • And . .
'
things.
°
QO not appear to be ideas of
According to Frankfurt, it makes perfectly good sense to
predicate Material truth- of both concepts and propositions.
proposition is: raateri all - ; r • ."
’- J uc 1£
-’-t represents an existing
-
-ate of axtans
,
and a concept materially true if ,• t re
''Prankfurt
,
o
44, 11. 3-4.
.23 ’ee PH I, 164; AT VII -f i o c n r\n..L
. /O- jU
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sent, an existing object (Frankfurt, p. 129)
. We
900- sense of ^cartes' ruie „ •
'
—
- Allows: whatever we cieariv d a
1e m t .
'
-l ly ana distinctly perceive
materially true fprar,i ^Urankturt, p, 129 ).
, .
" We DeSCartSS
'
— «*• interpretation, howeverlr Urt thinkS a new ana "*« serious problem arises. Iquote Frankfurt:
the existence of ^"ob^c**^ i “er^w*11! true ' thena Pfrson has a clear and distinct c? 2 the fact thatcartes would be saddled' , f 1 ccncePtion of it. Des-
wrth the grotesque doctrine the? vn*
aatually nis view,
ence can be decided by conceotirW f ^ Uestlons of exist-would be his belief i-L f ; 1 activity alone. It
clear and distinct idea V *
person need only formulate a
to be certain that an Sb^ct of tilt °J °bject ia orderAccordina to ha tVfPe exists,
is committed to an aorior^n^f relation, then, Descartes
Anselm 1 s (Frankfurt^ S). m°re radical than St.
In Frankfurt view, the rule that whatever is clearly and
distinctly perceived is materially true entails a "grotesque
apriori siii” which Descartes rejects „ u • *
.
IC J ^ fa m his discussion of
matter in Meditation H. To be fair to Descartes, therefore,
Ve Sh°UJCi aVOid interpreting his Rule as a guarantee of the
1 h ‘“ Ul'n of c -lear and distinct perceptions
.
Frankfurt thinks we can give a satisfactory interpret-
atioi) °lCe reali^ "having a clear and distinct con-
} JJek>Cai tss f an altogether non-propositional
c-ficM.r (rranuiurt, p. 131). Elaborating, Frankfurt says:
to have a clear and distinct concept of someth ina i P top*;,.cexve what characteristics necessarily belong' to ifi-OcL i tik. chaf. a clearly and distinctly conceived
oo.ieep
. is true means only that the concept does actually
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i^licitly
e
in
r
!r
r,
;nfl%w
rela!' ions perceived to be .
necessarily has those propertie^rd^el ^tS t!?
e concePt
p. 131).- p rue “ ana relations (Frankfurt,
According to Frankfurt, clearly and distinctly conceiving X,
WhGre “ 15 ri concept, is a special case of clearly and dis-
tinctly perceiving that p :
--
c -Ler-' rly and distinctly conceives X -- ( v ) (•) .'if
d.f ' v 1 ' ~
-
L y.
exemplifies X and z_ is an essential property of y,
then A clearly and distinctly perceives that a
characterizes y)
As an example, consider the concept Wax. Assume that the es-
sence of wax is extension. According to (Dl)
,
I clearly and
distinctly conceive Wax if and only if I clearly and distinctly
perceive that all wax is extended.
nut when . 1
. clearly and distinctly perceive that wax is
extended, Descartes' Rule does not entitle me to infer, on
the basis of my clear and distinct perception, that wax exists.
What my Rule guarantees is the formal rather than the material
t ruth of what I clearly and distinctly perceive. It guarantees
that if there is any wax, it is extended. Descartes' Rule
does not imply that whatever is clearly and distinctly per-
ceived is exemplified, and we do not have to saddle him with
this sort of apr iorism.
I'o vindicate Descartes from the charge of apriorism,
Frank f urt c . rec r s a reduction. He reduces the problem of
' Fmphanis mine
.
(Tj
analyzing
'clear and distinct nPm 4-Perception that'. This
•ic . r .
XX11S reduction
-LS justified T+- all.
p>1
allOWS US t0 aTOia interpreting Descartes'
uXe uncharitably
. At the 4 •same time, Frankfurt's reduction
IS consistent with Descartes' claim that hot,-h b h concepts andI— 3re °bj— — - distinct perception.
'
^ ;
Ctly “““ in Which «• clearly and die
“1210
-/ perceives conc'^it ^ mt.'
’ sense ^ elucidated in (Dl)
although at this st -top fni 1 ,•
" not verY helpful
. (Dl) defines
'clear and distinct conception ; in terms of ' Cle?- and diceu -u- c“- o. stinct
perception that*. Bu 4- i-'t - ^
- teanmg expression is itself
vague. What Frankfurt must provide is a satisfactory account
OJT WhSt ':t iS t0 PerCaiVe and distinctly that such and
sue] i is the case.
11
' 4’RANKFUKT 1 S ANALYSIS OF ’ CLEAR AND
distinct perception that*
cuicturr says we clearly and distinctly perceive that
E Xi Snd on -'y J- :c v ’e recognize that certain relations hold between
1
dnd aD evidential basi “ tor £. An evidential basis for p
a. G'lJO v 0. o fill ^0clSOncilD ’ nTOlinrl .p... v •• i • •gro lncis foz doubting that p. Comet lines
the evidential basis for £ is -.another proposition o or some
experience. Otherwise the evidential basis for p is P itself,
Xo ‘ ja ~ Q to 1,e self-evident (Frankfurt, pp,
133 - 134 )
.
i-t-. n p j. s not self-evident, v/e need some external basis
in virtue of which we recognize that R is indubitable. In
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turn the evident
-i ai v
-o i l basis must
,
baSiS 13 nea tiler self-evident no," an
« «*,
1,0r experience
-i i
verified by yet snnf u .
' 11 must bei i 1-- a other evident-’ n i
.
^entj-al basis. Rut
-nne this process ad infinitum. At
C°n”
an evidential basis which
‘ “ ^ P°lnt "* ”USt reach
n suffj
-ees to establish
indubitabilitv ' 1 ownAA y* oelf-evid^n+-laent propositions and Q
SQCh evidential bases when
' '
' exPe^ences are
W °ne understands »
Proposition, one is n - .
" belj -
-evident
18 10 “ positi°n to recognize that «,indubitable
. When one has an experience one
"
experience, for experiences are ot th
_
' ^^
n- he sort of thinac ^
can doubt (Frankfu-t a
* ' gs one
vrxc Ki r , pp. 133-139)
.
Position to define Frankfurt's notion°- an evidential basis:
(D2)
-
13 an evidential basis for n-
E~df ® ew] udes all
reasonable ct T'cnr*
n
r. <-9 Una& f°r doUbt“3 that E , and either
(l) ® is self-evident, 4
QT ( \ o *vl:
-
~r -s an experience.
or (iii) 03 e w
•
—
-1 - either self~evidp>r - rwaen-. or an exper-
•a.once
, and e, excludes all reas-- -n-
-
-• -'-ubuiiaoic grounds
boabrinq that e) ( Frank fi-v-
..
J 'na ^urt, pp. 133- 139)
* 1 cannot
f while attend in a to ->J '° d pain 1 having, dout
u..a t
„ p -- that l * ir j r •
.
' " P “• My pain institutes an evidentia
18 °r E> anrt 1 ara in a position to clea~i v ." -'- 1V •'J j
c
<3 1 s1 1net!
v
perceive that n Vl ranhfUr t f rip T -3 rr
....
_ _
' 1J6)
- 1 clearly perceive
-iia
.
l
p if and onlv i f n,, Paj-n is an evidential basis f
v "~ C;Ilow the possibility that p rr e
.
and I recognize it to be so (Frankfurt, p. 136)
.
TO distinctly perceive that E , x must not confuse
Wlth PrOPOSiti°nS Wh°Se indubitability is not establish by
^ eVldential baSiS
' BUt
' - — says,
..xt is possiblt.
CO recognize that southing is certain without understanding
exactly what it is that is certain
.
.
." (Frankfurt, p. 13„
1 mi9ht
'
f°r example
' think Chat £ is equivelant to c,
"I have a pain in my leg," so that *y evidential basis for p
establishes the indubitability of o as well. As a result my
Clear perception becomes confused. a entails "I have a leg.'
a proposition I can reasonably doubt even while attending
u° my pain (Frankfurt, p. 136)
To avoid making my clearv —L perception conrused, I must
come to understand d fnii v t -in ,L --Uy. - tally understand when, for
all r, if E entails r, I understand that E entails r. Having
an exhaustive list of E 's entailments, 1 know exactly what it
is that my experience of pain conclusively establishes. My
^lo„,. perception V) at £ is also distinct (Frankfurt, p. 136 ).
Accordingly, we can formulate Frankfurt's definitions of c.lea.
ness and distinctness as follows:
(Fi) a. clearly perceives
-*-h =»+• — a* t
- ^ - nat: E
~df '£ is an evident u
bssis for p, and a recognizes that e is an evidential
basis for £) (Frankfurt, pp. 134 and 137)
0>!) a distinctly perceives that p -
fi£
a clearly perceives
" 1 - y :
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baS1S ° f then understands that
, q , (e entailq
SI tf and only if p entails a , ] and <*, (lf £ entails
thSn
-
UndSrStands «»t e entails r)>] (Prankfurt
p. 137)
111
• ANALYSIS OF (D2) - (D4)
(D4) contains a oenil i sr r-p -u. a Jsage of rhe term 1 entails'
The Varlable
S. ranges over evidential bases. These bases
are either propositions or experiences. One distinctly per-
ceive.. that £ only if he understands that p entails all and
only what is entailed by his evidential basis for p. If his
evidential basis is an experience, he must understand that p
entails all and only what is entailed by his experience. But
u ls propositions, not experiences, that have entailments.
J-hrs raifriculty is easily resolved, however. Be need only
substitute for ’entails' the words 'excludes all reasonable
grounds for doubting'. This terminology already appears
• in
' Tj2 '" and ifcs usage there would allow us to say that exper-
iences and propositions can exclude all reasonable grounds
for doubting that p.
On Frankfurt S s analysis, both ’clearness' and 'distinct-
ness are defined in terms of 'having a basis for excluding
ali reasonable grounds for doubting that p‘
. As Frankfurt
says
, "Clear and distinct perception is a matter of recogniz-
mg that, there are no reasonable grounds on which a proposition
v, an he doubled (! rankfurt, p. 135) . But what is involved
in recognizing that there are no reasonable grounds for
96
9 that £ - Something more than the sublet Lve - • •
is needed if Descartes is „ .
'
" °°nVlotlon
r to avord charges of psychologism
Although Frankfurt does not provjae ^ effect . ve pro _
cedure for ascertaining when we have a basis it -that excludes all
reasonable grounds for doubting that j>, his discussion c, , P
,'
f
-dent Propositions suggests a direction we might Pursue
.
Frankfurt says, "Sven the clear and distinct perception of a
self-evident proposition involves more thanc n apprehending the
proposition itself; it requires recognizing that no possible
state of affairs is inconsistent with the proposition" (Frank-
p. 134). Frankfurt is speaking loosely here. Propos-
itions are inconsistent with propositions and states of affairs
incompatible with states of affaire_ s. In speaking loosely of
ai£a "rs
' however
' Frankfurt seems to be acknowledging
that both experiences and propositions can be grounds for
doubting that ;p.
as far as propositions are concerned, we can state
Frankfurt's view in the following way:
O’j) a is a reasonable ground for doubting that p = r
i- consistent, and the conjunction of p and o entails
a contrad ict ion
„
Experiences can also be reasonable grounds for doubting that
ctj L-houg.i she situation is slightly more complicated:
CDS) An experience F is a reasonable ground for doubting
ihat.
j: ^2.’ *a represents E, and the con junction
•°f E and 2 entail s ^ contradiction
)
5
Having CDS) and (D6)
, we are in _
vhat ,
l ± a position to define
c
- it is for a proposition or an~ experience to exclude ailreasonable grounds for doubting that p T -
~
y n^ . i ri the case ofpropositions, we can say:
(D7) 2 excludes al l reasonable crounds fo- d •yxu tine t r oubting that.
~
"
df a 13 C°nSistent
' and - (Er) I(a and r) is con si,
bUt and £• is inconsistent]
in the case of experiences, we can s av;
(D 8 ) An experience E excludes -,niud. all reasonable grounds for
doubting that p = /-p rf \ s
*- df - represents E, and - (Er)
!(2 and r) is consistent, but (£ and r) is
inconsistent]
j
combining (D y
)
and (j \uj ) a iD8)
, we can sav that- vUlat £ — an experience
or a proposition - excludes all reasonable grounds for doubt-
->nt that E provided that there is no state of affairs or
proposition compatible w-i + h v •
‘ WlvJl £' but incompatible with p or the
state of affairs g represents.
d„..rl,e._. or ouEak and distinct perception that
Having set forth his definition of 'clearness' and
'distinctness'
, Frankfurt recognises that his analysis 3 S
spelt -
- 4-
USCi the term ! represents
' loosely. strip
t
p picpobitions represent possible states of a f
’
A
~
\
J
*r
;lcc
**
;
J' ut j:or every experience E, there is a p - r-~ •, having j.. A s having E is a state of affairs
, "and’ihere"if? c 5 ace oi affairs corresponding to everv e-
‘
' sents E” means "there is a state’sue! x that r
xpenence. In
of affairs S
usage cf
-Oj. responds to E, and a represents S. The samer r* <“i r. 4* ^ l • - . _ . _ / .A--. . - _ •—
- e_.'i ereii i,s ' appears in (D8) below.
rs of degree
problematic in part. PrankfnrfIU t says Descartes holds to thevxe« that both clarity and distinctne-s
-qu etn s are matte]
(Frankfurt
,
nr,
. 13 9
/
n \ «140)
- °"e can perceive that p more or
'es& Cj
-earl y, and one can perceive \-h *that p more or less
distinctly. When we loo 7 ' at- tpv - -
" •
-ankrtirt s definitions, however
we see that (D4 ) allows for degrees of di ,f • .-- - i stinctness but that
oes not allow for degrees of clarity.
Speaking loosely, we can say that (M) impiies that _01s fcmctly Perceives that E only if everything entailed bv
bis evidential basj s for ,,- -S £ is understood by him to be entailed
by his evidential basis for n ww10 £’ Whatever my evidential basis
e for o, e entails an infinite set of propositions P
- p . p .
_
E2 1 diStinCtly that E only if x understand
that e entails E , that e entails E , , that e entails p
and so on ad infinitum/ But as a finite being, X v2ot under-
stand this much (Frankfort np - 1431 • 0n the other hand, there
are rim te s-nbcif^f-c -f m r>
~
•-* ° ome ot these subsets will have p
as a member
, and of these subsets n ur
' some will have more member:
..
than others. if k io ,
~
l the heL having just p and p as members.,
cai. anQv-x stand that e entails p and that e entails 0.,, when
1 understand chrs much, I perceive that p with a certain
degree of distinctness.
The degree to which I distinctly perceive that
p_ can
' c ‘ r
^ ' hovevor * 1 can
'
tor example, make my perception that
P more distinct if I come to understand that c entails P as“ L2
wen a/. •£ and p., . As Frankfurt defines ‘ distinctness •
,
we do
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perceive more or less distinctly sc that n -
distinctness is
‘ebCdJrte s ’ view that3 md"tSr °f d^ree is preserved
When we turn to Frankfurt's definition of clehowever, we encounter difficulti
“i
both Claritv and d , , .
'
-^tnough Descartes holds
~
-
ncl istinctness tn a mutter nf „
cannot
, on (no\ ,
1 k a.ee f we
^
-
J
r perceive fh 3 fV tilaL P wore or le « s
evidential b^c r clearly. Thex Datj.T.S tor n ffi.-i-L.-i_,-, -iE eiuher does or doe- rw-
reasonable grounds for doubting that p „ -
311
p- is perfectly clear Cr it . „
* ^ "*
is inconsistent w th De
As a result, (D3 )
of claritv
aJ:teS ' th3t « degrees
car
To resolve this difficulty Prav,v - .
. '
--a-'Kturt argues that Delloot -P . ,es us' the term 1 cl
-learn©: r- t
L v h-1 different senses( r\ *' \ -i ~ - a i- i i fci S .J) elucrdates the first sense Tn -v,-- - I the second sense, a perseclearly perceive « rn3 .t
bv hin ,
2 Wten eVSrythi^ enhailed by p is kno,yJ i ria.m o oe entail aD u,.
,
y p
-
* rankfurt
,
p. 141). But as we
1,0 ’'°C db°Ve
'
1
one can clearly perceive that n v-J ‘ ~a r £ although he maviior understand xi ...
—
-id...
. t ly what p enta-i 1 - t T -- a~lo.
-as evidential basic
mav 'vn=5t i f-\ - i ; . >
roving a proposition he does not fully
understand. To fully understand -
- S E- one must have what Descart,
Cdj.j.3 adequa te knowledge *
(D9} § Adequately knows that o =- in),L ' J - E df (a) (ir ^ entails a,
then S knows that n \ > „
--
’ ' c ° 3) Frankfurt, pp. 14] -14
'Ul l'^ ia
s
sense, a person's ppr^enfinn + v *-
-opt o
..hac p can be more or less
cioar depending on the extent to which r » +. ••
"
n p c entailments
6See p. 9 4 above.
are
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known by him to be entailed by p In th -v E- is second sense,
° "lty iS
' aS DeSOartes matntains
, a matter of degree.
V. the minimal requirement for clear
and distinct perception
.
HaVin9 ShOWn that b°th c^earness and distinctness are
mattSrS °f
' lrt acknowledges another problem
-th his account. In the sense in which clearness is a matter
deSreP" °ne C;lear1
'’ that E only if everything
entailed by p is understood by him to be entailed by p.
Similarly one distinctlv perceive -h-w n .
-
ceives u at p only if everything
-ntailed oy his evidential basis for E is understood by him
to be entailed by that evidential basis. m both cases ade-
quate knowledge is rocrui rpr! rs,,.J acq ed. But adequate knowledge is a
level of knowledge we cannot attain y(Fiankfurt, p. 143). Human
beings always fall short of perfect clear -m* t » •Prii r and distinct percep-
tion and must settle for something less. But how much less?
What
.is needed is a minimum requirement for clear and
p-i caption. We need to be able to ascertain those
features of clear and distinct perception that suffice to al-
low Descartes
• rule of evidence to apply without error (Frank-
furt, p. 144). According to Frankfurt, one's perception
-u- mj a., M, ly clear if and only if one recognizes that his
evidential basis removes all reasonable grounds for doubting
th.it £. To have a minimally clear perception that p, one
must clearly perceive that £ in the sense in which clear
percept ion is not a matter of degree (Frankfurt, p. 144)
.
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istinctness is always a matter of decree v
in Frankfurt's view .
' * ' hOWever
'
- s we cannot fix ; i-,, .
t
-
tb nunrmal requirement.
* fu.i t says:
J.he sensible response is that tv.general solution; it calls fL problera admits of no“ each case. The appropriate £«*'**** of judgementalways be a function’ of the uLs to , ? , diStinctness will
? ^
Je
f
c
-LOn t:o be put . and of the
W
^
1C
,
1 the Proposition
.
it that seem likelv to ho f. “ . confusions conce
144-145)
.
' 1 be trou lesp (
Vi. CRITICISM OF FRANKFURT 1 S ACCOUNT
Criticism 1. Frankfurt is right when he claims that wc
clearly and distinctly conceive only if we clearly and dis-
<. xnctly perceive v, ->
^
'hot £ ’ XOr Some E- A Close reading of Des-
caries supports this view, and textual <s,/ a support seems to me tobe the best rlpfonco
- en,,e ol an interpretation. Although no add-
.vtional defense is needed Pranirftiv.1
• ' Irankrurt makes use of an argument
1 unconvincing.
Frankfurt argument can be summarized as follows. If
».o do not define ‘clear and distinct conception' in terms of
1 clear and distinct perception that', we are forced to inter-
pret Descartes' Rule as a rule that guarantees the material
° E V'V,t 13 Clearly and distinctly perceived. But if we
Di
'ra:le s ” CJh an interpretation, we saddle him with
an apriOXiCn he Probabl
.Y did not hold. To be fair to Descartes,
therefore, wc need an analysis of clearness and distinctness
that IS consistent wlth the view that Descartes' Rule guaran-
tees the formal truth of what is clearly and distinctly per-
ceivecl.
102
p
FranKfUrt ' S is unconvincing. Acceding to
we wnw be
— •—a^ if weted 10 hlm the View «“t his Rule guarantees the raat _oxxol truth Of what is clearly and distinctly perceived. ,t
' XrS '
_ glanCe> FrankfUrt ’ S P°int“ obvious. On Frankfurt ‘
3
view, an idea is, by definition, materially true if ancl c:, ...
“
lf Xt 18 eXemPUfied
- This ^finition of 'material truth' <
derived from a passage cited earlier.’ Xn this passage Des .
cartes does not define
'material truth'. Father he states a
sufficient condition for an -iaQ - • t1Qecl to be materially false. He
says that ideas are materially false "when thn.> - r u ney represent what
is not a thing as if it were a thing.
.
.
.»
Although Descartes does not define 'material falsity'
here, X will grant for the sake of argument that Descartes;
holds (D 10 } :
(1> 10) An idea i is material! v f a '- a _
~
L-X
-L 1 i? i ise “df 1 represents
what is not a thing as if it were a thing
•Since it is natural to suppose that 'material falsity' and
'material truth' are contradictories, we can define a mater-
ially erne idea as follows
i
(0 11) An idea i is materially true =
flf
i i s not mater-
rally false
(D 11 ) is ambiguous, however. Frankfurt thinks it means
CD 11a! :
See vi. 89 above.
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{D lla) An idea i is materially true - a
.
~
df i represents what1S 3 thlng as if ii: were a thing
11 ” ****
interpretation
T
11
“*• a-
What 15 clea«y and distinctly perceived, then his Rule seeto guarantee that the. object of clear and distinctu n-i-btinct percepti
exists
.
ms
cn
BUt VD 11} Can also be interpreted as (D lib)
:
(D ll.b; An idea i is materially true =-- i r<adf ~ represents what
iS n0t a thing as if it were not a thing
Both (D 11a) and (D lib) have peculiarities. On both inter-
pretations,
'material truth' and 'material falsity' are nor
contradictories t «- T7C, , ,“ We accePt < D Ha), those ideas that
represent what i s not- i
— a thing as n it were not a thing are
not materially true, and those ideas that represent what is
a thing as if it were not a thing are not materially false.
ily ideas can misrepresent wi i-hr-if k" 1 thout being materially false and
correctly represent Without being materially true. On (D lib),
the material truth and falsity of concepts i s not analogous
to the loimai truth and falsity of propositions. Since every
concept representing what is a thing is neither true nor false,
1 of excluded middle does not hold for concepts.
•-O nor. mow how to decide between (D 11a) and (D lib)
,
and I arn not claiming that (D 11b) is right. My only point
j 3 that "raftkfurt has not shown (D lib) to be false. .Accord-
inn to (D lib), an idea is materially true just in case it
satisfies two conditions: it nrn^tXL - mus represent what is not avhmg and it must represent i +P C as nonexistent
. There j „nothing in either +-u
ob . /
°f th6Se C°nditi°- that implies that the
°f a materially true idea exists Tf „
Ule guarantees the material truth of h ,a clearly and distinct]-./perceived ideas, it does not follow that u
to an . .
" l ^scartes is committed
^ e apriorism.
.
, ,
S~^SB “ GaSSendl
es failed to provide
method for ascertaining when we are clear]y ^
perceiving. This problem emerges again when we look at Pran„_
-t s definitions of clearness and distinctness. To clearlv
and distinctly Dercpivp
.
p e e that p, we must recognize that an
evidential basis for p eyrlnrioe _in
*-
fcXtll*d'-s a11 reasonable grounds for
doubting that E . But how can we be sure that „h-£-.ria.i. wnat wg ‘chunlc
WS re°0gniZe t0 be an Evidential basis for £ really exo]u(;£
311 reaSOnabla gr°Unds for doubting that p ? We need a decision
procedure, but Frankfurt does not provide one.
Criticise 3. i,ike Gewirth, Frankfurt thinks clearness
ana diotincjias are matters of degree. The best we car, have
if minimally clear and distinct perception. But on Frankfurf c
interpretation, the minimal requirement for distinctness
depends on what is appropriate under the circumstances.
"it
calls for an exercise of judgement in each case ." 8 For Frank-
furt, the re is; no effective procedure for deciding which per-
,JSce n, 101 above
ceptions are minimally distinct wi tv, .
,
.
. Without such a procedure
ov.'over
, we can never be sure that we
,
.
W ara Parceiving with a
dlstlnctness appropriate to the circumstances,
result Frankfurt’s interpretation makes Descartes
vulnerable to Gassendi's criticism.
^ ^ £ U. 2Tt 3 0 c; o 1
1
+- *
-
* t0 g
-
1V0 ^account Of clearness anddistinctness that permits a charitablet- t3.Lv. interpretation of
Descartes' Rule. But the net result 1=
^
"
' ls uncharitable. Prank-
*
- kD ciVQ 3 DP ^ p 3 ”y** 4— /-» r? . f
01,1 apI1
'0risin by leaving him vulnerable
to Gassendi ' s charcTr><5 * , .
J A Satlsfact°ry and charitable account
or clearness and distinctneso n: x s still needs to be provided.
iH
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CHAPTER x V
E. J. ASHWORTH'S ACCOUNT Op CLEARNESS
AND DISTINCTNESS IN DESCARTES
E. J. Ashworth's article or olsrit,, , , . .'
- an y and distinctness
in Descartes is basically critical.-1 Ashworth thinks that
Descartes eouivocated on the terms 'clear' ana 'aistincf and'^ MS rUlC °f SVidence be adequately defended. m
Sections I through IV, I discuss and. criticize Ashworth's
arguments to show that Descartes equivocated on the term
'clear'. In sections V through X, I do the same thing with
respect to Ashworth's discussion of distinctness. Finally
sections XI and XII, I consider Ashworth's criticism of
Descartes * rule of evidence.
I. TWO MEANINGS OF 'CLARITY'
Ashworth thinks Descartes equivocates on the terra 'clear
that every idea is either clear or obscure,
if not coextensive with the class of concep
it of consciousness is for Descartes an iclo,
ii a result, both sensations and concepts
are ideas, and both, can be said to be clear or obscure. The
•
,
E
:
Ashworth, "Descartes' Theory of clear and Distinctae*8» lr
?
Cartesian Studies, ed e.
, 1>w York .
Ashworth”s i
'
'
’ ™ fences toLLn ° article v/ili appear in the text.
Descartes believe
The class of idea
however
.
Any son
(Ashwort
. ,
n
, 9 2
)
ea;- !
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question is *
"When oe ^ •D6SCarteS Predicates
'clarity' of both con-
cepts and sensations, is he using this word in th,^ ‘if-o lq .in e same sense?"
In defining
'clearness' Descartes draws an analogy between
perception and eyesight (Ashworth, p. 96)
.
Ashworth believes
that this analogy shows a clear perception to be "some hind of
immediate awareness about which we cannot be mistaken" (Ash-
worth, p. 96). But if we view clear perception in this way,
problems arise. Since we are immediately aware of every concept
we refelct uPon, a simple act of ref^ctirn T7,^-i ,u - icr.L^CLj,on wo id enable us
co perceive clearly any concept whatever (Ashworth, 0 . 97).
2
Although Descartes' analogy between perception and eye-
sight seems to support the conclusion that all ideas are
clearly perceived, his discussion of fictional ideas supports
the opposite conclusion. Descartes believes that fictional
ideas can be clearly or obscurely perceived depending on whe-
thei chey are understood or misunderstood. If we understand
a fictional idea, we are able to give a "full definition" of
a term expressing that idea (Ashworth, pp. 98-99). \ fuj 1
definition is an enumeration of terms denoting all and only
essencial properties of the object our concept represents
(Ashworth
,
pp. 9 8-99). Experience, shows us that we are at
times unable to give full definitions. Since we have concepts
v.-e do nou understand, we can obscurely perceive some ideas
we reflect upon. Despite Descartes' analogy, we can avoid
2 ~,For a more comprehensive treatment of the same point,
see the chapter on Gewirth, pp. 4-6 above.
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saddling Descar-f-**y caites with the view that ,nr.nat all ideas are clearlyperceived if we take clarify to be a e
A „
5 ° S functio» of understanding
3 worth counters that we are trading one problem for
another, x» defending Oescartes from the charge that all
arS
.
Clearly PerCSiVea
' We— «*» vulnerable to a charge of
ecmivocation Tiarif,,!ariLy SeGras have two different senses.
There rs the clarity of sensations and the clarify of concepts
Ashworth thinks that Descarf-***Cartes analogy between clear percep-
tion and eyesight shows clear perception of .a sense datum to
be a matter of immediate awareness. Since I am Mediately
aware of all my sensations, I clearly perceive every sense
datum I am having.
Clear perception of a concept involves more than
immediate awareness, however Analv^’e c. . ,x * a ysis is required. I must.
analyze my idea into constituents representing all and only
properae0 of the objects of my idea. But such
involve® more rhan immediate awareness, when predi-
cated of concepts, ’clarity' has one meaning; when predicated
C'l sense dana, it has another (Ashworth, pp. 9 8-99}
.
II. DOBS DESCARTES' ANALOGY SUPPORT
ASHWORTH'S INTERPRETATION?
If the clear perception of a sense datum were a matter
of immediate awareness, Descartes would be guilty of using
'clarity' inconsistently. But the analogy between clear
perception and eyesight allows for more charitable interpret-
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auions. Descartes says:
attentive mind^L^h^same^rav0 '11 an<3 apPar6nt to an
objects clearly when, being SLen/to^h^r thM*e see^operate upon it with sJficient'strength^A&S?
Ashworth is right when he claims that we are Mediately aware
sensations. But in the above quotation Descartes does
* compare a clearly perceived -in t-i-' i •,
.
L idea with a clearly perceived
sensation
. Instead,, he compa^e^ -> pi o a .r ir s a cle rly perceived idea with
a clearly perceived object - the sort of thing that is pres-
ented to an eye but not to a mind. We are not tempted to think
that we clearly perceive every object presented to our regard-
r. c eye. The object must "operate" upon the eye with “sum-
cient strength."
Jt 1S GaSy to iraa9'irie cases where the object of percep-
tion does not operate with sufficient strength upon the regard-
J ’ny e
"
e * If J ' aia drivin9 on a foggy night and see something
in the road before me, an object is present to my regarding
eye. But, ordinarily, I would not be inclined to assert that
1 see that object clearly. in fact if T n , -i j... i.aau, x asKea, I would denv
that r see it clearly. After all, I cannot even make out
enough features to tell whether what I am observing is a man,
J 1 ^'- c f or a lock. Descartes' analogy does not sup-
port the conclusion that all ideas are clearly perceived.
Moreover, his analogy does not support the conclusion
that clear perception is a matter of immediate awareness.
Dbscur u- perceptions can be made clear i.i the proper procedure
110
is followed
. if I Slowly approach the object in the road and
turn on my parking lights, 1 may be afale to identify^ T
see as a man. First I notice that th,6
-M e figure is human. Then
1 observe other features and t am
* 1 m PrePa.red to assert that what
1 866 13 3 man
' My—tion depends on a process of class-
ification and inference. More than immediate awareness is
involved
.
Ashworth
' s interpretation of Descartes’ analogy is
uncharitable
. If „e accept Ashworth's interpretation, we sad-
dle Descartes with an inconsistency. If clear perception is
3 matter ° f immadiate awareness, then all ideas are clearly
perceived — a view Descartes expressly denies. We need not
accept Ashworth's interpretation, however. The text admits
a plausible and more charitable alternative, and in fairness
to Descartes, we should adopt the most charitable interpret-
ation available.
HI. WHY ASHWORTH INTERPRETS DESCARTES'
ANALOGY UNCHARITABLY
I Mh.in.iC ' can offer a reasonable guess as to why
Ashworth gives an uncharitable reading of Descartes' analogy.
Strict .
j
y speaking
, Descartes never perceives external ob jects
J '""' of perception are always mental entities —
surrogates for external objects. As a result, one might be
L( -'
-Mink. that, the object seen clearly when present to
-he. regarding eye is an object of consciousness, an object of
m
which we are immediately aware. But the object n00 i c. Descartes 1-refemng to is an object that .«
” '
a
b Fresent to a regarding evea" °'3e°tS °f C°nSCiousne^ are not such objects obje -/
'
i consciousness are ore-on +- -iP 10 a re9arding mind, not to aregarding eye..
in the passage cited above, 3 Descartes is speaking
oosely
. ho is, alter all, drawing an analogy. Analogies are
useful when they draw on something familiar to help one to
understand something unfamiliar. m the =bovc n- ue. an
o
ie passage, Des-
cartes uses the f •; >•<=+
.--rot person plural. He is talking to his
reader and referring his reader to „ .d familiar experience
the experience of asserting that an object is clearly seen.
ln reflective moments Descartes himself ha- r **‘“i r s made such asset-
irons
, and he reviews with his reader the conditions under
SUCh cl&serl
-LOns are ordinarily made. There are three
condi ti on s
,
(1) the eye is regarding;
("5 tne ob iect is present to the eye, and
(3/ the object operates upon the eye with sufficient
strength
.
p..esu„,,ibly, these three conditions are analagous to the
three conditions Descartes spells out in his definition of
clarity: the regarding eye is analagous to the attentive mind,
the object being present to the eye is analogous to the
-ViSee p. 110 above
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ohn e ct of con ^
p
t t •
••-Ouontos osincT
'D2rG c? o,nh j_
u
g Prese t in the mind, and the
3SCt °Perating UPOn the *ith sufficient strength is ,na.
^ O \xS to tto ol'h "1 /*; 4- -T •object of consciousness being apparent to the
mincK In the example I gave of driving on a foL ggy night, the
object cl i d Dot o rho v» —> j-
_
°Per“te on ** with sufficient strength:
x could not make out its identifying features. it had these
features all along, but they did not appear to me. Using
Gewxrth terminology, we could say that the object was nor.
"open" to my inspection. What I needed to do was to get a
loo,. ... to scrutinize the object more carefully.
Analogously, ideas have contents that are not always
open to the mind's immediate inspection. Further scrutiny or
dlYSj"S 'L “ ne ‘- aed
- For an idea to be apparent to the mind,
the mind may have to perform operations that reveal the con-
tents of the idea. Immediate awareness is not enough.
Ashworth probably misinterpreted Descartes' analogy
because he knew that Descartes believed that, strictly speak-
ing, we never perceive physical objects. On the other hand,
I do not think Ashworth would so readily have overlooked what
Descartes actually said if independent considerations did sot
seem to him to support the view that clear perception is a
matter of immediate
.awareness
.
-CV. 14ORE ARGUMENTS IN DEFENSE OF
ASHWORTH
' S INTERPRETATION
Ashworth r s interpretation of Descartes’ analogy entails
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that all ideas are clearly perceived. Although I think I
have argued convincingly that Descartes- analogy allows for
“ m0re Charitable interpretation, Ashworth thinks that his
view is supported by additional evidence which I have not,' as
yet, considered. Ashworth says:
*- he
cSoSf
s
' ?\the sort when we ' consider' then si t- ’Tt ,°“10r th l '>gs ofthoughts." He appeals to the exm 111 'show how a perception „av ’e "ere nam to(Ashworth, p. sell y ® ar wlthout being distinct
Ashworth refers to three separate passages here. Let us con-
s.ider each in turn.
• There is a footnote error in Ash-
worth's article. The reader is referred to page forty- throe
of Haldane and Ross, volume II (Ashworth, p. 96). But there
is no mention of a jaundiced man on this page. There is svcr.
a reference on the preceding page, however. I assume this is
is the passage to which Ashworth is referring
The passage reads as follows:
Ifc
J;
s
. ihoeed clear that no one possesses such fperfeet
}
cercarnty
.in those cases where there is the ve--y y ---
confusion obscurity in our pe: Lon;
wnatev^r sort it be, is sufficient to make u-oouol here
. In matters perceived by sense ]
clearJy, certainty does not exist, because we nave on-e^Tno tea that error can occur in sensation, as in the instance
,
tJ;ie
.
thirst of the dropsical man
,
or when one who isjaundiced sees snow as yellow; for he sees it thus with
no less clearness and distinctness than we see it as white.
J.f
r then, any certitude does exist, :,.t remains that it
.must be found only in the clear perceptions of 1 ho
intellect
.
4
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Although Descartes
"sneaks nr- +->2£ the 'jaundiced man who sees Bnow
"an
'
S PerCePtiOT iS and distinct
. Kathet^e
y n_ Cc.se of the jaundiced man to show „ cus that we cannot
di
"
SenSeS> ”hat DeS— - -ying is that the jaun-tcea man sees as clearly and distinctly as the normal person
n°rmal PerSOn ’ S sense Perceptions are obscure
and C°nfUSed
- AShW°rth
- mistaken
. Descartes does not _
the jaundiced man example to show that sensation is a model
of clarity. On i-hp , .
- contrary, his example shows that sensation
is a model for obscure and confused perception.
Another consideration shows Ashworth's view of the
jaudiced man to be wrong. it follows from Ashworth's inter-
1 ° -c-tlon uhat Descartes is implicitly denying his own rule
cf evidence. Asnworth's interpretation draws heavily upon
Descartes' claim that the jaundiced man sees with no less
Clearness and distinctness than the normal person. This claim
seems to imply that both the jaundiced man and the normal
observer perceive clearly and distinctly. But if we adopt
this interpretation of Descartes' remarks, we face the fol-
lowing difficulty. Although both the jaundiced man and the
normal observer perceive clearly and distinctly, they hold
contrary Iwjrrefs that cannot both be true. But Descartes' Rule
: atev< r 1 nd distinctly e ceived
4
HR, II, 42.
as
trUe * Theref°re, Descartes * Rule is false.
.
This difficulty is avoided once we realise that Descartes1S n0t Sayln9 that Sense perceptions are clear and distinct
se. Clearness and distinctness are matters of degree
’’he hSalthy PerS °n ' S P^on has very little clearness and
distinctness
. i» other words, it is very obscure and confused,
^ th0 0 xs no ^ ^ c* 4-SaSOn t0 SUpP°se ^at Descartes' Rule should
apply to very obscure and confused perceptions.
Clear and distinct perceptions fall under Descartes' M,
When a minimum requirement is met. Only clear perceptions
of the intellect
.meet this requirement. The jaundiced man
example does nor show us that sense perception is for Descartes
a model for clarity. On the contrary, it is a model for
perception that fails to meet the minimal requirement.
— &5MS££. knowledge of pain and color. To
support: the view that clear perception is a matter of immed-
iate awareness about which we cannot be mistaken, Ashworth
"COD'- paooege a sentence from Principle LXVIII
Of the Principles ; "We have a clear and distinct knowledge
°" paln
' cclour
'
and ^her things of the sort when we consider
tllem : ' J
-
nply as sensations or thoughts" (Ashworth, p. S 6 )f
I no hot. see how this passage supports Ashworth's view. The
passage cites a sufficient condition for having clear and
; knowledge
. It cites neither a necef
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sufficient condition for havin, clear and distinct perception. 6
But even if we ignore the distinction between clear and
distinct knowledge and clear and distinct perception, the
passage does not entail any of Ashworth's claims. Descartes'
point seems to be that our sense perceptions are clear and
distinct or obscure and confused depnding on what we "consider
By ltS6lf
'
my sense Perception is neither clear
nor obscure, distinct nor confused .clan ty ana distinctness
entei the picture only when we reflect upon our sensations and
make judgements about them
.
8
Ashworth is mistaken. clarity
18 not just a matter of immediate awareness.
Ashworth is also wrong when he claims we cannot be mis-
taken about our sensations. Principle LXVIII suggests we can.
Instead of making the informed judgement that my pain is a
sensation or thought, I could judge that my pain is in my foot.'
Tnere is nothing in my immediate awareness of pain that forces
me to judge correctly about my pain.
ll^LY. have thouc?ht
. Principle LXVIII supports
— Although the passage Ashworth cites does
not. support his interpretation, we can speculate as to why
he thought it did. I suspect Ashworth thinks Descartes is
C, Sao my discussion, pp. 6 8-71 above.
foee Gewirth on this point, pp. 7-8 above.
8
bee Frankfurt on this point, pp. 90-91 above.
Fee Principle LXXI
,
HR 1, 249-250.
1X7
Pi^idg US a WaTn i n a i n 4- I-,/-,wcixuxiig m the passage nifpH •t c ted. He is warning us
° confine our judgement to what we are immediately aware of.
Gxnce a pain in a sensation or thought, we are immediately
aware of a sensation or thought whenever we are in pain
10
“ •' ••»*». „„„„» „„
““ “ *“* ” “ immediately «, „„ „
In
-aome sente, clear and distinct perception appears to be a
matter of immediate awareness. But in what sense?
Vne sense in which clarity is now a matter of immediate
IS not the sense Ashworth wants, for clarity is now
a matter of confining our judgement to contents of which we
ere immediately aware. Since we are not forced to restrain
our judgement in this way, we can have perceptions about which
we an. mi.-, t-aken
. if Descartes is warning us to restrain our
judgement in Principle
'
LXVIII
,
his warning does not support
Ashworth's account of clarity.
—
L®- The last passage Ashworth cites in
support of his interpretation comes from Principle XLVI
. Here
De,j s •cz/s
,
hhen, for instance, a severe pain is felt,
the perception of this pain may be very clear, and yet for all
mac nor. distinct.
. . .
;,
'U
Ashworth does not indicate why
4 , ,
,A' (, v y 'O immediately aware of a sensat ion or thought
u.t. g,oa„ recognizing that it is a sensation or thought we are
rmried lately aware of.
'HR I, 2 37.
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he believes this passage supports his view so once -b °' again, weare forced to conjecture about Ashworth's reasoning.
SlnCE PrinClple XLVI rmmediately follows Descartes'
definition of clearness and distinctness rmcL es , I suspect Ashworth
takes Descartes to be elaborating on his analoav 1J J- s gy between cla-
rity and sensation. It seems nat-vir-u +. • .° llatu dl to interpret this elab-
oration m the following way- When T w
-L a,JVS a severe pain, m
y
perception is clear; when I have a mi id m-Snl pai , my perception
is obscure
. vi owed i n i- v, i ~l tn,s Clarity Of sense perception
seems to be a function of the inters i t,. - --n i y oi sensation, and
this intensity is part of our immediate awareness when we sense
{.r<
—ding interpretation of Principle XLVI is one
Ashworth accepts, it does not go far enough. Although we now
have a perfectly good sense in which clarity can be said to
be a matter of immediate awareness, problems arise with two
ether theses Ashworth holds. These theses are (i) that we
cannot be mistaken about what we clearly perceive and (ii)
that all ideas are clear.
Descartes explicitly denies (i) in Principle XLVI itself.
He says we can make false judgements about a clearly perceived
severe pain. Whether our pain is severe or mild, we can make
Lh0 oi' thinking our pain is -in our foot. Judgement
abou
- ,.>na s sensation is independent of the intensity of the
rioat.'on fc.lt 4 if intensity of sensation determines clarity,
th„n
.it appears that clarity is a matter of immediate awareness
about which we can be mistaken.
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Turning to Ashworth's second i •W unclear ideas Sor ^ “ «- «« - d°
Pajn c ,
e ‘Se PerCSptions ^ vary i„ intensity.
“n be S6Vere °r If intensity of .en,«ti
‘
,T ,
.
-
U
-L s sa on tor-
0
ity
' ^ a
—— *
—
is having an
and ASh™ iS
— -— - -
„IVI
"
aVe triea t0 f°rmUlate an interpretation of Principle
WO"ld “Plain "’hy AShworth thi„ks this principle sup-
P01ti “1S V1SW
- In the interpretation presents
^ ^ CrltiCiZing 3 U"e reasoning that is not Ashworth
' AShWOrth d°es n0t tell us why he thinks Principle
hi,VI supports his view, this i s the best I can do.
V. ASHWORTH
’ S ACCOUNT OF 'DISTINCTNESS'
Ashworth thinks Descartes' use of 'distinctness- is as
vague and inconsistent as his use of 'clarity' (Ashworth
, p .
"K U3Ually
' the predicate 1 distinct * seems to suggest two
things: that the idea in question is complete, and that we
have ar, adequate basis for making some sort of judgement, though
°n1y th® neC°nd appUes to i^oas of sensations" (Ashworth, o.
99>
’
:
’
:
’ to elucidat Oescartes
’
’ dl Jtinctn ’• But o n ,
“ ‘n ”ont‘iste!it
. When predicated of sensations,
'distinctness-
bus one meaning; when predicated of concepts, it has another,
Eve.y distinctly perceived sensation must satisfy two condi-
'xhrough.out his article Ashworth speats loosely about
i:
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tions: it must be complete
-it
.
.
" ' dnd Xt must P^ido an adequate
uasis
- or judgement. a distin-M,,ctly perceived concept must sat-lsfY only one of tiles** cnnrli s -i ,ond tions, however: it must be complete
VI. ASHWORTH'S JAUNDICED MAN CRITICISM OP
DESCARTES' ACCOUNT OF DISTINCTNESS
Ashworth claims that there are other equivocations
besides the one that appears in Descartes' ordinary use of
'distinctness'. To ill nQfr a +-Q i •lust te his point, Ashworth refers us
to Descartes' jaundiced man. Ashworth thinks Descartes is tel-
ling us that the jaundiced man perceives distinctly. But the
jaundiced mar. cannot be perceiving distinctly in the sense in
Which a distinct perception is one that provides an adequate
basis for judgement, for the jaundiced man judges falsely on
the basis of what he perceives. In predicating
'distinctness'
of the :iaundiced man ' s perception, Descartes appears to be
departing from his ordinary usage. The jaundiced man perceives
distinctly in the* sense t-h-g-i- .* ° ° tlicU
- he is able to distinguish the
snow from the people walking in it (Ashworth, p. 99 )
sahnna
S
?ht°t°1!ff-and ^stinct perception. When it !
i . u O.JLU UJ-GciJ? einci Cl 'I r l n r+*
th.r^e^lcar^^-if-^ea3 of c^^Pts or ideas as 'concepts
confn-ion Ihc-- f
distinct
. See Ashworth, p. 100. Ashworth’s
n
”
-rp
ks
,
V1BW that a11 objects of conscious-
#
®
* inn ?
so that both sensations and concepts aie ideas
htT- P
*
'
i
a
^°VQ - • °n this ^alysis there are ideas as sen-
salons and ideas as concepts. But we can drop the cumbersome
(
Laea
f
.
as locution and speak simply of clear and distinct
sensations and clear and distinct concepts i.f we keep in mindmat botn. sensations and concepts have contents.
121
‘iss cartes were i n tfact claiming that the jaundiced
"I6’ diStinCtl- — -™ have to concede that
IS Uoing
'distinctness' equivocally. Rut as lpomteo out earlier, Descartes is not making such a claim 13
Wten Pr°Perly UnderSto°d
' Descartes 1 point i s this : thejaundiced man's sense perceoti'mp on is as confused as the normal
person ‘ s „ And t-h i ^ •
" 1 lm 1S oe rtainly consistent with what
Ashworth believes is Deqnvr Qr,i“ ^-e_, usual use of 'distinctness'.
vil. ASHWORTH'S CRITICISM OF DESCARTES'
account of completeness
I. Ashworth is giving a correct analysis of Descartes'
typical use oj distinctness’, we cannot understand what Des-
cartes moar.s by distinctness' until we know what he means by
'completeness'. But Ashworth thinks Descartes' treatment of
completeness is so confused that Descartes does not even know
whether it is clear or distinct ideas that are complete
(Ashworth, P. 100). TO illustrate Descartes' confusion,
Ashworth tries to show that Descartes believes there are some
clear ideas that are complete. Ashworth argues as follows:
But other remarks suggest that it. is clearness rather th-n
: ™„TailS completeness for he [Descartes]
IT- ; r* ;
hat Wc~ can liave a cnsti.net understanding of dvr-
* r~°
11
'
^
roer / a-ud number if we do not mingle with the^-
-ombb -
fc be
'Tr t0 the “"“Ption of sSstS^SL
,trv'• r
complete idea, since it is of a complete objectwouIq have to include the defining characteristics ofoLbstance (Ashworth
f . p.. 100) .
.13
>
-e pp „ 114-116 above
222
Ashworth's argument dope rio +- -
T
63 n0t SUpp°rt «"* conclusion he wants.
*ns C6SQ oil 3 llnnnv*i—} ^ i -isupposing the COnclusi°" that some clear ideas are
complete, it supports the corcjutm .' Iusxon that some distinct ideas
are incomplete.
Descartes does believe there are complete clear ideas
nowever
. Every distinct idea is for Descartes <W« so that
there are at least as many complete clear ideas as there are
distinct ideas. Because both clear ideas and distinct ideas
Can ^ C°rapiete
' AShW°rth tWnke Descartes is confused about
W ‘‘at “ iS tJ‘at iS COBp;,ete'- 3^t there is no confusion in
thinking that two types of ideas have a property in common.
A difficulty would arise if Descartes thought complete-
ness was the defining characteristic of both clear ideas and
distinct ideas, for then these two types of ideas would be
indistinguishable. But there is nothing ir, Descartes' admis-
sion that there are clear complete ideas that suggests that
completeness is the defining feature, or even a defining
£e atu re,- of ales.r i de as
.
Vt.i.u ANOTHER POSSIBLE EQUIVOCATION ON
Lb£CARTES
' USE OF 'DISTINCTNESS'
Although Ashworth has not succeeded in showing Descartes
to be confused about completeness, his argument resurrects the
criticism that Descartes is guilty of an equivocation. If
r-scai i.es
' ideas of duration, order, and number can be both
HR I, 237
distinct and
.incomplete, then Descartes i < ao s deviating from whatSU?POSSd ^ bS ^ tyPlCal
- Of 'distinctness.. But aredistinct ideas of duration, order, and number incomplete?
Asnworth argues as follows:
(1) Someone, a, has a distinct idea of
duration, order and number.
™ Assimpt .1on
(2) A complete id.-a ^ ,• qkJ an of a complete
object.
Premise'
(3) An idea of duration, order, or number
15
j® nCt an idea of Q complete object. - Premise J. 6
(3 1
, h's ideas of duration, order, and number
" XG both distinct and incomplete. (1 j ( .^
A-h^rtn develops tms argument on the strength of Principle
LV '’ 111 PrinClple LV Descai'tes tens us that, one can have
a distinct idea of duration, order, or number so that (1) ie
an assumption that can be discharged. (3) seems to be anrJy-
ticaliy true. 18 So the only premise remaining open to question
is { 2)
MteEthls defense of U). Ashworth argues in defense
oi \ 2) in the following way
:
—
1 J.
15c- e p 122 above.
16Ibid.
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In 13)
,
'number* is synonymous with its usage in theexpression * a number of x s '
.
These
To have a complete ir!o=> , .
that idea all the delinino cL°act
is
.
to “elude within
“ q^stion, or onlv SosI ^f^etxstics of the objectbe denied of it without contract'd 1CS whi<'h cannotincluded, then the object itself -;!'!,' 1 - these are allf°r " “lrt
-
-
9This ar— *- - support (2) . Ashworth is defini;;-
J4K
"'h"' “ 13 t0 be a C°mplete idea ° f
- But What Ashwort
needs is a definition of what it is to b~ *l -° a complete idea.
Ashworth seems to give us the defir,-;^-*cu finition we need in a
passage that refers +-r> +v,«S Lhe one 3ust cited. He says:
[on clarity] are reminiscent of the account he (Dei
cartes] has already given of a complete idea as containing all
and presumably only, defining characteristics „
P- 98> - We have a di
-repancy hare. In the first passage the'
term defined was 'being a complete idea of an object'. In the
second passage the term defined
-i e * u •a imcci is being a complete idea'.
^et the second passage -> qnnnncp^ „-- supposed to review ror us what is
-aid in the first passage.'19
can resolve
-his discrepancy in one of two ways:
either Ashworth is saying precisely what he intends to say in
the second passage or he is speaking elliptically. If we adopt
the second alternative, then the second passage reiterates
h-.hwoi.tn s definition of 'being a complete idea of an object'
.
nnd we have a definition that is not germane to a defense of (2)
19m .pys- nre actually two discrepancies in the passages1 ' d h - tL°nd Passa9® qualifies Ashworth's original ac-count or completeness. y m u
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«.
-op, »,
„
r;.r~- r
“* i"—
• * « «.
oOiinition of 'completeness
'
:
(D) a complete idea x contains all and only
defining features of what x represent,
<D! aOS * n° l SUPP°rt (2) > however
- consistent with the
possibility that there are complete ideas that are not complete
ideas of objects
,
Our ideas of duration, order, and number are such ideas.
Although complete, they are not complete ideas of objects
We knOW that the
-““1 Properties of substance - extension
and thought - are not part of the essence of duration, order
or number. If we include Extension and Thought in our concepts
of these attributes
,
we render our concepts incomplete. But
if we exclude Extension and Thought and include all and only
essential features of duration, order, and number, our ideas
are complete. Yet these complete ideas are ideas of attributes
rather than complete ideas of objects, if (D) is the
tion Ashworth means to give us, then (2) is false.
-
'
- 121 • " ’ hap wort could jiop
an°th ense
'
but J d° not think it would 1
him to do so. m conjunction with his definition of 'distinct-
ent:ai i
- s that there are no distinct ideas of pro-
perties. To be distinct
, an idea must be complete. But (2)
that all ideas of properties are incomplete so that
no ideas of properties are distinct. Vet Ashworth's own dis-
cussion of the ideas of duration, order, and number shows UE
th»t there are distinct ideas of properties. So either
Ashworth's definition of ' disti nctneco ' ju ss is wrong or (2) is
c\X S0 * i)inCG ( 2 j rlrioc i- v_ n
" paay a crhcial role in Ashworth’s
overall interpretation rn -t-n- i •V ' U) 1
-’ the claxm he should abandon.
IX. ASHWORTH'S CRITICISM OF DESCARTES'
CRITERIA FOR GOOD GROUNDS
FOR JUDGEMENT
Ashworth thinks Descartes is confused about the con-
Under lvh
-L ^h an idea provides good grounds for judgemen
Descartes is alleged to shift his criteria for good grounds
depending on wbetner the idea in question is a sensation or
concept
. Although a sensation provides an adequate basis
for judgement only if it is clear and distinct, 20 Ashworth
argues that the clearness and distinctness of a concept is
neither necessary nor sufficient for providing such a basis.
He says:
hi-J
* oon
G
ept is a complete idea we already
.
e good
,
pounds for judgement; whereas if a distinct
.idea can be incomplete, we will not have sufficientgrounds (Ashworth, p. 100)
.
vve have two arguments here — one to show that clearness
Ashworth, p. .100. It is clear from what follows thatAsnwcrth intends clearness and distinctness to be a necessary
ana sufficient condition tor providing adequate grounds for
! uagement
,
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anu distinctness is not necessarvy, the other to show that
clearness an* distinctness is not sufficient, tor provide
adequate grounds for judgement. Before criticizing these
arguments
,
I will try to cHve a* J fa±r Presentation of each;
argument I
U) If t.neie are clear complete concepts, then there
are ideas that are not clear and distinct but that
do provide good grounds for judgement.
C) There are clear complete concepts.
(3) There are ideas that are net clear and distinct
but
.-hat do provide good grounds for judgement.
,r)
.u not the conditional Ashworth wants. (1) i s false if,
u- a matter o, tact, there are clear complete ideas and every
such idea is distinct. What Ashworth wants is (l') :
(!') If there are concepts that are clear and complete but
confused, then there are ideas that are not clear and
distinct but that do provide good grounds for judge-
ment
.
11 Ve Saosc:it”te (*v ) tor (1), however. Argument I is invalid.
We need to amend (2) to (2’) where ('? '
'
v > '“‘tii, \
)
1.0 tue antecedent of
) . Now (3) follows.
ARGUMENT II
(4) If there are distinct incomplete ideas, then there
cii e clea.i and distinct ideas that do not provide
good grounds for judgement.
.12 8
(5) .There are distinct incomplete ideas.
(6) There a.t'© fi par . r, j •
~ e Qna distinct ideas that do nor
provide good grounds for judgement.
(4) is not the premise Ashworth wan^s But «" r * since Descartes
holds every distinct- i jCt lded to De clear, we can let (4) pass
.
U-3TH IlOV/
"t* O n c* 1 +- > A r~cisro Of Arguments I and li„ The
problematic premises are (2') and ( 5 ) B°th are supposed to
follow- from DcscsyfAe • ^ •
-ej dlSCUSElon °f the ideas of duration, or-der, and number. A^hwArfit r , . ,s worth thinks Descartes' discussion shows
on the one hand that there arP i. •c Incomplete ideas and on
the other hand that there are ™ 4 .le°i complete ideas that are con-
fused. But as I argued in the last section, Ashworth has not.
presented a convincing case. And lacking such a case, he. has
not. shown us that Arguments I and II are sound. For all we know,
Descartes does not deviate from the view that all and only clear
ano distinct ideas provide adequate grounds for judgement.
X> m CRITICISM OF ASHWORTH'S ACCOUNT OF DESCARTES'
USUAL USAGE OF 'DISTINCTNESS'
After presenting his account of Descartes* usual usage
t.^i.n.uasi,
, Ashworth, argues that this account creates
problems for Descartes. In Sections VI through IX, I argued
thar., if correct, Ashworth's account does not produce the
problems ne ihinrs ft does. Now I want to consider Ashworth's
account itself.
' nis account is problematic. Ashworth maintains that
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Descartes is cruilfi/
sens
"
' 7 311 eq"1V°Cation- When predicated ofations,
‘distinctness' h- s nno
nf
meaning; when predicatedot concepts it has another. Concent. ,' '- Pt- are distinct if andonly it they are comniofny li plete; sensations if ar»* ,S dnd only if thev arpcomplete and provide adnrm- +-P 6 ^equate grounds for judgement.
Ashworth gives i->q
, . .
partlal defen
- of his account ofdistinctness. He H, fp C 4- T ,tW° eXamPles deigned to show a ai ,..ti.ict sensation to ba an ide=- th-i
.
' 63 C tlt Prides adequate groundsior judgement
, but he cive- nnJ ' d ±snss whatever of his claim
a da sum cm, concept need only be complete. in fact<> a
J-ater passage suggests that a distinct concept has to be com-
plete and Provide adequate grounds for judgement. Defining
a clear and distinct idea, Ashworth says:
A. clear and distinct i ripn . ,
any ref i°ctina mi na s * * musu be both aooarent to
If contra 1 on?y^hat
S
is°
d * -Acting mind,
standing and hence it™? • essentlal *>* this under-
of judgements about'tif ide^ttehSfpf^oS?! "Bklns
Presumably the grounds contained are good grounds. And the
good grounds are provided by the completeness of the idea.
Since completeness is the defining feature of distinct concepts
it follows that every distinct concept provides adequate
grounds for judgement.
Asnworth. could reply that providing adequate grounds for
judgement is a necessary condition for, but not a defining
characteristic of, the distinctness of concepts. So the
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distinction between di n,-+- ^stinct: concepts and distinct sensationslemams. Such a reply seems perfectlv revn i1 asonable, but the
same reply can be made to Ashworth's claim that providing
adequate grounds for judgement is a defining feature of die-
t j.nct sensations.
*1X^0 J7 tl"I cl £-* "f G* t'i c; t p n i •uerends his claim as follows:
I-™;.
1 0.TS& j& r„rs: “lor* b’—:
sations?
h
Againf^evere^aT^i^ ^
not distinctly because 1 h^fusethe^eib®! ?learly b-Jtpain with my judgement about~its " of thethink that the pain h a ~ a i 1 t nalUTie ' 1 • e. I tend to
although this may not be jistifi°biw-
a Physical cause,i u r.itiable (Ashworth, p, 99)
Ashworth's remarks here do not support the claim that provid-
ing adequate grounds for judgement is a defining characteristic
of distinct sensations. What Ashworth says is consistent with
an interpretation that holds completeness to be the defining
feature of distinct ideas. On this interpretation, every
distinct idea is, by definition, complete. And every complete
idea provides adequate grounds for judgement. Consequently,
every distinct sensation provides adequate grounds for judge-
meri ' ex?en though Providing such grounds is not a defining
ciiar a cteristic of dis tinctne s s
.
In criticizing Ashworth, I am not arguing that Descartes
ovoiaed equivocating on his ordinary usage of 'distinctness'.
aL
‘ P° ini.ing out 'chat Ashworth has not demonstrated that
Descartes did equivocate. To prove that Descartes is guilty
01 an equivocation, Ashworth needed to substantiate the
l_l.
131
following two claims:
!i) Providing adequate grounds for judgement is a defininq
feature of distinct sensations.
(ii) Providing adequate grounds for judgement is not: a .
defining feature of distinct concepts.
Ashworth substantiates neither of these claims, however. ?or
all we know, Descartes is not guilty of the equivocation of
which Ashworth accuses him.
XX. ASHWORTH'S CRITICISM OP DESCARTES' RULE
To utilize Descartes' Rule, we need to be able to :i dent-
lfy °Ur ClSar 803 distinct ideas. Ashworth thinks Descartes
oepaiated tns clear and distinct from his obscure and confused
ideas by ascertaining whether he was deceived by judgements
based on these ideas. If one is deceived, then one's idea
rs not clear and distinct (Ashworth, pp. 101-102)
. Like
Kenny, Ashworth thinks this approach is illegitimate. If
Descartes is identifying his clear and distinct ideas by ascer-
taining whether judgements based on them are true, then
Descartes is arguing in a circle. To know by his rule whether
judgement based on an idea is true, one must ascertain whe-
ther t-nat idea is clear and distinct. But to know whether an
J.ooa is clear and distinct, one must ascertain whether the.
udg'ement based on that idea is true (Ashworth, pp. 101-102). 21
Dtiscartas would not .be guilty of the circularity of which
he is accused if his criterion for identifying his clear and
2lSee also ray discussion of Kenny, pp. 80-81 and 86.
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diStir
'Ct ldeSS iS n0t witeri °» »-b-orth and Kenny clain
:° r
s
— - —— says
,
..Descartes
avoidea the nxtfall of introducing yet further criteria which
would distinguish clear and distinct ideas from those seem-ln9ly 50 ' • •" (Ashworth, p. 101)
. A=hwort . appears to be
mating two claims hero: (i, Descartes did not introduce
tl'er CritCria
' (ii) “ had introduced further criteria,
he would have confronted a pitfall.
Ashworth's first claim seems to contradict what Descarte
says in his reply to Gassendi. Descartes said that in the
Meditations he provided an adequate method for identifying his
clear and distinct ideas. 22 Ashworth does not try to refute
claim by arguing that no such method appears in the
instead
,
he tells us that Descartes would face
a Pitfall if he introduced further criteria - without, how-
ever, telling us just what pitfall he has in mind.
1 imagine Ashworth thinks Descartes would be guilty of
an infinite regress if he identified his clear and distinct
ideas by ascertaining whether they have some property £, for
then Descartes would have to introduce yet another criterion
to identify those ideas that are £. if a regress is the pit-
tail Ashworth has in mind, Ashworth might be right. But at
thm, juncture we are not in a position to tell. First we
22HR II, 214
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ou, whether
.Descartes did in tl
3 meth°d f°r identif*in* **» clear and distinct' ideas
.
If ho did, we can then decide whether his method leads himinto a vicious regress.
Mr. CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS AND INDUBITABILITY
.
Bef°Ie reje°ting DeScartes ' n»le altogether, Ashworth
examines what he claims is Descartes’ best defense of his
rule of evidence. This defense can be put as follows:
(1) Whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is
indubitable
„
(2) Whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true
(Ashworth
, p. 102 ).
Ashworth announces that Descartes asserted ( 1 ! (Ashworth, p
102), but Ashworth does not support his claim with references
to text. Without references to guide us, we can only speculate
as to why Ashworth thought Descartes held (1}
.
— SSSSSSt in defense of OK Ashworth may have had
the following considerations in mind. In Meditations III,
De scarte s wr ite s
:
't ./if i-'-kev/ise know what is requisite to render
there
ftath? Certainly in this first knowledge
, ! / k ' u '-' J lng tnat assures me of its truth, excepting
\ i-stinct tion
/
1
.^
Wulucl not indeed suffice to assure me that what l
#
° •' 1 ever happen that a thing which1 so clearly and distinctly could be false; and
according.! v it seems to mo that already I can establish
as a general rule that all things
-which I perceive very
clearly and distinctly are true
,
/;3HR I, 15 8.
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The point of t-hic; sage is not what it night seem. Descartes13 nQt Sayln? he ^s established his rule of • -
'
evidence. Hear.iveu at a point in his meditations where he has
.
.
c n b uncovered
“is mdubitandum
-CU
- 0bs«vlng that this proposition is one he
° earlY ^ distinct] y Perceives, he savs thar » it -o yb mat. I seems to him"
>e can establish his Rule on the ba-is rf w •
.
.
° l ot this clear and dis-tinct perception alone. But he re-i=e .UL s sts d°rng what merely "seemsUlm t0 be legitimate. Instead he turns to ori b L ° db examination
° f C°UntereXampleS that be raised against his Rule.
D e begins his npyf _ ,-
-s ext paragraph as follows:
At the same time r h^ro, e
things to be certain and manffes-^wh®^
3
^
3dmitted ®nv
recognized as being dubious' "‘w-v f.,,lch 1 yet afterwardsJ l us
- What then were these things? 24
•( f fiis
, glance Descartes 1 rotrivi v- 0 remarks here seem to be off the
point, his Rule states that whatever is clearly and distinctly
perceived is true; it does not state that whatever is very
certain and manifest is indubitable.
Descartes’ examples ° L irrelevant, however. it is
not enough that Descartes' Rule be true; Descartes must be
certain of its truth. To acquire the assurances he wants,
Descartes must canvass all those perceptions that could pos-
sibly be construed as clear and distinct. Perceptions of
WImt SeSmS Very certain and manifest would surely be among
-
,c,c. regarding such perceptions, Descartes must perform two
tasks; he must ascertain whether the perceptions in question
are really clear and distinct, and he must ascertain whether
2 4HR I, 158.
what is
JL.
perceived is really false.
TO perform the first task, Descartes needs adecuate
ciiteria by which to identify his clear and distinct percep-
tions. At this juncture we are not- int m a position to say whe-ther he has such criteria Tr, perform the second task, Des-
cartes cannot make use of his rule of evidence, for it is this
rule he is trying to establish. To ascertain whether what
he perceives is false, Descartes must utilize his method of
doubt - the only other method available to him at this pointm the Mentations. But this method involves withholding
belief from any proposition open to rational doubt. Por this
-a»on, Descartes' defense of his Rule involves his showina
that „e cannot rationally doubt propositions we clearly and
distinctly perceive. But a proposition that is not open to
rational doubt is indubitable so that Descartes will defend
r.i..e of evidence by showing that whatever is clearly and
distinctly perceived is indubitable.
Ashworth is right. Descartes did hold the thesis that
whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is indubitable,
ana he did use this thesis to justify his rule of evidence.
:lh.'.s criticism of Descartes ' defense of his rule.
Ashworth and 1
. that Descartes defended his rule of
evidence v.i th f.ne following argument:
(i) Whatever j. clearly and distinctly perceive is indubit-
able.
(2) Whatever I clear i.v and distinct!v perceive is true.
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But is this argument good? Ashworth thinks it is not.
Ashworth begins his criticism by pointing out that
,
1 )18 VagUS
' The PrSdiCate
' indubitable ’ admits of three differ-
ent senses - a logical, a psychological, and an ethical sense..
But regardless of the sense we give
'indubitable', Descartes'
defense of ( 2 ) is problematic.
Lcoical Indgbitability
.
"
E is logically indubitable"
means "It is logically impossible to doubt that p" (Ashworth,
P- 102). Ashworth will use 'logical impossibility' in a
wide sense. It innicnii
-
-is logically impossible to doubt that, n pro-
vided that not-* either entails a contradiction or is 'self-
defeating (Ashworth, p. 102). By 'self-defeating', he means
a proposition which is falsified whenever it is affirmed.
"I do not exist" is such a proposition. 25
If we define
' indubitability' in terms of 'logical
indub
.itab i 1 ity , then we have a straightforward logical cri-
terion for ascertaining whether a proposition £ is indubitable.
We simply determine whether not-E entails a contradiction or
” S “>CJ f footing
.
-But is this logical criterion also a
sufficient condition for ascertaining whether p is true?
Ashworth answers as follows: "We cannot use a logical
criterion to pick out the paradigm case of certain truth that
Descartes was searching for" (Ashworth,, p. 103). The eternal
25 ,.,
,
.
}or more detailed accounts of self-defeating proposi-tions, see Norman Mal.com, "Dreaming and Skepticism" and A. J
/ ; 3 Thlnk / Therefore I Am'*," in Descai
' tJ-txcal Essays
,
(ed. ) Willis Doney (Garden City, Newjfork: Anchor Books, 196 7), pp . 5 8-61 and 80-87.
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truths are propositions that should be picked out as true -an adequate criterion for identifying t
-uo .
'
^
-
v rUG Propositions.
the , ;:;
te
:
na
;
truths are «*«“*•»*^ Go,. 8 .m so th?,
n°"' "trl0tly SPeaki“3 ' analytic (Ashworth, pp. 102-Th6y d° ^
- logical criterion for irdub
* and ^ to be true if the logics
orrterron is the only criterion available. Somethin* otherl,,at a purely looical cr ' tf'rim •a... i erion xs required.
PsXchqloaical indubitabilit v » 0 , c
.—;i_* P - chc ogicall’
indubitable" means "it is psychologically possible to d^th.c p" (Ashworth, p. 103). Ashworth notes that Descartes coo^ " lf hS bSlieVeS he is in
-Pable of doubting what he
cLtr 1v di nof Tv?J u ^ s’Linctly perceives
* Paraphrasing two passages
x ° i:', Descartes, Ashworth says:
^ 1 i O i. pos 3 IDIf for vn *“ r~\ r r-I 4-V.l i n
clearly understood, he (Descartes)* writls^V^01” What ; "frarn from accenting our cleer *„i ” f l,e cannot r;-
or bring ourselves and custinot ideas as true
worth, o. j 03)
1 “n^ mathematical truths (Ash-
11. Jfsoari.es has psychological indubitability in mind,
/-.snwort.b or fers three arcrwmrm he ,1 .
,
JU^ n s to show that Descartes ‘ defense
U) tS U"SOUnd * °ne of theSR arguments is convincing, it
runs as follows. since the atheist can be skeptical about wbd
clearly and distinctly perceives, clear and distinct per-
eeption is nor. a sufficient condition for psychological
indubL,.t*.ji.l.j t_y
. belief m God's veracity is needed. But since
d.i
- <+ck tne ieq,j....ied faith, one can be in genuine doubt
®bOUt the truth of what he Perceives clearly and distinctly.
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" (1> iS
,
a rUle ° f PSyC^iCal indubitability
, hearts*.own remsrKs about thp • te at^eist falsify (i).
BUttlttfetefeUte. "£ is ethie.il, indubi table"
E ought not to be doubted" (Ashworth, p. 104)
, andought not to be doubted" means that "n o - •H contains within jtself
no grounds for dmihf _ 3
,
'
"
' anQ one has adequate evidence for p"
hwortn, p, * Hut Ashworth thinks <-ha- r
fS
•
KS '-nat for Descartes
the n°tl0n ° f a<3eqUate eviden=® collapses into the notion of:
containing no grounds for doubt"a (Ashworth
.
p. 104)
. on this
view, ( 1 ) is equivelant to "Whatever i=> clear!., , .15 arly and distinctly
perceived contains no grounds for doubt."
'S£2SSS£ aaaj-ngt; ethical indubjtabi.lity 26
proposition containing no grounds for doubt is "self ~r + „u w - -supporting
(Ashworth, n ini'! a „ r
'
• A self-supporting judgement is an analytic
truth. It is a judgement whose subject concept is a complete
Idea. An idea is complete provided that the person having that
idea understands what it is that belongs to the essence of the
object of that idea. When one formulates such a self-supoov-Hn.
Judgement, the subject concept - a complete idea - is before
r;U!K"' ancl “c knows by analysis alone that the predicate
concept represents part of the essence of the subject. There
is nothing in the judgement itself that could give this person
auy reason to doubt his judgement. As Ashworth says, "Any
grounds for attacking a judgement about the [complete] idea
™.st then be external to it
.
. (Ashworth, p. 104)..
'\ £Ashworth offers a second criticism of ethical indubit-
ability that I will not discuss. See Ashworth, p .. 105 .
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f there are PXfprnalexte grounds for doubting a self_
supporting Judgement p, then E seems to be a proposition weT t0 dOUbt - ^ E i- self-supporting, it is note ically indubitable
.
^Plying, Ashworth points to a passage from one of
Descartes letters -f •to Regius. Here Deqrsrfuo • ^
•
- — ca tes indicates that
a self-supporting judgement . .
- J is supported by such strorm r»a-
S °nS n° Str°nger
— - found to attack it" (I,-, ,or
P- 101). on Ashworth's interpretation of this passage.
thlnXS that a self-supporting judgement ought nor
to be doubted because it cannot be justHfiablv b,.Ma l. .. x x
a
diy aouDte d . To
justifiably doubt that d, one must ht -nri ,lJo
- bala ce one's reasons fir,-
end agams c p and fr nd f h -if xv.,,-. - -a t at the evidence against p outweighs
the evidence for it,
Ashworth distinguishes two types of evidence - interna
i
-.roc,.,... one external evidence. Internal evidence for or
against £ is gained by analyzing E 's contents. If p is
'
self-supporting, £ is analytically true, and the internal
evidence for E is vary strong. Any evidence one has against
P must be external. The evil genius hypothesis would be such
evidence-. Cut whatever the external evidence against p,
'-° suggests that the internal evidenc
for p will outweigh the external evidence against it.
If Ashworth, is correctly interpreting what Descartes
Sciys to hegius
, ( 1 ) boils down to the view that whatever we
clearly and distinctly perceive is supported by such strong
14 0
reasons that no stronger can ever- be found to attaok lt
. m,interpretation of ( 1 ) is inconsistent with what Descartes says9 °Ut tha atheiSt
' hOWeVer
- The atheist clearly ana distinctly
perceives mathematical truths. These truths are self-support-
it the atheist has an external reason strong enough to
1 ustify his doubting his self-supporting belief. The atheist
rli dn<3 dlotlnCfelY Perceives what is ethically dubitable
.
Once again, Descartes' remarks about the atheist falsify ( 1 )
^essment of Ashworth's crdtimm Ac.u
—
gue. Ashworth argues that
Descartes cannot defend hi q i .J ls Kule bY appealing to the indubit-
ability of what is clear] v thH j _ +. j ,my and distinctly perceived. "-0 is
indubitable" is vague. Ashworth considers three interpretations,
but each interpretation is problematic. So Ashworth concludes
that (I) is problematic.
If Descartes meant by (1) any of the interpretations
Ashworth discusses, I would not quarrel with Ashworth's con-
clusion. But I think a fourth interpretation of ( 1 ) is
available. ±n j;js discussion of logical indubitability,
Ashworth points out that Descartes believes God to have the
power ho make eternal truths false (Ashworth, pp. 102-103).
But Descartes does not think that God's power provides a
reason tor doubting those propositions whose denial is self-
defeating. Ashworth f h i n ir <q f-n-p-i- ihnv.- r _ ....jvuwux n
-n...i,Ks tnat there is something about the
logic of first person assertions like "I exist" that makes
them immune to doubt (Ashworth, p. 102) . Whenever I doubt
that I exist, I am forced to admit that I do exist, for I
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procedure
fc
f
ln ^ ^ GXiStenCe
- But Cartes- own
L
r Pr°Ving hG—
-- not consist simply
^eeing whether he can successfully deny his existence. Xn-te=d, Descartes examines the evil genius hypothesis, and heasks himself whether he rnnia k ^could be deceived into believeing thatae exists when m.,n° d°eS not
- concludes that the evUgenius hypothesis does not prcv'de -P a
-at,
.ona.L ground for doubt-Ing one's own existence = na n
' “d tner° are “> other good reasons
one could adduce.
"I exist- is rationally indubitable.
'Rational instability- may be what Descartes means
y rndubitcbj Irty
-
. £ is rationally indubitable provided that
canno
- conceive a world in which
p_ is false. Once again
the eternal truths seem problematic. X clearly and distinctly
perceive sncn truths, yet it appears there is a possible world
they are raise the world in which God wills to
deceive me.
but is the world in which God deceives me a possible
world? When Descartes questioned his existence, he did not
simpiy conjure up the evil genius hypothesis and coalesce in
concxu„j.„.i chat, i exist" is false. Instead he tested the
evil genius hypothesis by seeing whether there is a possible
world in which Descartes does not exist but in which the evil
genius deceives Descartes into believing that he does. Dec-
Carte., concludes that there is no such possible world and that,
his own existence cannot be doubted.'"2 7
2 7
Rational indub.itabi.lity is not identical with ethical
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lowing Dg s c ? rf o p *b ^scartes procedure for a
.
JbCe i taming the
rational indubi lability of »i »xist ,
r , , .
'
' we can ascertain whetherCod s omnipotence nrnvi--
-/ides a good reason for doubting the
eternal truths or any truths clearly and distinc*
1
T ,
Hb tly PerceivedWe need to consider whether th or- •
thp ,„ .
" e e is a possible world in which
°UOWlng COnditi°nS obtain : a person A clearly and
distinctly perceives that E and believes u true, but A is
deceived because God has willed D false jf th „b " 11 L ese conditions
Obtain, it is also true in this world that God has de • -nd ceived A
SO that God is a deceiver But i
«
1£> 1-he world m which God is
a deceiver a possible world? If no- „J
' t
' »y reason for doubting
clearly and distinctly perceived propositions is idle. And
f there aie no .oetter reasons that can be produced, then there
are no good reasons for doubting Descartes' Rule, and his Rule
is rationally indubitable.
.
On my view Descartes defended his rule of evidence by
shoung tficij aie no good reasons for doubting his Rule.
Descartes
‘ own words support my interpretation. m a lengthy
paragraph in the Third Meditation, Descartes outlines his
strategy for proving that what he clearly and distinctly
perceives is true. I quote this paragraph in its entirety:
~ ;aaa
ere
indubi tabi 1 ity
. Descartes does not decide that "I exist" in
^
1C b6CaUSe thS evil ?eniUS hypothesis has merit but
I.; ^
ng enough to outweigh the evidence "I exist" pre-
i'"'
’ ln
.
J
"1 own behalf . On the contrary, the evil gen' ushypothesis has no merit at all!
C ^
-a other things of the
would not have been so for am, nt?
“ ^ doUbted
' this
came into my mind that perhaol a
®
a
f°n than «.at itme with such a nature that I L m^ht have endowed
concerning things which seemea
been **" en
every tine this'
'
preconcefv^ op^ ion “2^ manifest. Butpovjer of a God ureseni-s -P^' 1 the sovereian
strained to confess that it != Jo
ny thought, 1 am con-
it, to cause me tl err even M S3 wishes
myself to have the best evidence
ln
V
hich 1 believe
always when I direct mv go- -C
' hnd,
.
on the other hand,
myself to perceive very c/ar"- T thlngs which 1 believetruth that" I let myself break' out*-
^
S ° parsuaded of their
these: Let who will deceive me
° 5 such as
be nothing while I think tha*- -'// / never cause me toto be true to sav <-t y- r , ' or some day cause it
now to say that I am or this
"ever bee"' ib bain? true
less than five or , b.'.°
ar
' three make more or
contradiction/ And? ceZiinl/^s- ZV , --\ch 1 see a manifestbelieve that there"'-, rv,a’ / ' s ' ! ‘ce 1 have no reason to
have not as yet satisfied m^ZZZthat th^r?' f
alone^is Whif Spends on thL pinion
?
Ut
,
in crder to~be*able altogethe^to remov/it"*!V-iflcjuii g wnether thcro i c -a r'r-sA ~ . muo t.
Presents rtself, ‘SSYfVfS tha^
Su^s ?
decsi
r
r: f<;; with -
,
r.A..bt t. v/o rr i.ns i co not see that 3can ever be certain of anything. 2 8
In this passage Descartes is saying he will remove a metaphys-
ical doubt from propositions that are apparently logically,
psychologically, and ethically indubitable. Among the propo-
sitions subject to a metaphysical doubt are logically indub-
itable judgements. These are truths whose denial Descartes
sees to be "a manifest contradiction". These logically
indubitable truths are also psychologically indubitable.
2 3
1/ 158-159. Emphasis mine.
Descartes
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cannot seriously doubt nuy o them
. Whenever he thinks of
,
SS Pr0P0Sltl °ns Whlle Pertaining his metaphysical doubt ag-
t0d
_
d0eS n0t have the
—
-ch truths to be false
.
y, the propositions m question are ethically indubit-
able. The metaphysical doubt Descartes entertains is "slight"
BUt " Sllght d°Ubt C°Uld—^ »>e strong enough to outweigh’
the interna! reasons favoring logical truths.. Yet Descartes
feels that he cannot be ppri-ain ... ." 1 in 0j
- anything until he removes
even this slight doubt.
But how does Descartes remove this doubt? He shows that
the world in which God deceives Descartes about what Descartes
‘ \ cmd distinctly perceives is not a possible world. The
Descait.es pio/as no exist is one "who possesses all those
supreme perfections of which our mind may indeed have some
.... Who is liable to no errors or defect [and who has
none of all those marks which denote imperfection ]." 29 Con-
tinuing, Descartes says that it follows from God's perfection
"that He cannot be a deceiver, since the light of nature
tGacn.es us that fraud and deception proceed from some defect ." 30
The worI ci m which God is a deceiver is impossible, and God's
omnipotence does not provide a rational ground for doubting
clear.iy and distinctly perceived propositions.
' 9HR I, 171.
30
Ibid.
Ashworth argued that
.1 45
/
-M • .
we give to (!)(1) is either false or inconsistent with other c i •
holds. But if we takp (1) tU C “ean that whatever is clearly
?,
" bt 'LnCtly perceived ls rationally indubitable, Ashworth's
objections to (1) disappear. God 's power is un-.-v ru/vtia. problematic^ the °f thS athelSt
-ineffectual. What the atheist
clearly and distinctly perceives is rationally indubitable
a j.though the atheist is not in a po—tinn +-r o to show that meta-
Physical doubts brought against d»sri,- .J clearly and distinctly perceived
propositions are not good reasons for doubting.
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CHAPTER V
STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES
This thesis aims at answering two questions:
(QD What did Descartes mean by
'clearness' and 'distinct-
ness 1 ?
(Q2) How does -Descartes ascertain whether ideas are clear
and distinct or obscure and confused?
111 thG flrSt f°Ur Chapters 1 examined other commentators'
answers to mese questions. i have argued that each
commentator
' s answers are un ^ ^ +- ; a r - .c ^satisfactory. Now I want to
orrer m>
r own answers to these question c u -c r s
. But before suggest-
ing answers, I think it is best th*t ™tbl ' cit we m*P out a plan of at-
A ght i.orward approach suggests itself. Find the
places where Descartes addresses (Ql) and (Q2) and explicate
what he says. Let us see whether this straightforward approach
can succeed.
I. DESCARTES' DEFINITIONS OF 'CLEARNESS'
AND
' DI STINCTNESS
'
Descartes explicit definitions of 'clearness' and
'distinctness' appear in Principle XLV. 1 In this Principle
-we are told that the distinct "contains within itself nothing
but what is clear" and that the clear is that "which is present
and apparent to an attentive mind. ' But what do the predicates
1HR I, 237.
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'being present to a mind' m •
' bein9 apparent', and 'being at-Lsntive
' mean'5
• ‘ere we encounter serious difficulties. Dr-earies never defines these key term. r ,nt .' Lacking such definitions
:
al
V
0rCed t0—
-— meani-d bv examining
18 US_ ° f thS terniS “ qUestion
‘ Unfortunately, these term.
- not part of Ms ordinary vocabulary. They rarely appear
^ " lltlng
' neVGr ****«
- a way that illumine..
Jescartes
‘ meaning in his definition of 'clearness' and
' distinctness '
.
.'
r° ClarlfY DeSCarteS '
— iug, we could try another ap-
P-LOd.cn. in Principle XLV Deqca-hpc n-u s rtes draws an analogy between
clear perception and eves-i ah+- wryes g u. We can examine this analooy
to see whether -! t- Cdn he]p us "J-arify Descartes' definition.
Wh6n WC eXamine Desc«tes - analogy, however, we flnd
it is not helpful. Kenny and Ashworth criticize Descar to. -
analogy because it makes use of distinctions that make sense
for sight but not for pains. 2 Although X have argued against
this line of criticism, 3 J agree that Descartes' analogy is
n0t h
-
lpfUl
' interpreted straightforwardly, it makes Descartes
vulnerable to the criticism Gewirth raised-
->ii1-cu.oca, an 1.0025 seem
to be clear.. 4
3ee p. '6'4 and pp. 107-112
i
~’Cv-. pp » o 3~ 7 ± and 10 8—110 above.
Sec pp . 4-6 above.
We can avoid Gewirth's criticism *
.
,
' 11 we d° not define
t
9 PrSSent
'
' bSi
- and '-in9 attentive' in
whltTf
GeWlrth,S CritiCiSB reqUireS
‘ BUt h°W
- knewhat definitions are corro,^? cect Since ^uescartes does not heln
us to define his terms T +-m i • *_S
'
1 thlnk be natural to dojust what Gewirth did. Fir-t xrr, ^ irr . , we look at how Descartes actu-
y uses the tern, 'clarity' elsewhere in his writing, andthen we try to locate a definition of 'clarity on this ba*Once we have arrived at this definition, we can go hack to
Descartes' explicit definition of 'clearnc— ' a 'a-clearness and d.istinctne;
and juggle the meanings of the predicates he uses. In this
way we can make Descartes' explicit definition equivalent to
the definition we formulated on the basis of Descartes' actual
usage
.
If we adopt this, approach, however, we are abandoning
the strategy with which we began - namely, that of using
Principle XLV to elucidate Descartes' definitions of 'clarity'
and. ’distinctness Descartes' explicit definitions are hope-
lessly vacuo
,
and his analogy is not helpful. So instead of
using his analogy to elucidate his meaning of 'clarity', we
define
...la,-, v on the basis of its usage and then use the
definition arrived at to clarify Descartes' analogy.
11 • DESCARTES' REPLY TO GASSENDI
i.,in no to the second question we have raised: "How
ascertain which of his ideas are clear and
does Descartes
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distinct?" To answer (Q2)
,
„e want to ex-1
..
' Plore a strategy thatinvolves a search -Fnv
-n
.
,
' !?assa9e m which Descartes expressely
UP !Q2K TUe Posing passage is one Gewirth
’
locaces and di c
.
iscusses. re ls Descartes' reply to Gassendi
Gewirth translates this reply as follows:
And as tor what you then ar)r]
not so much with the truth of -m-J ' ’V° concern must beto discern whether c~ rn<- \ T ,1Uie as with a method
that we clearly perceive ^something
0 °S
T
V
do '"TA ^but 1 contend that this v^rv hJ 9 V 1 G° not (?enY this;
set forth by me in it-
has been accurately
prejudices i and then Inwlrated aM J, £lrs* ^^arded' alland distinouisherthnseTn- w 1 che Principal ideas
obscure and confused?1
Were clear the
—
—
-’•£ of Descartes' reply. Gewirth 's com-
mentary is short and. raises more questions than it explains
He says, "Descartes is here referring, of course, to the
procedure followed in the first three Meditat ions." 6 Gewirth's
comment is perplexing. It implies that there is one and only
one procedure followed in the first three Meditations and that
Descartes is referring to it. Yet Gewirth knows full well
chat there is more than one procedure followed within the first
three Meditations. Descartes uses the method of doubt in Med-
itat lc i j. and
-he method of difference in Meditation II ^
J-c make sense of Gewirth* s comment, we need to interpret
~ Gewirth
, p. 251. Emphasis mine
6
.
b oid
. Emphasis mine.
HP I, 144-149.
8
HB. I, 150-157.
him diffSrently
- When ha that Descartes is in his rep3v
referring "to the procedure followed in: the first three Med-
ltat-ions Gewirth means Descartes is referring to the pro-
cedure followed throughout, not within, the first three
,ted-
ltations. But the method of difference is not this procedure
“““
"I
meth°d ° f
- not used anywhere in Medit-
at.ion I. The only procedure that c^i rnnufadl- an qualify as a procedure
used throughout the first three Meditations is a composite of
several processes Descartes mentions to Gassendi - the dis-
carding Of all prejudices, the enumerating of all the principal
ideali
' " th< ‘ ritity nc o t hose tl
Mill in^retation narrows the sco^e of our
If we have interpreted him correctly, Gewirth thinks
Descartes is referring Gassendi to the process of discarding
ail prejudices, enumerating the chief ideas, and identifying
those that are clear and distinct. But this process is not
the procedure for which we are looking. We want the method
Descartes used "to discern whether or not we are deceived when
we think we clearly perceive something." Although Gewirth has
not given us this method, he has narrowed the scope of our
inquiry. Descartes tells as that the method we want is to be
iouno at The place where he carries out the process that
Cev/irth says occurs throughout Meditations I r.o III,
irillil in'terp rotation of: Gassendi 1 s objection.
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****• “*•“* ««•— »•«»..
...
„
— u «™. c„-„,
PreSentS GaSSendi ' S critici^ in the following way:
so many
lMi^s^vari6™|ninioendi writeS! "Why are ththat he pcvrceivefc^arly and'dS- *** ™e thLkshe defends, And lest yoi sav that th® ?Pinion whichpartisan or pretending, I want von i'f® e *ther being?.ie those who even face flpafv, .c' l" no -ice that there.
Which they hold, even“h^hht£y sS^r° f£th?the sake of the opposite ooininn' ee othe s facing it for
eludes, Descartes'- mui,Sconce™ ,2®,noe' Gassendi conpound a method which should dfr» l have beer> to • ro-
we are deceived and when not deceived in
US when
clearly and distinctly perceive something"- 18 ^ that Wa
Since we know that Gewirth thinks Gassendi is "in a general
sense" accusing Descartes of having a merely psychological
criterion for ascertaining what is true, we can construct a
reasonable interpretation of how Gewirth reads Gassendi's
criticism.
GeWlrth thinks Gassendi*s objection contains two parts.
111 thS ril"St Part Gassendi P°ints out that people are willing
foi.
-vhui. they think they clearly and distinctly per-
Tneir willingness to die shows they are subjectively
convinced they are clearly and distinctly perceiving. But
people have been known to die for false beliefs. To ascertain
Wheth
^
P®^PtionS are clear and distinct
method that coes not rely on subjective conviction, it is
this method Gassendi thinks Descartes failed to provide.
Having charged Descartes with failing to provide an
1 ‘ J Gev/i x th
, pp . 25 0-251.
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adequate method for ascertain^
„ .
' g olearaess and distinctness
-assendi moves on to the second pert of h-'. u •P ,J
- iJ
-° objection. Herebe concludes" flatthat Descartes' main concern should have been
Lo ProP°und [such] a method. .. T * .. .• ‘ Gewirth is right
Gassendi is asking Descartes to answer (Q 2)
.
- E£2ki^ interpretation of Descartes'
"ePly ‘ GeWlit " d°eS not seem to entertain the possibility
that his interpretation of Gassendi's objection might differ
from Descartes'. Gewirth thinks that r-,e- L.uai Gassendi asked (Q2) and
that Descartes gave Gassendi what he asked for.
Gewirth u right, the strategy we have adopted for
answering (Q2) succeeds in the sense that it leads us to the
method of difference. This method does seem to qualify as a
„oi u.,ce... raining clearness and distinctness. On the
other hand, if the m^thnc n-re iloa of difference if Descartes' answer
to
f his answer raises new problems. In Chapter I, I
pointed out that the method of difference does not allow us
tQ aSCertaiU WhiGh ° f our sirnPle are clear and distinct,
oo if rhe method of difference is the method by which Des-
cartes ascertains clearness and distinctness, Descartes has
nCt Prov -LQea tu '-‘ adequate method Gassendi requested, and
Gassendi’s criticism stands up.
^iieUier interpretation of Descartes ’ reply. If we
adopt Gewirth' s interpretation’ of Descartes' reply, Descartes
11
] 1 cbee pp
.
54-56 above.
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answers (Q2 ) , but his answer is not *° satisfactory. Anotherinterpretation of Descartes' reply ls , ,
....
^ uilable, however. On
interpretation Descartes' reply to Gassendi seems to fol-low the structure Gewirth finds in Gassendi's objection.
'
Initially, Descartes replies to the first p rt of rj-x^sr a Gassendi's
criticism. H0 +- u 4- n' - aL Gassen«i S point about people will-
9 o face death for their beliefs
"proves nothing"
"because
it can never be proved that they clearly and distinctly per-
ceive what they pertinaciously affirm " 12 n==y uuni. Descartes then
proceeds to the second part of his reply. He says:
so^much^a^question
W
of
t
faMno~~
Sap viz - that it is not
of the rule, as of finding a method’ thf
truth
we err or not when we think that wf
^oiamg whether
clearly
. But I contp'nrUhaftJ- perceive something
attended t- 0 in its
thls
,
has been cai
all prejudices a^l fLrn where 1 fir£5t laid aside
confusedt^^
in
9
^ishin
^ thec 1e ay f
It is plain that Descartes is not replying to one criticism
having two parts, as Gewirth supposes. What we have here are
two separate replies t.o what D°s cart- <=><5 1- nVoe j“u' u
- rtes takes to oe tv;o separate
criticisms. Let us look at each reply in turn.
£t-i£i£iS2! SM Descartes ’ reply . Descartes'
" ly ° G n uggests th not read :
tnc. lines. Gassendi pointed out that people are willing to
die for beliefs they think they clearly and distinctly perceive.
12
1JO
hR II, 214
.
Ibid. Emphasis mine.
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We can all agree that whsf c-- , •at Gassendi says is true, but what
Uoion are we to draw from his comment? Descartes took
him to be suggesting that sincere persona.! conviction in one . ,bellef 13 SVidenCe that °ne is perceiving clearly and distinct
-Pi
-
precisely to the criticism he thought Gassendi was
making
, Descartes simoly denied tint- "no +-
•
r } u c hat pertinacious affirmation'
is a criterion for clear and distinct perception.
Gassendi may have actually meant more than Descartes
realised. Gewirth thinks Gassendi was pointing out that we
must fall back on subjective conviction unless Descartes gives
US adequate criteria for axcertaining clearness and distinct
But in fairness to Descartes, Gassendi does not say explicitly
what Gewirth interprets him to mean.
Record criticism and Descartes ' reply. if j ar)
right, Descartes did not interpret Gassendi's objection as
Gewirth does. Gewirth thinks Gassendi's objection has two
paits. the urs-c part charges Descartes with psychologism,
and trie second part is a "conclusion" telling Descartes what
no must do to avoid the criticism raised in the first part,
roi Descartes, however, the second part of Gassendi's objec-
tion is not merely a continuation of the first part, it is.
rathe j.
,
a different criticism and requires a separate reply.
But what is the second criticism Descartes thinks
Gassendi is raising? Gassendi
whether or not we are deceived
asked for a method "to discern
when we think that we clearly
perceive somethino. " J 4 Gas?.„,., .9 sendi s objection is ambiguous
and can be read in two ways. To exhibit itc mb L its ambiguity, I putCasssndi ' s obieot-irinej ct o as a question:
(Q3) How can a person be sure
-i Q ,^+.'
' " ls not mistaken when he
thinks he is clearly and distinctly perceiving?
The first reading of |Q3|. The first reading Qf (Q3)
13 the reading Gewirth *.J °sclibes to Descartes. If, as Gawirth
argues, Descartes is referring Gassendi to the method of dif-
ference, then we can surmise that Descartes took Gassendi to
be wondering whether a person who believes he is clearly
and distinctly perceiving can support his belief with something
more than his own subjective conviction. Descartes' reply is
straightforward: such a person can use the method of differ-
ence
.
—
- jading of (Q3 )_. if we adopt the second read-
1 “” " J
'
' Uassen<2i is not suggesting that Descartes’ method
for ascertaining clearness and distinctness falls back on
subjective conviction. Granting that Descartes has a method
that does not rely on subjective conviction, Gassendi is
wondering how Descartes can be sure he is not deceived when
he uses whatever method he does have. After all, the evil
genius can deceive him. He can make Descartes believe an
inadequate method to be adequate.
Descartes gave Gassendi's objection the second read-
ing of (Q3) it would make no sense for Descartes to refer
Gassendi to the method of diffo,f l ^rence since this method isitself vulnerable to Gassendi's criticism tolu . if, as Qewirth
supposes, the method of difference i* n*« ,lo DG& cartes' method for
ascertaining clearness and distinctness rae. ^ •- o
, Gassendi could on
the second reading of (03, put the foliowing guestion to Des-
cartes: How can you be sure you are not deceived when you
believe the method of difference to be adequate?"
Assuming Descartes did give Gassendi's objection the
second reading, we can make sense of Descartes' reply only i,
suppose that Descartes is referring Gassendi not to the
method of difference but to some other method. But what is
this other method to which Descartes referred Gassendi?
TO answer this question, let us return, once again, to
Descartes' reply. He says:
I do not question what you next sav . v-i ? •
of the
h
rule
Ue
°-
i
of ft i
ak±ng pains *-° establish the' truth
« Sea^^rle^
attended
9
^ i^' f,.°
ontend
^
at this has been carefully
,
,
n J- to Pr°per place where I ’first laid a <- i dp
idea?
r
^d?^i?
eS
'
-
a
i
n
^
afterwards enumerated all the chief
fusS:^ ngU1Shln3 thS Clear from the obscure and con-
Descart.es agrees that he must answer (Q3) . His answer consi:
in his referring Gassendi to a method found at a place in th<
— the place where Descartes "first laid aside a.
prejudices, and afterwards enumerated all the chief ideas,
distinguishing the. clear from. the obscure, and confused,"
15 7
Descartes mentions three distinct operations here. Does he
mean, as Gewirth supposes, that the method Gassendi requires
18 tD be fOUnd at the place "here ail three operations are
performed? Or does he mean that the method Gassendi reeuires
IS to be found where Descartes "first laid doide all prejud-
ices ? if the second interpret at inn i - --mu x reratior) s correct, the oper-
ations of enumerating the chief ideas and distinguishing the
clear from the obscure and confused came after; Descartes laid
out the method for which we are looking. To find this method,
we must look at the place where Descartes discarded his pre-
j ud ices.
— Ei— Descartes discarded his prejudice s.
When Descartes says he enumerated all the principal ideas and
distinguished those which are clear from the obscure or con-
ri’ooo, (itwirch thinks Descartes means he set forth the real
definitions of 'Cod’, 'mind', and 'matter', and distinguished
these real definitions from those that are merely nominal. 16
Descartes distinction between real and nominal definitions
of 'God' occurs in Meditation III, 17 and his distinction be-
tween real and nominal definitions of 'mind' and 'matter'
appears in Meditation II. 18 since Gewirth acknowledges that
16
3 7
Gewirth, p. 273
HR I, 165-171.
18,
1 5
1
~15 4 • These distinctions are discussed after
ueai r.acion III as well, but we are here concerned with justtnose discussions that occur in the first three Meditations,
enumerates the
1 5 0
Descartes discards his prejudices
' ^ s ^efore he
chief ideas and distinguishes the clear from the obscure or
confused, Gewirth has helped to narrow our search for the -
Place where Descartes discards his prejudices. We need to look
at Meditation I and that portion of Meditation II that pre-
cedes Descartes’ discus'?! nnq r\ -f +-u„scussio s of the nature of mind and matter.
In the relevant portions of Meditation II, Descartes
simply reviews the skeptical arguments he has raised in Medit-
ation I. Apparently, Meditation I is the place where Descartes
first discarded his prejudices, and it is to Meditation I that
Descartes referred Gassendi. At the outset of Meditation I,
‘ eocart_.,
...ays, I shall at last seriously and freely address
myself to the general upheaval of all my former opinions." 19
x.i th.. same
.'em, he says, "I was convinced that I must once
tor all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions
which I had formerly accepted." 20 Among Descartes' former
opinions are his prejudices —
• those opinions he held without
rauxuj/ed justification. 21 If Descartes rids himself of all
his former opinions in Meditation I
,
then he rids himself of
all his prejudices as well.
in Gewirth
' s view Descartes' discussion of matter is his dis-
cuss:.on of wax. see Gewirth, pp, 270-271.
1 9
nr 14 4.
? 0
'bid
.
I leave open the possibility that Descartes' prejudices
are coextensive with hi s former opinions.
.DeSCarteS ' Syr'°psi3 °f—tion X also suggasts that
1S thG firSt Meditation Which we are looking. This
synopses appears in the Synopsis Of The Six blowing Hedit ..
atrons, which precedes the six Meditations themselves. The
Synopsis is divided into six narfc, « ,p its, each part summarizing one
° f thG Meditati0nS
‘ In Sho^ Descartes is telling us
in EeCtiCn °f his Scepsis what he has done in the cc
rcsponamg Meditation. The entirety of Descartes' synopsis
on Meditation I is as follows;
we raay/genlrall^spenkdn **1 f,°rth the reasOTS for which
especially abSuth^eX^th" ^other foundations for fiio s ~ ' at least as we have no
have hitherto “ss^ssed IS®"??? than tho3e which we
a Doubt which is so genhafdols
'
is at the same time verv emit , , " ‘ 'V =ppee./, i t
us from ever-, Hn VI^ ?r® at - lnasmucn as it delivers
verv s" f
of prejudice, and sets out for r a
the senses ; and finally iXmSes ?fimpossi
’
th°be thlngS which' „e hav^once^di scovered
Here Descartes says he will "doubt about all things" and that
such a doubt is useful because "it delivers us from every kinc
of prejudice
. Apparently, Descartes plans in Meditation I
”° '"p£'*jf " 1S ra'5lnod of aoubt to ail his former opinions, and,
b.. - doing, to rid himself of all his prejudices. On the
second reading of (Q3) , Meditation I seems to be the place to
which Descartes referred Gassendi.
~~
found
. at the place
-where Descartes discarded
160
13 ^ejUdi
— ' Wh6n We rSView the fir^t Meditation, we find
that Descartes never makes use of the method of difference
there. The method of difference is first used in Meditation
In Meditation 1, Descartes uses one and only one method
the method of doubt. J
The method of doubt and the second reading of (03J . Onthe second reading of (Q3)
, Gassendi is WOI ng how D
can oe sure ha is not deceived when he thinks that his method
for ascertaining clearness and distinctness is adequate. Des-
cartes' answer is straightforward:
"Use the method doubt." 24
But the method of doubt is not the method for which we are
looking. We want Descartes' method for ascertaining which of
nrs ideas are clear ana distinct. If the second reading is
right
, Descartes did not give us this method. Instead, he gave
us a method for discerning whether we can be deceived when we
a.,e his method for ascertaining clearness and distinctness,
whatever that method might be,.
Ms^ssment of the straightforward strategy for answering
----
- ' have Pursued a strategy that had us search for a
Passage in which Descartes takes up (Q2). 25 The only passage
that seems promising is Descartes' reply to Gassendi. This
HR I. .145-149.
to
2 4.
Presumably Descartes would argue that we would have
God as a deceiver if the method He has given us isinadequate. But we cannot rationally doubt God's veracity.
Gee my discussion, p. 142 above.
2.5 See pp . 147 - 1 5 0 above
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reply has two equally plausible interpretsterpretations, however. On
one reading Descartes is refe-rinrr m
_
±e,rmg Gassendi to the method of
-f ference
,
on the second readina + - ig, to the method of doubt.
If the method of difference turned + t
. ....
°
Ut t0 be an adequate method
or ascertaining clearness and distinctness, we would have good
reason to accept Gewirth's interpretation. But the method of
difference fails for simple ideas re
’
t a i- we are to avoid the con-
elusion that Descar^P'? did nnf \cai.es not have an adequate method for
ascertaining clearness and distinctness, we need to reject
the first reading and adopt the second. But the second read-
ing leads us to the method of doubt, and this method is not
the one Descartes uses in Meditations II and III when he
distinguishes the clear principal ideas from those that are
obscure or confused. As a resnU- -* •
-oUJ.t rhe strategy we adopted leads
to a dead end. To find out what method Descartes uses to
ascertain clearness and distinctness, we will have to develop
a different strategy.
HI* 'l'IIE strategy we will adopt
S ince Descartes 1 definition of 'clearness' and 'distinct-
ness ' is vague and since his reply to Gassendi does not expli-
citly identify Descartes' method for ascertaining clearness
“nCI ca
-="- Lnc'-nass, I think the best approach available to us
IS to delve into the corpus of Descartes' work and to see how
he actually uses the terms 'clear ' and 'distinct ' and how he
actually goes about distinguishing his clear and distinct
p,„a„ ;ci /ides ideas into two types. tg ; “ch type in turn, wecan try to identify the features of the clea- ..
,
' i i and distinct andobscure and confused ideac: f^n-i-Luea® .tallinq under t-f- +.J i-nat type
. At the
same time we can trv +.^try to identify the method or methods by „hlch
-scau.es ascertains whether his ideas are clear and distinct.
16 3
C H A P T E R V I
ANALYTICALLY CLEAR AMD DISTINCT IDEAS
objective in M- n r -nl the following throe chapters t .g-ive an interpretation of Descari-***
..
' artes account of claritv ,md
-Btinctncss and to exhibit his method tor a™1 d C02 ta inmg whi cl1Geas are clear and distinct T ,U, 'a
- 1 v;iU argue that there ar-two different aspects of oi-.rH-,, .an<^ distinctness, i cal i
xhe.se asp f;joto .
1;
:
l
- lcal clarity and distinctness'
sentational clarity and distinctness'
, U .
oioev is mine, the distinction to which I am pointing ia
, j
•trelieve
,
j.n Descarte s
.
in this Chapter I will try to elucidate the notion of
analytical', clarity and distinctness and to set forth beecteie
memod lor ascertaining which ideas are analyticallv c ’ea-
-m,
^StinCt
-
T° 8Chle- «*" I wild give considerable
attention to what Descartes says about the composite ideas,
for his remarks on these ideas provide what 1 regard as the
best
.basis for formulating an account of analytical clarity
and distinctness. In section II, I attempt to elucidate what
DeSCE ' '
-• 'fictional id a \ Section
. u
because there is an important connection between an idea’s
being fictional and its being analytically obscure or confused
J.
. T'iE COMPOSITE IDEAS
I v.i.i.i pursue «. strategy like one Descartes undent s
16 4
in the Meditations. This qtrat-om,-
- s tegy seems to me to be character-
istically cartesian. At the outset of the First Meditation,
Descartes says he will doubt all his former opinions. 1 But
be recognises that he cannot doubt each and every opinion he
formerly held, for there are so many that he could never
apply his method of doubt to each.
2
Instead, he groups judge-
ments into types. There are particular sense beliefs, 3 beliefs
P-rtaining co "corporeal nature in general," 4 and mathematical
* repositions. Against each of these types, Descartes raises
at least one metaphysical doubt. By raising these doubts,
hop_, to show that all his former opinions falling under
toe enumerated types are dubi table.
To find out which ideas are clear and distinct and which
o uj.o and contused, I want to try to adapt Descartes' method
for telling which of his former opinions are dubitable. Since
Descartes cannot assess each of his former beliefs separately,
ne groups them ar.d considers them as a class. Similarly, al-
though we cannot survey every idea separately, we can survey
types of ideas to see whether they have clarity and distinct-
1UR I, 144.
>
“ihid, p. 145.
5
Ibid.
,
pp. 345-146
!.
Ibid-,, pp. 146-14 7.
\
Ibid., p. 147.
1G5
n^ss or obscurity and confusion as generic features. I thini-
Descartes Mmself adopted such a procedure. This much is clear
at any rate. He does give us a classification of ideas into
types and subtypes. Using Descartes' classification, „e can
proceed systematically from one type to another. If Descartes
also proceeded systematically in this way, we can expect to
Hiir. reeling us, for each type of idea, whether ideas
falling under that type are clear and distinct
Descartes divides all ideas into simple ideas and com-
plex or composite ideas. He thinks composite ideas are com-
posites oi simple ideas. u The composite idea of an inscribed
triangle contains the ideas of being inscribed and being a
triangle. The .idea of a triangle is itself a composite idea,
for it is analyzable into the idea of being a three-sided
figure. Alghough the
. idea of being three-sided may in turn
be anaiysaoie, the idea Figure is not analyzable in the same
sense. It is a simple idea, and all composite ideas have
Vsuch simples as their atomic elements
Descartes ! distinction between the simple and compos i te
s rai ses two questions
:
IQ1) 1that is a s imp1e idea?
(Q2) \/> 1Vi ! * -jii iiCl t the containment relation that hc-lds between
fi compos ite idea and the simple elements it contains?
"ibid.
,
p. 40 and pp. 43-44.
7
'Ibid.,, pp. 41-44.
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1- lake up (Q2) first.
— i~ AlthOUgh Descartes floes net expressly clarify
the part-whole relation holding betWeen a content and the idea
containing it, he frequently
.peaks about the contents of ideas.
In a typical passage he says:
ccrtiLL^tvLT^ire “ ^ S^“e ‘ ’ thenidea of a triangfe
, n vTtatTA? 8
'~ L* w
• f -L oiiciix truly af f j rm of f hp 4» v*-i ,.r i ^ . . .. - •
I shall af ^ i rm Is- * ' ‘- j —aacfle ; and simij arJ y
.
1 J
- xl of the square whatever T find
-i n +- v, ^
tLlequaUty % ^ «
.ljnu, yet 1 cannot aenv that attribute of it hv -and distinct mental operation ,• V , °t x b/ anY cle ar
understand what I
.ay!§
' Mhen 1 "*self rig»tly
Descartes* view seems plain. The contents of the idea Triangle
are those concepts that represent necessary features of triang-
les. We can say that an idea’s contents are its entailments.
An idea Y is contained in an idea X provided that X entails Y.
2ii A2iL* Descartes is, I believe, confused about simple
.ideas. Sometimes he talks as if simple ideas have no parts.
He writes:
I I 2 s evident that we are .in error if we judge that anv of
_nese simple ideas is not completely known by us. For
otherwise it could not be said to be simple /but must becomplex -- a compound, of that which is present in ourperception of it. and that of which we think we are ignor--
10
Descartes means "equal to two right angles."
r)
HP II, 20.
1
r
^
In what follows f ! entails' will
meaning something other than 'strictly
eyp1an at ion
,
see footnote 13.
be an
implie
undefined term
!
. For an
ant
.
11 16 7
Here Descartes seems to be saving5 ym that we cannot sensibly
speak of simple ideas as having parts.
yet in the paragraph immediately following the above
quotation
,
he says:
of
gtEL!\r^r m0t“n duration
of a i Decease it is impossible to conceive
hL^oiSation!^- n° 6Xtensi0^ of a motion th^
His remarks here imply that the idea Figure entails the idea
Extension and that the idea Motion entails the idea Duration,
yet. figure and Motion are for Descartes simple ideas. And
since the parts of an idea are its entailments, it follows
from views Descartes holds that simple ideas do have parts. 13
Descartes appears guilty of an inconsistency. On the one hand,
he thinks that simple ideas have no parts; on the other hand,
it follows from the view he holds that they do have parts.
Although Descartes sometimes lapses into language that
L1KR I, 42
12Ibid
.1.
Descartes need not recognize in simple ideas all theparts wo might think them to contain. The simple idea Figure
entai.is tne o.isjunctive idea of being a figure or being red,hut Descartes can consistently deny the latter idea to be
contained in i:he former. For Descartes, the entailment relatiojis i.Qv • ual of strict implication. His method for recognizing
necessary connections is what he ;alls 'intuition*, "i t
>.t. tel .i. us, .is the uncioubtmg conception of an unclouded and
attentive mind, and springs from the light of reason alone."
See HP. r, 7, X do not propose to elucidate what Descartes
means by 1 intuition’ . What 1 do want to point out is that
Descartes could on the basis of intuition deny that the idea
figure entails the idea of being a figure or being red.
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suggests he believes simple ideas to be unanalysable
, his con-
s idcred opinion is, I believe, plain. In his explicit defin-
ition of a simple idea, Descartes says:
Here we shall treat of things only in our understanding
FFF -»annot be analyzed into others more distinctly known. 14 "
Descartes does not say that a simple idea cannot be analysed.
Instead, he suggests that such an idea can be analyzed but
not in a way that will make it more clearly and distinctly
known than it already is.
Giving us an example of such an analysis, he says one
could define 'figure’ as ’the limit of extension'
. The person
ofrering such a definition thinks the idea Figure has an anal-
ysis and contains among its parts the ideas Limit and Extension
Descartes responds that the idea Limit is less clearly and
ois*-iiic*...ly known than the idea it is meant to clarify. 1 ^ He
de-s not say that Figure has no analysis and no parts. His
explicit definition of 'simple idea 1 and his elucidation of
it are consistent with his view that the idea Figure contains
the idea Extension as one of its contents.
Although Descartes sometimes speaks as if he thinks
simple ideas are unanalyzable, I think we would be interpreting
1 j iru i.nciuj. i t_aniy if we accepted this view as his considered
opinion. Or. the. .interpretation 1 will adopt, both the complex
and the simple ideas have parts in the sense that they both
.15
i
.>
“
'HR II'ibid., p„ 41.
16
.Ibid
,
I, 40-41.
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Have entailments
, There is in Descartes' view a signifigant
dirference between these two types of idea, however. „e bel-
ieves we cannot profitably define the predicates expressing
simple ideas
. Satisfactory definitions are an aid to under-
standing because they define what is less understood in terms
of what is more understood. But in the case of simple ideas,
Descartes thinks that among the defining expressions will be
terms that are no better understood than the predicates they
a-e meant <_o clarify. We can, on the other hand, profitably
define terms expressing complex ideas. Complex ideas have part
simple Ideas among them — which are better understood than
t-ht.i complex ideas containing them.^'
ideas
. Having answered (01)
and (Q2)
,
we are in a position to classify composite, ideas.
1 concentrate on the composite ideas here because Descartes 5
discussions of them give us the best material for developing
ci.n account of analytical clarity and distinctness
,
and it is
chis account that I want to develop first.
Descartes divides ideas into three types for us. Ideas
falling under a certain type can be combined with other ideas
falling under that type or with ideas falling under some other
type. Once combined in this way, these composites can be
17-r- . .j.n another sense, however, we can, j believe, legit-
imately say that simple ideas can be better understood than
they are. The person who knows that Figure entails Extension
seems to me to understand the idea Figure better than the
person vaio does not recognize this entailment to hold.
i
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further combined so that the possib'e ™ ,
all „K
1 S1°‘ combinations are endless
- these syntheses win be reducible to a few basic combi,,
s, however. In turn these combinations will be reducible
°
' "e oirnpic ideas of which thpv ,U) ‘-neY composed
5 ** *m»i. a. um.
"
7*
1* lae* * <» »•*=•«-
- <«. « . „«,
«
c*t^r.tbute
r or a substance mv-,.;,, c •h fe second waY of classifying
ideas is misleading, however. Descartes act,, no u tually recognizes
ideas of individual modes and types of mode, of individual
attributes and types of attribute, of individual substances,
types of substance, and of substance itse’f
18
rvj.L c...t. For our purpose,
uooevar, we can refer to ideas of individual modes and idea*
Of types Of mode as ideas of modes, to ideas of individual
attributes and ideas of types of attribute as ideas of attri-
cUuSS f and to ideac; ^
-i
»
j. -\ ,
“ r. mCiXvrlQU 3.1 £\Ub S t r3 nHP O ^ r- ,ouuoLd ces, types of substance
and substance itself as ideas of c U >,<,f= n -, c> T , .b ur
-> Psea ce
. In blurring these
important distinctions, I do not think we are raising unneces-
sary difficulties for the analysis I want to give
.
19
0n the
other hand . f~h is an a l v<?i c ; r. , , i .w ys s 1J
= greatly simplified if we blur
these distinctions as I suggest
,
20
13
See HR I, 239-246
19
7: attribute°of
X
matter Z \ " It 'i \ E^My idea ° f
- - iaea Of £
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Descartes is a conceptualist n •a . Universa Is do not existds mmd independent entities 21 vrl
. We can have universal ideashowever
. Our - - , °
'
Lx xoeas ox substance and of types of ailh , t
would be such idea^ « , ,j-ccas
. Really ejp'stinn —,~v •
2 i
" g ° ub s lances are indi-
vidual tinners, ~ 'Pbncpi--fc.se tilings have modes h i
_
. 24 S * A Tl1ode is a pro-
,
1
^'.
8nd there arS tW° tYpes of them - attributes and modpi oper
. An attribute •; cG X ° a necess arY feature of a substance, 2 5
..'ode proper, a contingent feature r0 *j «- l c . Being red headed is a
contingent fea^-nm _ ,J i u..ure of a human beina* if n. .i* lt i j mode proper.
But being rational i c< .. ..... a rs a. necessary feature - an attribute. 26
When we combine our ideas of modes, attributes, and
substance xn various ways, we get various types of synthesis.
The°e 1,1 tUrn fail int° three ?eneral Classifications. Borrow-
idea lnd
d
?ts
0
con?ents°arrnecess **?
*aCh idea Aether that”
need to show is that De-cartf«f
r
i,
ly connected. What we
effective oroc^durfappficabfe t?'
—
findin* out is an
Using Descartes* classification^^* Kln<? of comPosite idea
can show that his method appUes fo ?3" int° three *YP«, weidea and, bv extension ^re«. sorts of composite
-
-Auji.o , to aj.l composite ideas.
21HR I, 242,
22
_
r) i
24
'ibid./ pp. 242-243.
'HP II, 101.
|
Hr I
,
2 41 „
23
' PP- 240-242.
26
.
r
,
n
j1>
-
l allows I will use the term ‘mode* to
_
*ode proper t. Although Descartes recognises that he
u.vocally, he admits that he is not always c t.about his usage. See HR I, 245. We will be careful
f oi.
,
if we contuse the . i
i
* ® ‘
'
;
u two senses of 'mode'
,
we wilier
aole i.o distinguish modal syntheses from svnthe«es ofSee HR I, 244*245.
mean
uses
reful
however
lot be.
reason.
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in, from Descartes- terminology, ! will refer to various
Of synthesis as modal syntheses, syntheses of reason, ana ...
syntheses. These types ofi? S>nuhGSls can ^ turn be subdivided.
I discuss each type and subtype separately.
_
M^al syntheses are syntheses that
combine an idea of a mode with an idea of the substance of
whlch it is a mode or with an id^a 0 f arntw
0
°- d!i°ther property of the
same substance." There are three t-vnoc r . -ire
-yP efc of modal synthesis:
substance-mode syntheses ,
,
"-- o, mode-mode syntheses, and attribute
-mode syntheses.
U!
-
S^ t^e-mode syntheses combine an idea of a sub-
stance with an idea of a mode of that substance
.
38
Typical
of such combinations are the ideas of a moving body, a recol-
lecting mind, and a hungry lion. Bodies, minds, and lions are
substances, and moving, recollecting, and being hungry are,
respectively, modes of them.
(2)
^ ^l£]l§ses combine ideas of different modes
cf the same substance
.
29 My ideas of running swiftly and
recollecting clearly are such ideas. Running and being swift
are modes of an antelope; recollecting and being clear, of a
Inxncu VJhen 1 combine ideas of modes of the same substance.
- 7 ,
-f p T 244
.
> pC v>
Ibid
mar;
P. 176
.
2 9
;
My i (-sa of a reel, object will be a composite idea of
;on falling under the mode-attribute subtype. See below
! ! .
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I get a mode-mode synthesis, 30
<3>
a^theses are not explicitly discuss^
by Descartes
, but we can suppose he would have acknowledged
such a synthetic- -r -p„for,n an attribute-mode synthesis when I
add to my idea of an attribute an idea representing a contin-
gent feature of that attribute. Although thinking is the
essence of spiritual substance, how I think is a contingent
matter. I can think logically or illegally so that being
logical is a mode of an attribute, and the idea Thinking Log-
ic«_lly is an attribute-mode composite.
— theses. Descartes recognises three types of real
synthesis: substance-substance syntheses, mode of sub-
stance
l
-substance
2
syntheses, and mode of substance-mode of
subs tance^ syntheses
.
(1) Substance- sxfcsfcance .synthe ses combine ideas of two or
more substances to form ideas of things like a winged horse
or an embodied thinker/" Since 'winged' and 'embodied' are
adjectives, it may not be clear how the substance-substance
syntnesis differs from a substance-mode synthesis such as the
idea of a brown horse. Since we take adjectives to denote
I
,
24 4-245.
.
.
Descartes says, ’The real is properly found be-ween wool- more substances," I imagine he means two or more
non-idemp,oa: substances. But if this is his view, then weneed a y/pe of composite idea that joins together ideas of the
same substance. Some of the joined together ideas will be nec-
essarily connected; others not. I could take my idea of a
centaur and join it to my idea of a creature that is
174
properties
, we would be inclined to think that the tents
'winged eddied', and 'brown' express ideas Qf^ ^escartes does not group composite ideas according to *„ elinguistic function of the terms expressing Mthem or the logicalfunction of the idea itself H ~ d
.
ldssifles composites accord-ing to the ontological status of the objects of the ideasicmed together to form the composite. To form his idea of a
winged horse, Descartes takes his idp -, . .
.
c Wln9 s and joins it to
18 1063 ° f 3 hGrSe * Since v;in^ can exist independently o'
tf
j
ngS tHat are W±nged
' win3s ar= Descartes substances..
and the idea they exemplify is ™ r ct ->-b an idea or a substance.
Mode of Substan^^-substance
2 syntheses
Idea of a mode of one substance with the idea of another sub-
stance!' I have such a composite idea when 1 conceive of my-
self having the shape of a beer barrel. The shape of a beer
barrel iS a mcde ° f a SUbSt— « I think of myself having
such a shape, I think of myself - one substance - as having
the mode of another substance — a beer barrel.
___
_^
3)
of substance
^
syntheses join
a
?
n
j'c
t!
v !
H
h°rSe '
,
hs a result 1 get the idea of a ere-
si-v-e h ^
aur
.
ar
,
ld half man and half horse. But
h “ lf ~
ttsS*
'J° r ° L -
-^clucie these explicitly, however.
J2.
II id f PiP
.
244-245
.
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an idea of a mode of one substance with an idea of a^ Qf
another substance as when I form thc; idea of a frnit
an apple 0 shape and a pear’s color,
^
Although Descartes does not nentinr ^ ^r m on ocher categories of
real synthesis, he chn-ma n -"ld lllcluae at least two more types:
of substance,-Riih«f an «r
,
,1 synthe ses combine
“ ° f an attribUtS ° f substance with an idefof ano-
tner substance not having that attribute. if rationality is
part of man's essence, then the idea of a rational doo is
an attribute of substance^substance, composite.
{5)
~~ 21 gubgtancei
-attribute of substance, SVn-
— j0“ ideas ° f attributes belonging to different sub-
'
stances
. With this tvpe cf only one attribute
represented by the ioined ,
-
0 ldecib Can De a necessary feature of
both substance, and substance^ The idea of a rational
omnipotent man is such a composite, for it combines the
-d_a cl „n essential feature of man with the idea of an
essential feature of God.
-^.L'lcd^o Descartes recognizes two syntheses
of reason : substance-attribute syntheses and attribute
-attri-
' uts syntheses . To these I add a third - the mode- attribute
D
synthesi
V1 * syntheses combine an idea of
176
substance with ar ^
„ , .
,
ea ° f an "ttribut« Of that substance. 3 *
1
‘ of an enduring body is Such an idea»^!!Sasa U.„ „ two 0 ,mole attributes of the same subst-rc 35an e. She idea of endurino
:::::«
13 bCCaUSe dUratl°n and extension are both necessary
features of matter.
id)
^-attribute Smtheses coniine an idea of a mode with
“ °f ^ SttribUte
- mode
. My idea of somothing
'
t,hcit is ied and non-black qualifiesi - -xu. o a 0 suen an idea if we
regard being non-black o ->- t as a necessary feature of the contingent
property , be ing red
.
-Li. fictional versus nonpigtional ideas
Having sketched Descartes' c3 assifi cati rm -r-ab, ucdUon ui composite
ideas into types and subtypes, we want to ascertain whether
there are any types that have clarity and distinctness as
generic features. As a first step toward this end, we want
to distinguish between fictional and nonfictional ideas, and
We Want tQ fiRd °Ut whether are any types of composite
ideas that are nonfictional.
i'll 0!-' 1 FI. : ideas
. Comp-
osite ideas result from the synthesis of other ideas. Minds
hav„ the t.o j. i.ity to produce such syntheses themselves. A
Ibid.
, p. 245
'j. c:3
Ibid.
177
person can take any two ideas and combine them into al composite
' °ne f°rmS SUOh a" ia“ »-n he takes the ideas of
bexng inscribed and being a triangle and puts them together
to make the idea of an inscribed triangle. When one puts ideas
together rn this way, the synthesis that results is what
Descartes calls a fictional idea. I imagine that Descartes
calls such composites fictional because the synthesising cap-
ubrlity of the understanding is the source of what „e would
ordinarily call imagination. Using our ability to combine,
can create all sorts of composite ideas. Some of these
Will be ideas of mythical things - winged horses, centaurs,
sacyrs
, and the like. Others will be ideas of really existing
things -- embodied thinkers, tall people, etc. The term
'fictional idea’ can be misleading. Fictional composites need
not be factive : they can be exemplified.
Besides these fictional ideas, Descartes thinks people
have composite ideas their minds did not themselves create such
t.n.. I a oi a triangle. These ideas have an external source,
perhaps God. Whatever the source, these ideas are not mind-
produced
. They come into the mind already synthesized. Deo-
cartes re 3 era to them as ideas of true and immutable natures.
method for ascertaining which ideas are
are i'^eag of true and immutable natures.
In the First Reply, Descartes tells us that fictional ideas
can, but that, ideas of true and immutable natures cannot, be
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analyzed by "a clear and
says ;
distinct mental operation" 36 Ke
5 ;s** ?*» “ -
.
to a mental synthesis r S 7 a 1:ictl clous one due
not merely by" abstraction for resectif® f"? anaiy^d,but by a clear and distinct mental 1 n . o the thought)be clear that those thine* Vic’i ° ri: henc0 ifc will80 analyse have not been Tut^tncVk •^standing cannotwnen 1 think of a winged ho^e 'or of
“y2 t- Vor maniple,
existing, or of a trianale inscribed 4 i n aetuallyunderstand that I can on the 13 \t sc™ Rre, I easily
without wines, of a lion
ntraiy think of a horse
apart from a scuare ? r 6 so .
f
Xis
't
ng and of « triangle
things have **??«
sver^I ^iV^iTTt--' -ta^i;
triangle, as tha* its
nS<3 ln the idea qf' the
shall af&^Srs^a^S^i
Ping ^IriL^-al^^fltf
i cannot deny that 'attribute ol :i t bv cfear ' yCtdistinct mental operation, i, e. when fmvse?? rightlvunderstand what I say Besides if - ' 'ltiy
^r^V^T ' --infto ascribe^to ST91-
assign ^ the
t0 the trian9le al^.e , or to -
for the orroose h"9 o Properties of the scuare . but
Jhs colifA‘c??on of'‘h
C ara
lnlng that whioh arises from"‘ J ' l 0j" u e two *' the nature of that compositebe not
.Less true and immutable
square or triangle alone.
. . .
3 &
h rnan that: of the
The clear and distinct operation Descartes has in mind is hi .
method for ascertaining what he calls a real distinction. 35
this method allows us to find out whether cert
composite, idea are necessarily7 connected 40
ain parts of a
Taking a composite
36KR II, 20.
38
See footnote 8
»
HK II, 20-21
.
ke below, pp. 190-192
„
40
Throughout I will speak loosely. I will say that two
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idea, we see whether we can conceive of a possible state of
affairs in which features represented by certain parts of ouridea can exist in separation from each other. If we can
or such a state of affairs, the concepts representing
these features are contingently connected. They could by the
will of God be made to really exist separately . 41 If
, on the
other hand, we cannot conceive of such a state of affairs, the
represented parts are necessarily connected.
~
f
- 'fiP-MoaSi idea’. Commenting on the pas-
sage Cited above, Gewirth distinguishes the fictional ideas
from the ideas of true and immutable natures in a way that
suggests there are no ideas that are fictional and contain a
true and immutable nature /' 2 Although Descartes does not ex-
plicitly say that the fictional ideas and the ideas of true
and immutable natures are mutually exclusive, I will with some
entail~each Ither ^anfonly “"if^ SSS* other or+ t- „ • . dna °m it j.t is necessary, for 7that z is an instance nf; y , . , ' anY £*
V T t .4n -- lj - dllu onlY if * is an instance'of
that z is an instance o* y on iw if „ : aiy ' J ° J anY £»
t
;This way of ducida^i.ng'the'notion^f
"'^necessary ^con
sav o"t
between concepts is somewhat t
'
l
•
- y *Y°
ld 11
' necessarily connectedon 1 ' necessarily connected with Y . •
,
no
t
n
te
j”
1
d
uq
1
in “f • 2Y
oid
?
his formulation because ii^ does
'Y
L J. ., which direction the ent ailment goes, and fo>our purposes direction is almost always important.
41
4 2
HR I, 190.
Gewirth, p. 270
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reservation adopt what X take to he Sewirth'a readinq
„ f
Descartes. remarks. Speaking looSeiY .. ! will. say that a non-
notional idea is one that is not fictional, and I will takethe terms
' nonfictional idea' and 'idea of a tree a •r u and
-immutable
nature* to be coextensive.
Looking back at. the passage cited, nowever, we can see
that the interpretation I aor®-vi-,C^ L needs qualification. Des-
cartes seems to
,
.
-On tiirsu ict iLncr hnnsGl_fr 7V+- iy ii-uifac...La.„ At the beginning
of the passage, he says;
(i) 1 When 1 think of ^ •°- a * * • triangle inscribed in a
square, I easilv understand i-n-14- t“ ^hdt I can on the contrary
mink ... of a triangle apart from a square,
and that hence these things have [this thing has] ho
true and immutable nature."
But at the end of the same passage, he seems to contradict (i)
.
He s ay s
:
!ii> " If 1 think of « triangle inscribed in a square
.
for the purpose only of examining that which arises
j/t 1 1 t ‘le
-onjunction of: the two, the nature of that
composite will be not less true and immutable than
that of the square or triangle alone. ..."
LC saying tuct some ideas ao and do not
contain true and immutable natures.
^°° e exam^naticn of Descartes’ remarks reveals that
he is not contradicting himself. He is using the terms 1 fic-
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tional idea’ and 'idea of a t .rue ana immutable nature’ eoui-
vocally. 1 do not know wheth Descart
-'s «•,.aj-u- aware that hewas equivocal- i nrr k,,+. u •^ DUt his wnrric -. ,t. . , ,//o as at the beginning of the passage
arS diSCUSSing d° **
-t the possibility that he
"
"I
5 aUare
’ " StartS ^ *“»*
*— a discussion of ’’thoseideas which do not contain a .Uub a,,Q immutable nature, but
onxy a ficticious one due to a mental synthesis.” He leaves
open the possibility that there is a a Pr .Sc oe .se rn which an idea
can contain a true and i Tnn.,f ,?
-t-m-teoie nature and be fictional,
although he is not discussing such an id-v, - , . .J d c.ea cil this stage.
fstei he does discus ^ onnj- - •
- such an idea, however — his idea of a
triangle inscribed in a square. This idea is fictional in
the sense that the ideas Joined together to form it are not
necessarily connected with each other. X call ideas that are
fictional in this sense fictional,/. Ideas can be fictional
in another sense, however; they can be fictional,. Descartes’
idea of a triangle inscribed in a square is both ’fictional
and nonrelational^
; it contains a true and immutable nature^
t:he second sense..
.c ’j help make the dist ! r-c*- •? one r * T__ - . .uj.oiin cj. s I Wane to draw, l vili
aitfarentiate between three types of conceptual contents. When
join two ideas together to form a composite idea, the ideas
joined together are conceptual contents of the composite
foriu, "... i ‘'ill call these contents * the primary contents’ of
ths composite. In my composite idea of a triangle inscribed
in a square
,
the primary contents are the ideas of being
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inscribed m a square and being a triangle.
The composite idea formed as a result- of •suit joining the
primary contents tocrethe-r h->o ,g e has a content it entails. 1 call
thx.s content the secondary content. My ldea of a triangle
inscribed in a square contains in its secondary content all
the concepts entailed by the primary contents and more. Since
the concept of having angles equal to two right represents
“ r 'eCeSSary Mature of triangles and, therefore, of triangles
inscribed in squares, this concept is part of the secondary
content of my idea. But this content also contains ideas not
contained in the primary contents themselves. The geometer
uncovers the secondary content when he demonstrates what is
true of triangles inscribed in squares
. Although what, is
necessarily true of triangles and necessarily true of things
inscribed m squares is also necessarily true of triangles
Ar^uibvJu in unis way, what is necessarily true of these
-inscribed triangles may be untrue of uninscribed triangles and
figures inscribed in squares generally. Strictly speaking,
-it is the secondary content that is the content of a composite
idea. besides the primary and secondary contents, there is
What 1 cal1 a ‘tertiary content*. For Descartes, ideas are
mind dependent entities. There are no ideas that are not
ldeas ot a thinker. The tertiary content is what the thinker
believes
..in idea to entail. This content may include con-
cern us that are not part of the secondary content. The thinker
may believe the secondary content of his idea to contain
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concepts it really does not contain — ^1
-oncepts representing
contingent or neces^ari 1 -- e-,-ifalse Properties of the object of
"1S idea
' If 1 think that my idea of a tr- „r i •1 iangle inscribed in
a square contains the concent vCep " S ° f beln9 ted or having angles
equal to 190 dear«^<=
+ .
' n ule tertlarY content of my idea con
“ C°nCeptS n0t
- the secondary content.
In composite fictional ideas, the primary contents ar„
not necessarily connected with each other. The difficulty
WlUl SU°h idGaS 15 that the Pers°n having them may not realize
that their contents represent particulars that are really
- ai.j-i.ng to realize that the represented particulars
are not necessarily connected, he may make the mistake
thinking that what xs true of the one particular is true of
the other. He may, for example, ascribe to the square what
Je^“g0 V° tr^gles aIonc? and to triangles what belongs to
squares alone, 4 -3 Speaking in a characteristically Cartesian
.* v;e can say that composite fictional irip-rL r)c ‘ 1 laecis-^ provide mater-
i a1 for error**
4*
y 1CLlCn ' ? i ide^is m the second sense also provide material
joined to°form the^omp!^ °nly °?e ° f the ideas
with the ovher 5 ° be contmgently connected
with each ott^- r r~i-hr
n
°
,
" cxv
.
e to
.^e contingently connected
anqi« ard •< ••mv /u U C .ase or my ldeas of an inscribed tri-
to
-dn-"ncin??
horse
'
, nowever, the primary contents happen
cept%nt^ils^the'
L
other?
eCte<^ Wlth oth~' either "on
44..
|:
h® Fourth RePly Descartes says, "Certain ideas are
t
V
6 * according to my interpretation, that
° Ro Judgement with material for error." hr ii
.
J
;:;.r
i
’wh
f
ra ?escfrtes uses the term 'material falsity 5 ’
ra
-/lC'' ‘-c^tnctively, however. See HR I, 16 4,
for error. An idea X will be fiction-! •
*
noti al if and only if x nincons istGrit v n • ’ —
- contingently connected with some ideabelonging to
, s tertiary content. Descartes- fictional idea,
or an inscribed triangle is nonfictions^ because this idea
entails all the ter 1- ! sru ,tia y contents it contain *TeVili ms
. Necessarily
connected with, its t-prHam ,ertrary content, Descartes' idea can be
aaid to be an idea of a true and immutable nature.
Not everyone's idea of an inscribed triangle is an
Adea ° f 3 trU° and irmutable
"«ture in the second sense, how-
ever. In Principle LIV Descartes tells us i-h-t•LJij Uo tha we can put
45fictional content into our idea of God. We aake our ldsa
fictional when we include in this idea contents which do not
,,46
pertain "to the nature of an absolutely perfect Being.
There seems to be no reason why we cannot in the very same way
put neuronal content into any idea we have regardless of
whether that idea is fictional or nonfictional in the first
Whether our xaea is fictional, or nonfictional,
,
we
make our idea fictional., when we include among its tertiary
contents ideas it does not entail. if ray jdea of an inscribed
triangle contains in its tertiary contents ideas representing
contingent features of inscribed triangles, then my idea is
fioLrouc.i^. sat if this same, idea contains in its tertiarv
U.
con ten i. only necessary features of inscribed triangles, then
my idea is nonfictional^
,
and it is an idea of a true and
immutable nature in the second sense.
45HR I, 241 46 Ibid
.
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Looking back at the passage cited above / 7 we can seethat Descartes is misleading us. Speaking first of his idea
Of an inscribed triangle, he tells us ^, 4 . lU . .' 18 that this idea does not
contain a true and immutable nature. Speaking next of his
°f 3 triangle
' ^ suggests that this idea does contain
such a nature. Juxtaposing his remarks in this way, Descartes
gives the impression that he is contrasting these two ideas
cllid that h.0 ffl O p r» r *£*a\v , , « •«.
' ° US to the term "true and immutable
nature" univocally to both.
Ihe impression Descartes conveys is, I think, a misim-
PreSSi °n * AlthOUgh Descartes
' remarks suggest that his idea
Of an inscribed triangle is fictional, and that his idea of
a triangle is nonf'.ict
h i. s for
• filer, idea is fi
non f .ictional-
. What
fol low!ng two claims :
CO There a re f i.c
12 ) The re are
:non
Descarees
' idea of a
'2
'1
example of..an idea that is both fictional and nonfictional
-L 2
Although its primary contents are not necessarily connected
V/1U1 aeon other, its tertiary contents include only concepts
lep ..esc. iud ng j>ecessarv reatures of triangles inscribed in
47See pp . 15 9 *-160 above.
48 186squares
.
(2) highlights some difficulties
v f-h n
_
° Vvlu Descartes' view
hj;::°7
ideas
' 1 am not sure whether— s «**.
;
oa a triangie has
- ~~ or „hethor hsthinks
‘triangle’ is * -.=«!<=»lo a name expressing the idea of a three-
sided figure so that the iflcac ,* , •
«lmi „
at' 0i bein? three-sided and beingfigured constitute the
" primary content of his idea.
I am inclined to adopt, the latter view because I thin),that he would want to say that h < . , de .. . , ../ - - n --> ±a.ed of an inscribed
*-rianq 1e was pin ... . »
•10nal
l
SVen lf he renamed it, say, a 'scri-
triangle '
„ But •; e r • ,“ “terpreting Descartes correctly, we
can easily give an example to show that m tn (2 > is true. Although
Descartes ' -iapn - .or a triangle is nonfict.ional it i +. •
his idea of a triangle contains as its primary contents the
rdcas of being figured and being three-sided. But we can
easily conceive of figure* th
-
r- *.-3 ^-. x.cil. are not three-sided so that
fhe primary contents nf y ^ ,y 1-uu.o oi Descartes comnn^ifoouinpoo u8 idea are nor
necessarily connected with each other. 49 Like Descartes'
0
.
1
. a winged horse and an inscribed triangle, Descartes'
idea of a triangle is fictional
.
1
Po
3
ca rt e s ’ me 1l^.ui9d. for ascertaining the two types of
- 131— • :Et is important to realize that Descartes
is using the- same method to ascertain whether ideas are
4 S
, 7
+
.rr.x,. „
as
f
unK
:
that Descartes, the geometer, includes in ttm
.... oi his idea, only concepts his idea entails.
49
_c- . .
7'd.though the idea of being three-sided entails the id^t-emg figured, the entailment does not run the other way.
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fictional j n the fir-fnt nr°t and second sense wh-n-a^ub . nat changes are
ideas to whi ch iipcipari-o^ •Oescart.es apples his method. when he
applies hj.s method to the primary contents ot au 01 composite idea,
lie finds out whether-^ n t*ier tms composite i** fif u s national or an idea
of a true and immutable nature in the first mrr * „xrrs-L sense
. To find out
whether this same idea is fictinmional
2
or nontictional he
applies the same method to see whe^h^-r h--„ • „" ^eLne h±s idea is not neces-
sarily connected with any of its tertiary contents.
Regardless of whether Descartes is trying to ascertain
if a composite idea i s ti r,+-i' onn 1 r->
- 1 totronalp or fictional
,
his fund-
amental task is the same : he must ascertain whether certain
i<3ea" dLe' nece^ a^-ly or contingently connected. The method
Descartes uses to reveal such connections is his method for
ascertaining what he calls real distinctions. This method
dees double duty therefore-, it identifies both fictional
composites^ and fictional composites
SiarilZ and distinctness and the fictional and nonf.i c-
— • Descartes
' remarks in Principle LIV suggest that
We would be mistaken if we adopted the view that a composite
idea is clear and distinct if and only if it is nonfictional
.
He says
;
Te*.?. C^ar and distinct idea of an 1^dependent thinking substance, that is to say, of God,
we do not suppose that this idea representsto us ail that is exhibited in God, and that we do not
mingle anything fictitious with it, but simply attend to
vviu.t io evidently contained in the notion, and which we
are aware pertains to the nature of an absolutely perfect
188
Being. bu
-scarce*, language here is cumbersome, and it raises two
difficulties for our understanding when it is that a compositeidea is clear and distinct.
The first difficulty arises because Descartes may seem
r-o be stating at least a sufficient condition for having a
a-Lo-Li.net idea. But on closer inspection, it is
plain that ha is not giving us this much T n~+- i -- * un n
• Instead, he is stat-
ing a sufficient: and perhaps a necessary condition for being
— -
haVS 3 Clear and distinct idea. Descartes' remarks'
do not rule out the possibility that we can have nonfictional
loeas that are obscure or rnr-fncorililusea, oince the method of
difference can show us only that o11rXY ur iceas are nonfictional,
this method may not acccrnrhi i on .
.
y ul v-c upiish a- much as we might hope. For
a.j-1 we know, it cannot by itself tel'1 nr- w i-, ; p i, _ rJ --
- Uo hich of our composite
ideas are clear and distinct
.
The second difficulty with the above quotation arises
because we have no way of telling whether ideas which have
fictitious content mingled with them are fictional.,
, fictional^
i..itnei. i.ACtionai^ or fictional^, or both fictional., and fic-
tional
2
. This difficulty is not serious, however. In what
follows, it wiJl become evident that we can drop the distinc-
tion v. .... n c.'r.as that are fictional^ and fictional 2 . Then
we will be able to say that an idea is clear and distinct only
I, 241. Emphasis mine.
l-h
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this distinction and say that an idea which is either fictional,
° r flctlonsl
2 Prides material for error.
toalytical c learness and ^inctnegs. A nonfictional
a contains no material for error. It is nonfictional only
i.^ if necessarily conner'r<=a ui i u „ , . ..* -ecce Wlth each idea contained in
its tertiary content and only if its primary contents are
necessarily connected with each other. In some ideas the
requisite necessary connections will hold, in others not.
The determining factors are the analysis of the idea and the
analysis we give it — the primary, secondary, and tertiary
contents. If the primary contents are not necessarily connec-
ted with each otherbl or if the tertiary content is not a sub-
set of the secondary content, then the .-idea is fictional and
obscure or confused.
1 0311 this mods ' of obscurity or confusion 'analytical
obscurity or confusion'. This name seems appropriate because
it is the analysis of the idea — the parts it has and the
we ; 11 eve it to have — that determines whether the
iaeu .is an a.:.ytically obscure 03: confused or what I call
* analytically clear and distinct 1
.
xt is not clear whether simple ideas have primary con-
• 1
> cartes does not tell us how simple ideas origin oil' mur-ds
. On my interpretation simple ideas have parts,
ouu it does not fol.lov; that these ideas are produced as a result
01. a mi/Jci joining other ideas together. For" the purpose ofmis paper
,
I will adopt the view that simple ideas have noprimary contents. Lacking such contents, they cannot be
rot: onalp
,
and J will stipulate them all to be nonfictional
i
52Analytically clear and distinct .ideas need not be clear
190
HI. ANALYTICAL CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
1'N COMPOSITE IDEAS
Following oho stiatogy wo have outlined, we will now
“ ““ “
- «* types o, oo.po.lt.
thou., aie nor, fictional and analytically clear and distinct
SinCS °Ur Strate9y °0nf°-S ^ one Descartes himself adopts
we can follow his discussion of the various types of composite
iaoa as he applies his method for to- • •°a t ascertaining a real distinc-
tion to each. in nrHor T j-
r V.. i.o russ rhe real, composites, the
modal composites, and the composites of reason.
S££
- -
6rt^ ’ SSSSSfl °£ analysis when applied to real
comoosx_tes. When Descartes applies his method of analysis to
a real composite, he finds that the ideas joined together are.
as he says, really distinct. Two ideas are really distinct
if we can conceive of the objects of these ideas existing
b j
separately. ' We can think of objects existing separately that
arc not separated in fact, however. But Descartes tells us
that such objects are really distinct because whatever we
can conceive to exist separately, God can really separate. 54
Descartes' method for showing ideas to be really distinct
is not to be confused with the method for forming what Descarte,
call.s 'an intellectual abstraction". He says:
a ii d d i st inot
,
however
,
b 3HR I, 24 3-
5 4HR 1, 190 .
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A real distinction 'cannot be inferr^a ,,
°J
ie
.
thing is conceived apart from annfhov Vnat
°f ot er by means of the
ne
id^a^ joined together in a real composite are intellect-
ually abstracted when one diverts his attention away from o
of the ideas and concentrates it on the other, By so doing,
one can intellectually abstract ideas that are not really dio-
tinct. If he confuses his ability to abstract ideas with his
abalrty to make real distinctions, he is liable to think that
what ha can conceive separately is actually separable. He
might think that figures can actually exist apart from the
substances of which they are figures. But he would be mi.stakes
One avoids such mistakes if he uses Descartes' method
of analysis correctly. Used correctly, this method shows him
..hat his substance-substance idea of a winged horse is really
distinct because he can think of winged objects that are not
horses and of horses that are not winqed. ‘Mode of substance
1
-substance ideas and mode of substance
-mode of substance
1 2
ideas are also shown by Descartes’ method of analysis to be
really disrinct. I can conceive of myself to be shaped
differently from a beer barrel, and I can think of beer barrel
shaped - things that are not me. Similarly, I can think of things
shaped >'i 'ce apples • that are not pear colored and of pear colored
'NR II, 9 7 See also UR II . 22
19 2
thlngS that arS n0t Sh^ lik*
-PPU- APPlying the 8ame
attribute of substance
1-sub stance 2 syntheses and
f-o attribute of substance
-attribute of substance
-L oUDou c compos i tes
1 can show that these : do-,~ • •6 l e<1S also l°ln ^g^her ideas that are
really distinct.
Using the method for ascertaining'
--tam a real distinction,
we show that every subtype of the real composite ideas is
fictional^
. Depending on the analysis we give of the ideas
rn question, these ideas may be fiction -,11 notio al as well. But they
need not be.
~ ~
-
.yjai a teal tiomposite ide a is fictional
When X show I can conceive of the objects of ideas as existing
separately, I have provided what we can call a minimal proof
Of a real distinction. The minimal proof is not the best
proof, however. As Descartes tells us, "There is no better
proor of the distinctness of the two things than if, when we
study each separately, we find nothing in the one that does
not differ from what we find in the other. 56 Examples Descarte
uses suggest that he is giving the term 'in' here a technical
sense
.
I
s '- ec!'li)lca l
- sense appears in Principle LVI
, HereDescartes says: But when we consider su
OJ
:
:
,
1 ' 1
•
1
1
<
'
1
5
named
_as of such and such a kind, we shall useLae word gualities [to designate the different modes whichcause it co ne so termed]; and finally when we more oe.n-
‘
oraxly consider that these modes or qualities are in
5 CHR II, 102
.
substances we term them attributes . 57
Ordinarily, we say that properties belonging to an object are
°bjeCt
‘ BUt ln thS^ quotation, Descartes uses
tne tern 'in' more restrictively. Continent'•(-iK.inge . properties
modes and qualities - are not in the substance they modify.
Since Descartes reserves the term 'in' in this sense for at-
tributes - necessary features of the object modified - we
can take Descartes to be using 'in' to mean "in the nature or
essence of."
If Descartes means by 'in' " in the nature or e£sence Qf „
when he discusses the best proof of a real distinction, then
is t'-ilmg us that there is no better proof of the distinct-
ness of two things than if, when we study each separately, we
find nothing in the essence of the one that does not differ
from what we find in the essence of the other.
— Sfisessite idea of an embodied thinker
. Descartes
uses the best proof possible to show that his ideas of mind
ana body are really distinct. He says:
x understanci. in a complete manner what body is [that .is
bv thin^-nrthat
6
it
f4 aS - a S°mpl - te lhin* ] ' merelY
et.c,
,
ana by denying of it everything which beloncrs ro b, P
~cono?et
j
h-
C°nv
f
f
selY also 1 understand that mind"
^
C ^kU. which doubts, knows, wishes, etc., although
tV
anYthjgg belongs to it which is contained in
'•lit’ j.o.ea o l Doo.y
.
Here Descartes gives the best proof possible that mind and
57
,
r o
.3 O
HR I, 241-242.
"HR II, 22-23.
Empbasis mine.
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-ody are really distinct. Whatever belongs to the essence of“ n0t bel°ng t0 the—
- ^ and Vice versa,
v s the composite idea formed u . .
.
-a-i. ov joining together realjvdistinct ideas is fictional,, Descartes' i fl , *1 x^oa an embodied
t. inker is fictional, as well.
Recognizing that this idea is fictions! n-hi -Li na.i.^
, Descartes i sin a position to avoid
- ° of judgement he might otherwise
have made. He will not attr-'bir1-^ + ~ v~ l Uue to the ™-nd what he believes
" Paln “
" °f th°^ht
'
he will not judge the pain to
n.n his bodv bp r* qn ~ ,,Y -ecause, as a mode of thought, it is in his
mind. Ho can. how^v^T* • i
' W ',er
‘ a£,crlbe essential features of mind
ana essential features of body to a Mr,,n
-* Cl r'Oiso a union of mind
and body. A person is extended and does think,
—-—-2 iJPlEOSite ideas with analytical claritv
— ^MnetiSH. Although all real composite ideas ’are
"
fictional^ we can perceive them clearly and distinctly if Wft
are cautious. We must use Descartes' method for ascertaining
a real distinction and adjust the tertiary content of cur
xctea until our idea is nonfictions^
. Using the content of
our nonfictional idea.,, we can restrict our judgement in such
a way that wo cannot err. If I am a geometer whose idea of
an inscribed triangle is nonf ictional.,, then I include in the
-..rt.U.ry content of my idea only concepts representing nec-
1
'
aj.e.j. I appropriately restrict my judgement when
P c.:vl'.cate these features of inscribed triangles. X fail tc
restrict my judgement if I predicate of triangles Qr , f
rbed figures necessary features of inscribed triangles or if
1 PrCdiCatC 01 inSCrlbed tri
-^.es features not represented
by a concept contained in the tertiary content of my nonfictional
ro-ea
2 , Descartes would say that we must train our win - oar-
faculty of affirmation and denial - to act in accordance with
our understanding.
J n this chapter we are reviewing what Descartes says
about the composite ideas in the hope that his remarks will
shed light on that aspect of clarity and distinctness that I
Can ana 'ly '"1Cal claritY and distinctness. So far we. have exam™
.uiea Lhe real composite ideas,, and we have learned this much.
Although ail real composite ideas are fictional.^, we can adjust
then r tertiary contents so as to make them nonfictional
^cartes' Method of analysis when applied to modal
—
E££ites. Having completed my discussion of the real comp-
o.'uice ideas
,
1 proceed to an examination of modal composite
ideas. Here our analysis must become more complicated. Des-
cartes was able to use one method to show that all his real
composite ideas were fictional. When he considers the modal
composites
,
however, he modifies his method to fit the subtype
under consideration. Let us examine each subtype separately.
Descartes 1 method oc analysis when applied to substance-
l
n£dl: compos iter-:. Although Descartes thinks his method for
asc-rj.rt.ai nu ng a real distinction does not show substance -mode
composites to be fictional
,
he thinks a modification of this
196
^®4-hoci achieves thic:
“ can cal1 this modified method.
Descartes
'
procedure for ascertaining a quasi-real distinction
A composite idea is quasi-realiy distinct provided that one
of its primary contents is neceqnrP« r- , --essarily connected with che
other but not vice vpr?a p„i. xei ° a ‘ Substance-mode composites are
quas x~rea 1 ly distinct at j-Vi u
’ - ilLnough i cannot conceive of a mode
existing apart from its substance, I can conceive of the sub-
stance existing without its mode. 59 My ideas of a substance
and its modes are contingently connected, and like all such
ideas are fictional
1
JL
applied to Mode-mode composites
Since Descartes does not explicitly recognize the attribute
“•mode composite
,
we will have to speculate about what account
he rould gxve or such an idea. I imagine he would think modes
of attributes cannot be conceived as existing apart from the
attributes they modify. He would, no doubt, think I was
tal.,..,..ig uvRben.",e if I saici, "T am conceiving a state of affairs
111 Vvhxch exists apart from a thinker who is thinking
logically,
‘ On the other hand. I can think of a state of
affairs where thinking goes on that is not logical. Although
attribute- mode composites are not really distinct, they are
quas i •—re a 1Xy distinct. Like the other two types of modal
synuruisrs f the attribute-mode, composite is fictional
- ' * •
.
.
**i
59
.HR 1, 244.
IS 7
GS
~~"
~ to opposite ideas of
reason. Although both the real and modal composites are
rictional,, Descartes think, the ideas of reason are nonfic-
ticnal
1
. We were able to show the real and modal composites
to be fictional^ because we could in each case show that ideas
joined together to form, the composite were contingently con-
nected. With ideas of reason, however, Descartes thinks the
primary contents are always necessarily connected with each
other. they are neither really nor quasi-really distinct.
As Descartes says
:
fact ?w iaCUOn [° f raasoni is rnde manifest from the1 that we cannot have a clear and 5 . ,
a substance if we exclude from it sueb'a- -
1
l ty m f
^
°
' Sacn
we cannot have a rioa- •; a ^ o.t. Lj. _.t ate ; or
bnteo f ..1 ole j- idtja of the one of the two attH~
exis
t
S
whe^
e
1
1
.
^
r
^°
esSsLnL
t
which
h
do^s not ceasTto
SHHaamuuthought and from each other in a common object. 60 '
net us apply Descartes' remarks here to each type of idea of
reason
.
Descartes’ method when applied to substance- attribute.
^HlEpsj^tes. Descartes tells us that we cannot conceive of a
possible state of affairs in which an attribute and its sub-
stance exisr in separation. Like any property, an attribute
cannon ror Descartes exist apart from the substance it mod-
rfies. In turn the substance modified cannot exist without
the attribute modifying it. Since attributes are necessary
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features of the substances they modify, these substances cease
to exist as the substances they are, when any attribute of
thera is removed. In Descartes' view substances and their
attributes are not separable by either a real or a quasi-real
distinction
.
Descartes' method when applied to attribute
-attr ihu
e
SH^osites. Descartes thinks that two attributes A, and ft,
of a substance S cannot be separated by a real or a quasi-real
distinction. Although A., and
^ can be conceived to he
attributes of different substances that exist apart, a of S
and of S cannot. To think of A, of s as existing apart
2
as modifying something other
2
of £ I conceive as existing
Descartes' analysis here can be questioned. If I am
thinking of my extension and my duration, I can certainly
think of myself having my extension and a different duration
ana vice versa. Perhaps these individual properties are
-Just
inodes o.L me
,
nowever
. But as a material body, I do have the
attributes of being extended and having duration. Yet I can
easily conceive of myself as unextended and enduring — a
soul that thinks , But Descartes could reply that the attribute
or having duration is not an attribute of the self I took to
be me. Initially, the substance modified was I as a material
body. Now the substance modified is I as an immaterial sub-
stance
.
from A of S, I must thlink of A
than S. But, then
, i t is not A
apart. from of S'.
If Descartes
' argument is sound, attribute-attribute
composites have primary contents that are necessarily connec-
'-tu each other, tike the substance-attribute composite
they are nonfictional
.
bhascartes; method when allied to mode-attribute com
If being non-black is a necas-rv „essa y reature of the
color red
, then the idpo r,-pJca ° f a rea non-blaok thing is a mode-at
tribute-- composite
. The primary contents of such composites
cannot be separated by a real or quasi-real distinction. if
I think of a red thing which is not non-black, then it is a
brack rather tha.11 a red thincr t a i • iinmg I am tninkmg of. I-ike the
substance-attribute and the attribute-att-iWo -—
^
uLi.ridu lg svntho S 0 53
the mode-attribute syntheses are nonfictional
.
gonflctionalx composite ideas. Composite ideas of rea-
son are epistemically preferential. Because real and modal
composites have contingently connected primary contents,
these composites are fictiona^ and provide material for er-
ror. When judging about the objects of these ideas, we must,
Descartes believes, be especially careful, with composite
.ideas of reason, we can be less cautious, however. Since the
primary contents of these ideas arc necessarily connected,
these ideas are nonfiction^. Descartes thinks their primary
contents do not give us material for error.
composite ideas
. Although Descartes be-
lieves the primary contents of ideas of reason to provide
no material for error, composites of reason can contain other
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contents that provide such material. We can include fictic-
-us Concepts in the tertiary content of our ideas, i» this
respect composite ideas of reason are no better than real and
modal composites. There is only one way to assure ourselves
that our composite ideas are nonfiction^. Wo must painstak_.
mgly apply Descartes' methods for ascertaining real and
quasi-real distinctions to each idea contained in the tertiary
content. Whenever we find our idea to be contingently conned
ted with any of its tertiary contents, we must remove these.
Carrying out the process of reduction Gewirth mentions, we end
up With a composite idea that is necessarily connected with
each idea included in its tertiary content..
When the idea reduced in this way is a composite of
reason, the idea is analytically clear and distinct. It does
^ c'or,W-din within itself materia..] for error
. if i restrict
my judgements about the object of my composite idea and prod-
i.cate of this object only properties represented in the ter-
tiary content, of my idea, I will never make a mistake, for the
represented properties are necessary features of this object,
lli'l the distinction bcdy.ycen fictional^ a
Although Descartes thinks the composites of
reason are epistemically preferential, T. think he is mistaken.
He thinks real and modal composites provide material for error
that c°^POsites of reason cannot provide. Because the primary
contents of real and modal composites are contingently connec-
ted, wc are. in danger of predicating of the object of one
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primary content what is true of the object of another. But
this danger is eliminated if we take exactly the steps required
to avoid misjudgements about the objects of composite ideas
of reason.
First we reduce these ideas so tint -t-v,-.that they are necessarily
connected with every concent in thm* v>neir tertiary content. Reduced
ln r'hl " Way? our ideas become nonfictional,^
. Since we can
carry out the same reduction for real and modal composites,
v/e can make these nonfictiona^ as well. Secondly, we must
restrain our judgement by predicating of the object cf on-
composite idea only features represented by concepts contained
m the adjusted tertiary contents. But we can exercise the
same restraint when we judge about real and modal composites.
Restraining our judgement in this way
, we automatically avoid
the errors Descartes traces to fictional ideas
.
These ideas are dangerous because the unwary chinker will
attribute to an object represented by one primary content what
is true or an object represented by another. But if we
restrict our judgement by predicating of the object of our
composite idea only features represented by concepts contained
in the adjusted tertiary content, we cannot make such a mistake.
The judgement we form will always have our composite idea as
its subject concept and a concept beloncring to the t.ertiarv
content as its predicate concept. Since the subject concept
is necessarily connected with all its tertiary contents, it
is necessarily connected with the predicate concept, and the
:02
entire judgement is necessarily true The c +-* • m same steps required
to neutralize the. material for error in fictional ideas,
neutralizes the material for error in fictional ideas /
Since we safegurad ourselves from the errors Descartes
traces to fictional ideas^^ when we protect ourselves against
mistakes arising from ideas that are fictional^, there seems
to be little point in retaining the distinction between these
two type* of fictional idea. Dropping this distinction, I
will say that an idea is fictional just in case it is fictions.
In this sense all types of composite idea are on an equal
footing. Depending on whether we add fictitious material into
o,.r tertiary contents, our ideas will or will not represent
true and immutable natures. Those that represent such natures
313 nonfictional; those that do not are fictional.
IV. DEFINITIONS RELATING TO ANALYTICAL
CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
We examined the various kinds of composite idea in the
hope that we would find a type or subtype that is nonfictional
c,nd analytically clear and distinct. Although we failed in
tnis respect, we found out how we can reduce fictional ideas
i
so as to make them nonfictional. New we can bdc.in the task
of defining our terms.
vDi) An idea .X is necessarily connected with an idea Y
tfc is necessary, for any z ,, that z is an instance
of X only if v. is an instance of Y
On {
AT! CL
cone
repr
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(D2) An idea X is contingently connected with an idea Y
Qf ti consistent, and X is not necessarily con-
nected with Y
(D3) Two ideas X and Y are really distinct = X is notdf —
necessarily connected with Y, and Y is not necessarily
connected with X
(L'4) Two ideas X and Y are quasi-really disi .net =
flf either
X is necessarily connected with Y ar.d y is not nec-
essarily connected with X or X is not necessarily
connected with Y and Y is necessarily connected with X
(Dj) An iaea X is rictional x is inconsistent, or X
is hoc necessarily connected with at least one idea
contained in its tertiary content
(D6) An idea X is nonfictional = X is consistent, anddr —
(Y) (if Y is a concept contained in X ’ s tertiary con-
tent.. then X is necessarily connected with Y)
(D/) An idea I is analytically clear and distinct = nj. I
Q.l —
is nonfictional, and (x)(F) (if x exemplifies I and
x has F necessarily, then F is part of I’s tertiary
content)
07) Descartes ’ idea of a triangle, is analytically clear
distinct if and only if the tertiary content of Descartes'
includes, for every necessary feature of triangles, a
apt representing that feature and nothing but concepts
eventing such features,
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Besides having analytically clear and distinct ideas of
universale like triangles, we can have analytically clear and
distinct ideas of individual things. My idea of myself is
analytically clear and distinct provided that, for every nec-
essary feature of me, the tertiary content of my idea contains
a concept representing that feature and only concepts represent
i ng such features.
—
ytiCally SiSSE Mass and analytically diet j net ideas.
Having arrived at <I>7)
,
„e have a convenient way of distinguish
mg an analytically clear idea from an analytically distinct
idea. Descartes tells us that the distinct contains nothing
but what is clear and that whatever is distinct .is clear. 61
A1though we cannot be sure whether Descartes is talking about
analytical clearness and distinctness here, let us assume that
his remarks are applicable. If this assumption is correct,
I think we can modify some theories Gew.irth develops.
(D8) An idea i is analytically clear = (x) (?) (if x exom-
df
"
plifies I and x has F necessarily, then
1
’ s terti ary content °
‘
^
(Df) An idea X is analytically distinct -
df
i oral
part of
X is nonfic-
'Compare with Gewirth’s analysis
, p. 18 above.
I do not include as a condition that I must be con-
sistent. Since an inconsistent idea cannot be exemplified,
the tintocedent of the definiens will never be satisfied.
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cutting (D8) ana (D9) together, we get (D7) : an idea X is
analytically clear and distinct if and only if x/ s tertiary
content contains all and only concepts X entails.
Although an analytically distinct idea does contain
nothing but what is clear, we encounter difficulties with what
appears to be Descartes' belief that distinctness entails
clarity. But we can avoid this difficulty in one of two ways.
We could change (1)9 } to (B9 ! ) :
(°9 ) An 1Qea
~
1S analytically distinct = x is nonfic-
O.X —
tional and
_X is analytically clear
But now (D9-) is equivalent to (D?) f and an idea is analytic-
ally clear and distinct just in case it is analytically fiis-
tinct
. Although this result may seem odd, it is in keeping
with Descartes
' view that what is distinct is clear, for it
follows rrom this view. that every distinct idea is clear and
distinct. But if we do not want to modify (D7) and (D9) in
uhe way suggested, there is an alternative. Later in this
chapter 1 will discuss a second aspect of clarity and distinct-
iiss s . I cal l this aspect
’ representational clarity and dis-
tinctness
. In Principle XLVI Descartes tells us that distinct
ness entails clarity, but he does not tell us why he thinks
thus entaxlr ?.nt holds. It might turn out that distinct ideas
are clear because all distinct ideas are representationally
distinct, and representational distinctness entails represent-
ational clarity. If we adopt this view, then we avoid having
to introduce cumbersome revisions of (D7) and (D9) . For the
Sake ° f SimpliCitY
'
1 think it best to avoid these revisions.
!2i£h analytical clearness^ and distinctne ss.
Having defined
• analytical clarity and 'analytical distinct-
ness', we can see that one who has an analytically clear or
analytically distinct idea may fail to perceive it to be
S°‘ h±S lciea m:Lght
'
for example, be non.fictional since he
includes in its tertiary contents only concepts representing
necessary features of the object of his idea. But he might
not recognize
,
for each concept included in the tertiary con-
tent of hls idea
'
that his idea entails that concept. He
ma^ *'° tiave an analytically distinct perception he is
m a position to have.
VJe can now define the expressions ’perceiving with ana-
lytical clarity 1 and ’perceiving with analytical distinctness
(DIO) A person A perceives his idea I with analytical
clarity I is analytically clear, and (x) (F)
(if x exemplifies I and x has F necessarily, then
A recognizes that x has F necessarily and that F is
represented by a concept included in I's tertiary
content)
(Dll) A person A perceives his idea X with analytical dis-
tinctness X is analytically distinct, and for
every idea contained in X s s tertiary content, A
recognizes that X is necessarily connected with tha j
207
V. MINIMAL ANALYTICAL CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
To acquire an analytically clear and distinct idea X,
J- must include in x'^ tpri-is^r 4-
-
“ rLlari content all the concepts con-
tained in X ! s secondary content and oniJ c r
' ly such concepts But
the concepts X's secondary content includes may, for all *
be greater m number than the concepts contained in the
tertiary content o£ mv iden t mn,, va/ have an analytically clear
and distinct idea but be 'mahio ^ ,b^e r.o Know with certainty that
1 d°' ReC°gniZing this difficulty, Descartes thinks we can
got by with less than analytically clear and distinct ideas
^ VX. <511 C cl J 1 V /'x *1 q —• v* rj 4 ,‘ "
u v " 1Q dlstlnct perception
e What we need
oatisfy j.s waat Gewirth calls a minimal requirement.
M?.guate kiiowledqe, In the Fourth Replies, Descartes
tells Arnauld that we know an object adequately only if we
know "all the properties which exist in the thing known." 64
1 take Des °artes t° be usi»g ’in’ here in the technical sense
elucidated above. 6 " Our knowledge is adequate only if the
tertiary contents contain explicitly all the essential concepts
and all the concepts these entail. Although the explicit
tertiary contents will contain all the essential concepts, the
concepts these entail may be infinite in number so that I can
never be m a position to know whether the secondary contents
or my idea exceed the tertiary contents. I may perceive a
to
HR II, 97
„
S©e pp . 1 9 2" 1.9 3 above
.
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composite idea adequately but be ™-,m„ iy o u unable to know with certainty
that my perception is adequate.
— SaESSSSSEt for Clarity
. Although we may
not be able to know with certainty whether we are perceiving
adequately, Descartes tells us that «an adequate knowledge is
not required. " to We can settle *«_ .- for something less -- a know-
ledge that is complete and not inadequate
.
67
Intuitively,
What W° are a£ter are concepts that will provide us with no
mat-r..al fo. tuor than we make judgements about the objects
of these concepts. I safeguard myself against error when I
adjust the tertiary content of my idea so as to make this con-
ten '- complete and not inadequate.
Descartes 1 account of completeness is vague. He tells
us unar. “by a complete thing I mean forms or attributes which
suffice to let me recognize that it is a substance. 68 But he
qualifies his account by saying that incomplete entities —
properties -- can also be completely known. 5 ' Here Descartes
is speaking about complete and incomplete entities, but r
wili extend his remarks so that we can talk about complete
and incomplete concepts. Although I am not sure what Descartes
means by ‘completeness !
,
I will adopt an interpretation Gewirth
r rp t yuj, J
f 97.
Ibid
. f pp. 9 7-98.
Ibid
.
,
p. 93.
suggests
: an idea is complete gust in case its tertiary con.
t-ent contains explicitly all its essential concepts. 70
in this sense all ideas are, as I understand Descartes,
complete. Replying to Gassendi, Descartes says:
In attacking mv statement
S£?tina taken away from 'tlUutea^^f ~
co have attended -/0” appear not
that the essence of thTn^q
011 Sci
V
12? araoa<? Philosophers
idee, represents ?he essence^f’ For the
tiling is added to it or
~subtr-ct-d
•' ,10g
;,
arid it soma-
with the idea of somethin- so ' -• 7 Xt ls forth
”
all false Gods ^re DO -rt-^
J- t
.
LS thus that
. . .
the true God aright; But" aiter th^iLrof^h^t^0^®^0is once conceived " ~' uew" Gj- t e iue Gody i. «i Ch ssi.;s,ssf;sas •£
,
5* »•*«•*
Here Descartes tells us that our ideas "represent the essence
of things.” If we take away from or add to the concepts re-
presenting essential features, our idea becomes a representation
of something else. 72
nut are the essential concepts of the idea contained
in the tertiary content, as I believe? Descartes' remarks
~ogo'-. t.:at. they are. In the above passage, ho seems to
,
.
Gewirth, pp. 260-2C2. I distinguish essential conce-e-
?atf^fa-2 *r?m . concepts that are entailed by 'but do not on-*tar, the essential concepts. See p. 2 above. X is nec-
"ftltd;- Recced with its essential concepts and with the
'
- V
CS " en a l7" But to be complete, X does not have to
f : - roncepts xn its tertiary contents. Only theesse.nc.ial concepts must be contained.
7
1
7?
l? 1 tnout changing what our ides is s representation of,
W( c 1 '
> course, add concepts the es nti< concept
,
HP. II, 22 0.
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be distinguishing between the explicit and implicit contents
of ideas. "After the idea of the true God is once conceived,"
we can detect in our idea perfections that were "not previously
noticed" and that do "not cause any increase in the idea."
We conceive the true God when we conceive Him explicitly as an
omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and inflate being.
If I conceive Him otherwise, it is not God my idea represents.
But once I do conceive God correctly, I can detect in Him per-
fections — necessary features — I did not notice before,
i discover tnat the essential concepts contained in the tert-
iary content of my idea entail other concepts. These concepts,
which represent necessary features of God, are then added to
out do not increase the tertiary content of my idea because
these newly discovered concepts were implicitly contained all
along
,
On my 1.0ierpretation of the above passage, all ideas are
complete: they all contain their essential concepts as part
of their tertiary content. But this content may contain more
besides. It may also contain contents entailed by the essentia
concepts and contents representing features that are not nec-
essarily connected with the object of my idea. Recognizing
that I may have included fictional content among the tertiary
contents, I may try to improve my understanding by eliminating
any such content. But if I use the wrong method, I could con-
fuse a fictional content either with an essential concept or
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with an idea an essential concept entails.
To see whether an idea is or is not necessarily connected
with a concept contained in its tertiary content, I mast use
Descartes' method for ascertaining real or quasi-real distinct-
ions. 1 fail to use his method when I intellectually abstract
necessarily connected ideas
.
7 *5
Intellectual abstractions are
dangerous because I am liable to think that ideas separable
in thought represent objects separable in fact. And if, as
a result of intellectually abstracting, I judge a nonfictional
content of my idea to be fictional, then, in Descartes' view,
I render my complete knowledge inadequate .
'
4
To have a com-
plete knowledge that is not inadequate, I must have, an idea
thac contains in its tertiary content all the essential concepts
and only concepts these entail, and I must recognize, for each
such concept, that my idea is necesssrily connected with that
concept
.
Using the above analysis of Descartes' distinction between
complete and adequate knowledge we arrive at the following
definitions
:
(D12) An idea X is minimally analytically clear ~ d f X is
consistent, and X s s tertiary content contains all X'
s
essential concepts
(D13) A person A perceives an idea X with minimal analytical
73
For a discussion of intellectual abstractions see p. 175
above
,
74HR II
,
97-98.
0 1
clarity =
flf
X is minimally analytically clear, and
(Y) (if Y is contained in XY s tertiary content and
X is necessarily connected with Y
,
then A recognises
that X is necessarily connected with Y)
A1 chough all ideas are minimally analytically clear, not all
ideas are perceived with minimal analytical clarity.
Minimal an
:^
vtical distinctness
. Although all ideas con-
tain all their essential concepts in their tertiary content,
this content may contain more. It may contain both fictional
content and content the essential concepts entail. if fictional
content is included, an idea contains material for error. A
minimally analytically distinct idea excludes such material,
however
.
(Dj. 4) An idea X is minimally analytically distinct — X
df -
is consistent
. and X is necessarily connected with
every concept contained in its tertiary content
Combining (D12) and (D14)
,
we arrive at the view that an idea
X is minimally analytically clear and distinct, provided that X
is consistent, and X's tertiary content contains all its
essential concepts and only concepts X entails.
Minimally analytically distinct ideas need not be per-
ceived with minimal analytical distinctness, however.
CD15) A person A perceives an idea X with minimal analytical
distinctness = X is minimally analytically distinct,
Cl A.
and for every concept contained in X : s tertiary con-
tent, A recognizes that X is necessarily connected
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with that concept
A perception that is minimally analytically distinct is also
minimally analytically clear.
Extending analytical clarity and distinctness beyond the
Once I have a minimally analytically
clear and distinct idea, I can increase its clarity and distinc
ness beyond the minimum. 1 must be cautious, however, if i
add to the tertiary content of my idea concepts my idea does
not entail, I render my idea analytically confused. If, on the
other hand, I use Descartes’ method to ascertain concepts
necessarily connected with my composite idea and I add these
t0 the tertiary content, my idea remains nonfictional and min-
imally analytically clear and distinct.
pertain ing to analytical clearness and
J have two chief goals in this dissertation:
(.1) to see whether a satisfactory account of clarity and dis-
i-ii'ic
-Dess can be devised, and (ii) to see whether Descartes
gives us an adequate method by which these features can be
ascertained. Half this goal has now been achieved. Earlier
I pointed out that there are two types of clarity and distinct-
ness. T have completed my examination of the type I call
ci.OoilyLj.ca-L clarity and distinctness*
, The definitions pres-
ented give us the account I have been looking for. 1 arrived
at this account by following Descartes' investigation of the
composite ideas he had classified into types and subtypes.
Speaking loosely, we can say that the analytically clear and
distinct ideas are those having tertiary contents containing
all and only concepts with which our ideas are necessarily con-
nected and that the minimally analytically clear and distinct
ideas are those having tertiary contents containing all the
essential concepts and only concepts these entail.
To find out whether ideas are minimally analytically
clear and distinct, Descartes uses his method for ascertaining
real and quasi
-real distinctions. This method is an introspec-
tive method of analysis that is applied to ideas and their con-
tents. Those ideas whose objects our minds are unable to con-
ceive as existing apart are, Descartes thinks, necessarily
connected; those that can be conceived as existing apart are
Pot necessarily connected.
Descartes uses his method for ascertaining real and
quasi-real distinctions in t.he Meditations, and it is to this
method that he referred Gassendi, is Descartes guilty of
psychologism in using this method, however? Ills method cert-
ainly does contain a psychological element. What we are unable
to conceive as existing apart may in fact be able to exist
apart. On the other hand, Descartes' method is not psycholog-
ical in the sense that it is arbitrary. The inability of the
mind to conceive the objects of certain ideas as existing
separately depends at Least in part on the contents of the
ideas under consideration. Logical relations holding between
215
the contents of ideas are a determining factor in whether the
mind is or is not able to disjoin the ideas it has. 75
75
On this point, see Gewirth, pp. 276-277.
,
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CHAPTER VII
REPRESENTATIONAL CLARITY AND DISTINCTNESS
Although we have succeeded in defining what we mean when
we say an idea is ‘analytically clear and distinct', there is
another type of clarity and distinctness we must now consider
representational clarity and distinctness. To develop an
account of this mode of clarity and distinctness, I will first
consider Descartes* notion of material falsity, a key notion
in his dus cuss ion of clear and distinct ideas. To elucidate
what Descartes means by material falsity and to assist me
in developing an account of representational clarity and dis-
tinctness, I will focus on what Descartes says about simple
ideas
. I concentrate on the simple ideas because Descartes’
diseu.osi 0n .-3 cf them, provide the best material for developing
the account J want to give of representational claritv and
d i s t i nctness.
1. DESCARTES' CLASSIFICATION OF THE SIMPLE IDEAS
Descartes' best discussions of the simple ideas occur in
passages in the Rules and the Principles . In these passages
Descartes distinguishes five types of simple idea, material,
inteJ 1 actual
,
common, mixed, and privative and negative . ^
Let as see. how Descartes describes each type:
f.R I, 2 38 and 41-12.
2.17
(1) Material simple ideas are simple ideas that repre-
sent Properties belonging to material substance alone. As
examples Descartes cites the ideas of figure, extension, and
motion. 2
<2) Intellectual simple ideas are simple ideas that re-
present properties belonging to spiritual substance alone. My
ideas of perception, volition, knowing,' and willing are such
ideas
.
J
<3) SiHElS ideas are simple ideas representing
properties that belong to both material and spiritual substance
Our ideas of existence, unity, and duration are such ideas. 4
(4) Mixed simple ideas are simple ideas that repr<
properties belonging to embodied spirits but not to material
bodies and spiritual substances taken separately. Among these
mixed simple ideas are our ideas of emotions like anger, joy.
and sadness, and our ideas of sensations like pain, color.
2 ..,
.
icfl/i One can think of counterinstances to Descartes'
L
,
al“ rhat extension and motion are properties of only material
substance. Time is extended and light is in motion. I do
not know how Descartes would reply to these criticisms, butI think it is plausible that he would claim that light is ma-
t.erici... and mat 'extension' is used equivocally when predicated
op time. By 'extension' he means "magnitude or extension in
.length, breadth, and depth." HR I f 233.
3 .HR I, 238 and 41-42.
4 .
) 1 * * f P • 1 » in the Rules Descartes includes among
t>ie
. common simples a class of propositions he calls the common
),r ’ : ' " HR I, 41-42
.
In ! \
.
!
.
.
.
common notions are, no longer included. '"'See MR I, 238-239.
Following his account in the Principles
,
I exclude the common
not. ions from the. list of simple ideas.'
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odor, and taste.
(5> or Erivative simple ideas do not comprise
a distinct category of simple idea. Ml ideas have their cor-
responding negative or privative ideas. if the term <x' ex-
presses my idea X, then 'not-x' expresses the negative or priv-
ative idea corresponding to x . 6 For Descartes the negations
or privations of simple ideas are themselves simple ideas.
'.men such an idea is properly classified, it belongs to the
same type as the idea of which it is a negation. strictly
speaking, Descartes recognizes four, not five, general cate-
gories of simple idea.
II. TYPES OF MATERIAL FOR ERROR
IN THE SIMPLE IDEAS
On the interpretation I am developing, there are three
types of material for error, but simple ideas can have only
two of these.
h ?JL material for error that simp le .ideas cannot
*ave* Although on my interpretation of Descartes simple ideas
a.re analyzable' and can be incorrectly analyzed, Descartes
thinks these ideas are epistemically preferential. In the Rules
he tells us they are "known per se and are wholly free from
falsity. 6 He is speaking loosely here, however.
°
Ibid
. ,
p . 238.
6 Ibid
.
,
p. 42.
'See pp. 16 6-169 above
HR I, 42.
The context
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Of his remarks makes plain the sense in which he thinks simple
ideas are wholly free from falsity. In the Rules he proposes
to contrast the simple ideas with the ideas compounded out
of them. Although the simple ideas are "known per se and are
wholly free from falsity," "the union of these things one with
another is either necessary or contingent. 9 Apparently, simple
ideas are wholly free from falsity in the sense that they are
all nonfictional
.
10
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— Buria l for error in simple ideas
. Although
all simple ideas are nonfictions^
, they are not free of every
sort of material for error: they can be fictional, if we in-
clude in their tertiary contents concepts they do not entail.
”?teri_al falsity in s imple ideas
. But even analytically
cj.e.,r and distinct simple ideas can contain material for error.
For Descartes all ideas represent. "There cannot," he says,
be any ideas which do not appear to represent some
,,
. ,.11u.mgs.
. . . But what represents can misrepresent so that,
qua representations
,
.ideas can be a source of error. They can
k® ftntation
a
1 1v obscure or confused.
Descartes calls ideas that contain representational ma-
terial .tor error 'materially false'. Contrasting formal with
malarial falsity f he says, "Fox although I have before remarked
that it is only in judgements that falsity, properly speaking.
^XJhid
1C
11
See footnote 51 in Chapter VI above.
HR I, 164.
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or formal falsity, can be met with, a certain material falsity
may nevertheless be found in ideas, i.e. when they represent
'•’hat is nothing as though it were something. 12 Explicating
this passage, Harry Frankfurt takes Descartes to mean that an
materially false if it represents something that does
x
l
Y :Laed 0± a v/xnged horse is such a mater-
ially false idea.
Descartes' comment on material falsity is ambiguous. It
is not clear whether Descartes means to be stating a sufficient
or a necessary and. sufficient condition for an idea to be ma-
terially false. If he is merely stating a sufficient condi-
tion, he is not giving ns the full account of material falsity
that v,’c need
- Unfortunately, Descartes does not elaborate on
.Qi.s account
,
and we can only speculate.
We want to distinguish questions pertaining to analytical
cj.ar.iuy and distinctness from questions pertaining to the ex-
istence of the objects of cur ideas. For any idea, except our
idea of God, we cannot by simply perceiving with analytical
clax icy and distinctness ascertain whether our idea represents
anything that exists. If we perceive with analytical clarity
and distinctness, we can be sure that, if the object of our
idea exists, it has, as necessary features, the properties
the contents of our idea represent. What we do not know is
whether our ideas represent anything that exists, and if they
""Ibid
,
Frankfurt, p. 129.
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do, whether they represent them accurately. In Descartes'
vrew we need to find out whether our ideas are materially true
materially false. But what is material falsity?
As a first guess, we can try attributing to Descartes
the view that a materially false idea is one that provides
material tor °r->*r>r ho-’-u-pr a *.
-r De^ause
.it renredon-t-c? ,Lt-eoents a particular that
CiOGo no l. Ov r 4-" o becoUoe rt represents a particular as exist-
ing in a manner in which it does not. If pains really exist14
and I am in pain, then my idea of my pain is not materially
false because what my idea represents exists. But if I form
the idea of my pain as existing in my foot, then my idea is
materially false, not because it represents a particular that
does not exist, but because it represents a particular as ex-
o.-tmu m 3. way it doss not.
tha strength of these considerations, we could define
'a materially false idea' as follows:
(bib a) A person A has a materially false idea I = (Ex)
[A takes I to represent x but x does not exist, or
iE¥) takes 1 to represent x as having p but x
does not have F)J 15
1 A.
may ba tiie absisnCc Gif pie
’it CD j. o a. ) an-d CD1
o.c rep l osentat j Q il . Thj s :
i Peas can rep y C°ent ob i ec
want to be. able co make s<
"The re. ex ists an obj ect ip
does not exist !l This api
pears in one disjunct of (DIG a) . We deny the existence of an
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Against (D16a)
, we can pose the following alternative:
tD1Sb! * perSon * ® materially false idea 1 , (E „,df _:/
t^F] \.A takes. I to rpnrpfotvi- t“
—
-
u lepresenl x as having F but x
does not have F)
( D 1 6 a ) and (D16b) diff^-r i*n tne following respect. On (DIG a)
I can have a mater i pin- f a i 3 ,y ‘ol °e ldea that represents correctly.
•-f I have an idea of a centaur that rLXiCl
- 1 ^k.e to represent some-
thing that does not actually exist, my idea represents cor-
rCCtlY bU " 18 r"aterlally false nonetheless. (DISa) makes every
unexemplified idea materially false. On (1516b), however, my
idea of a centaur is not materially false. 16 Although my idea
represents an object that does not exist in the actual world,
my
-dea represents its object as not. existing. Representing
this
C
diff?^,Tt
iCh
T
We
(
lava existentially quantified. To avoid
tion 4
-o be^fourd n”r
ln <D16a) an<J <D16b > of a distinc-
/ ,
De
^'frtes distinguishes two types of existence. He tells
"
-hink '°
an e
^
lst formally or objectively. Sometimes
w umiK o.u tilings rhat do not really exist or, as Descartes
wou...d say,, do not formally exist. Yet every idea represents-e v/ery idea is an idea of something or other. When l’ have an'
^o.ocr or a centaur, my idea represents something that does notredily^exisi and has no formal reality. Yet there is some-
-eing that my idea is an idea of. This somethin- is the cen-tcinr or which I am thinking. Although the centaur does notrprmally exist, Descartes would say it exists "in" my idea:it exists as an object of thought, and it has objective exist-
ence out does
y
not exist independently of the idea containing
Using Descartes' distinction, I will take 'x f in (D16a)
and Dll. Go • to range over things having objective existence.
T° highlight the difference between (DIG a.) and (D16b)
,
1 assume, that centaurs do not. exist. As it turns out, Descartes
thinks this assumption is one I cannot discharge.
22 3
ito object m this way, my idea represents correctly and is
not materially false.
We want to be able to adopt the fol-
lowing definition of 'material truth':
(D.i.7) An idea X is materially true — v a ,“ y T- ~df IE is not materially
false
To understand what we mean by 'material truth’, we need to
decide between (D16a) and (D16b)
. Descartes gives us a little
help here, and I will be somewhat arbitrary. I will take (D1.6b)
to be the conect definition for two reasons: it opens the
possibility that one can have a materially true idea of an
imaginary object, and it avoids a difficulty Frankfurt raises.
intuitively, I think it is reasonable to say that my
ictea oi Macbeth's dagger is less obscure and confused than
Macbeth's idea of it. .Although Macbeth views his idea as re-
presenting something that does exist, I view his idea as re-
presenting something that does not exist. But whether I adopt
(D.I 60 ) or (D16b)
,
it turns out that I have as good reasons to
suspect my own idea of being materially false as I have reason
wO bi-speot. Macbeth's. (D.!. 6 a) and (D.L 6 b) lead to the same con-
clusion but for different reasons.
On (,Di 6 a)
,
it comes as no surprise that my idea is ma-
terially false, for I have good reason to believe that Macbeth's
dagger is a figment of Shakespeare's imagination. If 1 adopt
(D16b)
,
much more careful thought is required. Taking my idea
of Macbeth's dagger to represent something that does not exist,
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X believe my idea to represent correctly. I could be mistaken,
however, and I have good reason to think I might be. If the
genius desires to deceive me, he can make Macbeth and his
dagger exist. In my view (D16b) allows a more subtle and, I
think, more Cartesian analysis of ideas of imaginary things.
There is a second reason for adopting (D16b)
. Frankfurt
argues that Descartes is committed to a grotesque aprioriam
if his rule of evidence entails that clearly and distinctly per
ceived concepts are materially true. Descartes would, Frank-
furt believes, be saddled with the view "that a person need only
formulate a clear and distinct idea of some type of object in
cider to be. certain that an object of that type exists." ^ ?
Although (D16a) leaves Descartes open to this criticism, (D16b)
boos not. On (D16b)
,
I can have materially true ideas of par-
ticulars that do not exist.
an c?
:
falsity as fun ctions of representation
When we discussed analytical clarity and distinctness, we were
able to say that ideas can be analytically clear and distinct
even though the person having these ideas does not recognize
them to be so. Although the ideas are always modes of thought
and do not exist apart from the thinker having them, there is
a perfectly good sense in which we can say that analytical
c ajrity ymd distinctness are properties of ideas.
.similarly, we can say that ideas are materially true or
'See p. 90 above
falSe
- AlthOU9h a11 ideas «e representations and do not ex-
ist apart from the person having them, this person may not know
whether his ideas represent correctly or incorrectly.
„is
ideas will be either materially true or materially false, but
he will not. know which.
In acknowledging that there is a good sense in which
we can say that ideas are materially true cr false, we do not
want to ignore the role of the thinker in making his ideas one
or the other
. It is the thinker who interprets his ideas and
constitutes them to be the representations they are. On this
score, Gewirth is right. Viewed in one way, ideas are mater-
ially false; viewed in another, they are materially true. 18 if
I take my idea of pain to represent a particular existing in
my foot, my idea is materially false. If, on the other hand,
i take my idea to represent a sensation or thought, it is
materially true
.
fals ity and Gewirth 5 s account. We
are now in a position to give a fair assessment of Gewirth r s
account. Gewirth was right when he realized that clarity and
d.i-st inctness is a function of how we interpret our ideas.
'
All ideas represent, and all ideas have what Gewirth calls an
20interpi e< -
1
/? content
. They also have
f Gewirth believes
,
a
lk
1.9
See pp . 7-8 above
Ibid
.
20See pp. 8-9 above.
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direct content. 21 On my view this direct content is the an-
the idea what the idea contains implicitly and
explicitly
.
Cewirth thinks that clarity and distinctness is a func-
tion of the relation between direct and interpretive contents. 2
He is mistaken. Although there are two distinguishable con-
tents in ideas, clarity and distinctness does not consist in
a relation between the two. Rather, these two types of con-
tents give rise to two separate aspects of clarity and distinct
ness: (i) that aspect that pertains to the analysis of the
idea and concerns analytical clarity and distinctness and (ii)
thst aspect that per ,.ains to the interpretive contents of ideas
and concerns representational clarity and distinctness. On
my account an idea, is clear and distinct if and only if it
is bo'ch analytically and representational ly clear and distinct,
—
-~1- PJL our strategy , One issue we have been
considering can now be resolved. I inquired as to whether Des-
cartes recognizes any types of simple idea every instance of
which is materially true. My answer is that he recognizes
no such types among those he lists in his classification. Idea;
falling under each category can be materially false depending
on how we view them. But now we have another problem. We
want to avoid those interpretations that make our ideas mater-
21
22
Ibid.
See pp . 7-8 above.
ially false, and we want to adont rn-ii,, a vC dJ p only tb°se interpretations
that make them materially true. But how can we tell which
are the right interpretations to adopt? Descartes recommends
the method of doubt.
VJhv the method of doubt cannot be usee! to ascertain ma-
terial falsit*. Using the method of doubt, we cannot ascertain
whether our ideas are materially false. When I apply the
method of doubt to my ideas, I try to conceive of a reason
for doubting that ray idea represents correctly. Employing
the method of doubt against my idea of Macbeth's dagger, 1
find that X have good reason to doubt the adequacy of my in-
terpretation. The evil genius might have made Macbeth's dag-
ger exist so that, for all I know, my idea of Macbeth's dagger
misrepresents and is materially false. On the other hand,
1 have not shown my idea to be materially false. Although 1
have a reason to suspect that my idea misrepresents, ray suspi-
cion is, for ail
_l know, unfounded.
iil2.se ide as regarding which we shou ld with-
-----
Although the method of doubt does not show me
that my idea of Macbeth’s dagger is materially false, it does
tohow ^ can avoid errors of judgement due to the material
falsity of ideas. Recognizing that I have a reason to doubt
the existence of Macbeth's dagger, I can withhold judgement
from any proposition that I recognize either to entail that
his dagger exists or to entail that it does not exist. Re-
22 8
Stricting my judgement in this way, I protect myself from error.
— EE2i>.lem with using the method of doubt to
ascertain material truth. Although the method of doubt c».
not tell us which of our ideas are as a matter of fact mater-
ially false, Descartes thinks we can use this method to ident-
ify some materially true ideas. An idea is materially true
provided that it does not misrepresent. To show that our idea
does not misrepresent, we cannot consult the world directly
to see it it is as we represented it. But we can use the
method of doubt to find out whether there are any good reasons
for suspecting that our idea misrepresents. And if we find
out that there are none, then Descartes thinks we know with
certainty that our idea is materially true
.
^
But can the method of doubt really show us that there
are no good reasons for doubting that our idea represents cor-
rectly? At first glance it seems that the method of doubt
cannot do this much. To use this method, it appears that I
must canvass possible reasons for doubting, and I must see if
any of these are good reasons. After a diligent but unsuc-
cessful effort to conceive a good reason for doubting, I might
conclude that there are no such reasons. But I could be mis-
taken. There could always be a good reason 1 have overlooked.
Regara.L-e.ss of how careful X am in searching for reasons foy
doubting, I cannot know with certainty that I have canvassed
23Here we encounter Descartes' view that what is indub-
itable is true and can be known with certainty to be so. See
HR X, 158-159 and HR II, 41.
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all the possibilities. If I can use the method of doubt ef-
fectively only If X can be sure I have not overlooked any pos-
sible reasons for doubting, then I cannot use the method’ of
doubt to identify my materially true ideas.
Although Descartes was never faced with the above arcu-
ment, he would, I believe, have disputed its soundness if if
had been brought to his attention. He could have replied that
we can identify materially true ideas without canvassing all
the possible reasons for doubting that we have represented
correctly, what wo need to be able to construct is an argu-
ment showing that any doubt we could adduce must be a bad
reason for doubting. Since Descartes never was confronted
With the criticism I am imagining him to refute, he gives no
explicit illustrations of the kind of argument we are looking
for. But his cogito argument and his proof of God's existence
m the Fifth Meditations seem to me to indicate a line of raa-
.
_
24son
.!.ng he co u 1d adop t
.
Taking his idea of himself to represent an existing
2 5thing, • he could have argued in the following way. Either he
us interpreting correctly or he is not. If he is interpret-
24 .
.
. ,
i lit;
.
.Lvcerature on the cogito argument and the ontoloq-
verY extensive and the interpretations
numerous
„ It is not my intention to offer a new interpretation
,
fitese- passages here. I merely use what Descartes says inthem to illustrate the sort of arguments Descartes could have
con otrue cod if he had wanted to show his ideas of himself and
Cod to he materially true.
assume chat Descartes is representing hemself only
as an existing thing here.
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ing correctly, then he does ex-i^ T f u •b ist * If he is misinterpreting
thon he is deceived, and he exists. He does not have to can-
vass every doubt one could adduce in order to gain the assur-
ance he needs. Whatever doubt he could bring forward, if it
is a good reason for doubting, then he is deceived, and he
exists
. So there are no good reasons for doubting. He has
.1 -ul .uea or himself, and he can use the method
of doubt to ascertain his idea to be materially true.
in this respect Descartes' idea of himself is not unique.
Descartes also thinks his idea of God represents something
that exists. Could he be misinterpreting his idea, however?
He could argue as follows. His idea of God contains the idea
of having all perfections. And existence is a perfection. So
God has existence as one of his attributes
.
26
These consider-
ations would, I believe, suffice to satisfy Descartes that he
cannot be mistaken when he takes his idea of God to represent
an existing thing
.
27 His idea of God is, he could hold, mater-
ially true,
Altl.ougu Descartes did net. explicitly offer arguments to
:%R I, 180-183
.
J
I do not. know how Descartes would respond to the argu-
menu rhat he. could not be mistaken if he represented his idea
o.k the joeriect island as existing. He might argue that the
rdea of
tl
a perfect island is analytically confused because its
secondary content contains everything its primary contents
entail. The primary contents are the concepts of. being perfect
ano. being an island. But islands are necessarily imperfect so
that the secondary contents of Descartes' composite contain
contradictory concepts. The idea of a perfect island is anal-
ytically confused.
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^-ow his ideas of himse] f -"na .Sel± “nd God to be materially true, he
certainly believed they were hut fh r >c^v ^re. B t ese are not the only ma-
tcrially true ideas Descartes believed himself to have. Let
us apply Descartes' method of doubt to the various types of
simple ideas to see what interpretations make them materially
true and what interpretations warrant our withhoding judgement
regarding the objects of these, ideas.
IV. THE METHOD OF DOUBT WHEN APPLIED
TO SIMPLE IDEAS
—— SZSBilS. S2* serial falsity in mixed and mate r-
~ ViHPiE i$2S£- Our next task is to apply the method of
doubt to interpretations of the various types of simple idea.
In his wax example Descartes applies his method of analysis to
the concepts his composite idea of wax contains explicitly.
Descartes' aim is to distinguish between those concepts that
represent necessary features of matter from those that do not.
Descartes applies the heat to the wax so that he can
show that there is a possible state of affairs in which pro-
perties he ascribes to wax are not necessary features of it
Proceeding .in this way, Descartes is able to identify general
necessary features of matter — extension, figure, number,
place, duration, etc. " Although the physicist who studies
28
2
8
HR I, 154.
23 Ibid.
,
p. 146
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these features is studying properties "that are very simple
and general Descartes thinks physics is not as reliable a
science as mathematics. Mathematicians, he tells us, "only
treat of things that are very simple and very general, without
taking great trouble to ascertain whether they actually exist
or not.
.
. The physicist, on the other hand, believes
the properties he studies to exist. He thinks physics gives
hrm a description of the material world. But the method of
analyse.., that identifies for us necessary features of matter
cannot tell us whether the material world exists.
What it can tell us is whether properties are necessary
or contingent features of matter if matter exists. Telling
us th .is much, the method of analysis allows us to anticipate
what will happen when we apply the method of doubt to the
mixed and material simple ideas. If these ideas represent
contingent properties and I take these ideas to represent
existing particulars, then even if I assume that, the external
wox.ld exists, 1 will be able to devise good reasons for doubt-
ing chat my ideas correctly represent. On the other hand, I
w.uil no w be aole to conceive such doubts when the properties
represented as existing are necessary features of material
substance
.
30
•*«
Ibid.
,
p. 147.
Ibid.
233
The method of doubt when applied to mixed simple ideas
.
32
Descartes thinks that most of us believe our ideas of sensation
to represent particulars that really exist, that exist in ma-
terial substance, and that resemble the ideas representing
them. Interpreted in this way, our ideas are, for all „e know,
materially false on three counts. As the example of heat and
cold showed, we cannot be sure that our mixed simple ideas
are not privatives representing nothing that really exists.
But even if our ideas of sensation represent existing
particulars, our ideas might still be materially false. As
Descartes' example of pain shows, we could be mistaken if we
tnink our pain is located in our body. Amputees have been
known to claim that they feel pain in their foot even though
tiiey have no foot for their pain to be in.“^
Lescartes can also be deceived if lie thinks his idea
Gi P a:Ln represents a particular that resembles his idea.
Descartes has some plausible theories about the physiology
of perception. Sense perceptions may result from complex
changes m a nervous system that acts not only as a transmitter
but also as a transformer of external stimuli. Since the stim-
uli. are transformed, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose
that the causes of our ideas of sensation do not resemble the
I confine ray discussion to simple ideas of sensation,
but it wi.ll be evident that among the rational doubts applic-
able to ideas of sensation are doubts applicable to mixed simple
ideas general ly
.
gj O
" HR I, 189 .
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ldeaS they cause
- As Descartes says, the wise man will "never
assert that the object has passed complete and without any
alteration from the external world to his senses, and from
hxs senses to his imagination.
. .
If the wise man does not take his simple ideas of sen-
sation to resemble the particulars they represent, how does
the wise man interpret his ideas of sensation? He will, Des-
cartes says, view these ideas as representations of sensations
or thoughts. And what is true of his idea of pain is true of
ideas of mixed simples generally. Descartes writes:
But in order that we may here distinguish that which is
clear from that which is obscure we ought to observe that
we nave a clear and distinct knowledge of pain, colour,
and other
. things of the sort when we regard them simpiv
o sens a uions or thoughts. But when we desire to "judge
Oj. such matters as existing outside of our mind, wo canin no wise conceive what sort of things they are.^
Descartes' point is that our mixed simple ideas represent
correctly if we view them as representing our sensations 01
thoughts
.
‘Ihe method of doubt when applied to material simple idea
the material simple ideas are those that represent properties
belonging ro material substance alone. Among these are Des-
cartes’ ideas of primary qualities -— extension, figure, motioi
place, duration, number, etc. If we take these ideas to repre-
sent properties existing in external material substance, are
3
4
Ibid., P . 44.
35 Ibid., p. 248.
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our ideas materially true or materially false?
In Descartes' considered opinion, these ideas are mater-
ially true. Although I can conceive of reasons for thinking
the external world does not exist, I cannot conceive of good
reasons
. The dream and evil genius hypotheses are in Descartes'
view inconsistent with other beliefs Descartes thinks he has
no good reason to doubt: that God exists and that He is no
deceiver. Descartes puts the point as follows:
And the whole strength of the argument which T have
?hat £ t0 Pr't'e thG existence of God consign this
should be JhMf ac l1: v ls not passible that my nature
'
t) a V S ' and lndeed tbat 1 should have in
T
3 °f a God
'
lf God did not veritably exist
'
" sa'7
' whose idea is in me, i.e. who possessesa.i chose supreme perfections of which our mind mav indeedhave some idea but without understanding them all 'whois liable to no errors or defect [and who has none of aH
-hose marks which denote imperfection]
. From this it is
manifest that He cannot be a deceiver, since the light
of nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarilyproceed from some defect.
App_i.yj.ng these considerations to the dream hypothesis, Des-
cartes says, "And I ought to set aside all doubts of these
past days as hyperbolical and ridiculous, particularly that
very uncommon uncertainty respecting sleep, which I could not
distinguish from the waking state.”" Continuing, he says.
"Because Cod is in no wise a deceiver, it follows that I am
not deceived in this .
"
Aiid if Descartes is not deceived,
30
’.Ibid.
, pp. 170-171.
3
7
Ibid., pp. 198-199.
the physicist is not
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deceived either. To the extent that his ideas represent nec-
essary features of matter as existing, the physicist's ideas
are materially true. He could make his ideas materially false,
however. If he thinks that his ideas represent properties
belonging to a mode of substance that has no first cause, then
his idea is materially false, for God exists and created the
material world.
—
-
— when applied to intellectual simples.
Intellectual simples represent properties pertaining to think-
ing substance alone. .Among these simple ideas are my ideas
o.i imagination
,
willing, feeling, sensation, and the like. If
I take these ideas to represent properties that belong to think
ing substance, I represent correctly. 38 Descartes thinks we
cannot conceive of a possible state of affairs where willing
goes on without there being a thinking substance which is
doing the willing. Willing is, Descartes believes, a mode
or thought, and for Descartes there is no good reason to hold
e-hat chinking can go on unless there is a thinker. ^
One can, of course, misinterpret his intellectual simple
j.de.c-.s and mane tnem materially false. If he thinks that he
is essentially a body, then he will believe that thinking in
its various forms is a mode of material substance. Commonly,
Jb Ibid.
,
p. 240.
'"'-'Russell thinks that Descartes has not shown that
thoughts need a thinker. Bertrand Russell, A History of
Wes tern Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 19457", p
567'.
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people talk as if they believe it is their brain that thinks
and remembers
. If they think that their idea of remembering
represents a mode of a brain, then in Descartes' view their
idea j-S materially false.
The method of doubt when applied to common s imples
.
Descartes does not say a great deal about the common simples
that will help our analysis. He does mention his ideas of
duration, order, and number — attributes that are common to
oor.h material and spiritual substances. And he suggests that
our ideas would be materially false if we viewed them as repre-
renting a substance rather than a mode. 41
Perhaps Descartes does not say a lot about his ideas
01 common simples because we can easily infer what he believes
fj: om. what he has already said about material and intellectual
simples. To the extent that his ideas represent necessary
features of both spiritual and corporeal substance, 41 his ideas
are m.at.c.rially true rf he takes them to represent existing
properties belonging to either spiritual or material substance.
Sjiice j/es cartes thinks he has no good reason to doubt that
ne exists as a thinking thing' and since we have already shown
that he believes he cannot with good reason doubt that matter
exists, he has no good reason, to doubt that necessary features
4oim i, 241
41
42
He can use his method of analysis to find out
HR I, 1 51-152
.
23 8
ox both spiritual and corporeal substance exist. when he
represents such features as existing, he represents correctly,
:C
—
-
r
--^ ^terj.ajL falsity in ideas. The review
we have given of material truth and falsity in simple ideas
was not meant to be complete or penetrating. It was simply
meant to show that no type of simple idea, is epistemically
P j . ej.erential to any other type. Although Descartes thinks
the mixed simples are especially troublesome because we have
pxejudices at induce us to misinterpret them, "''’ these dif-
ficulties are not inherent in mixed simple ideas. Our pre-
judices result from a faulty education which fails to provide
us with an adequate method for distinguishing what pertains
to mind from what pertains to body
.
44
But Descartes thinks
fnese prejudices of youth can be corrected if one uses the
method of doubt and avoids giving his ideas interpretations
he has the slightest good reason to suspect.
Mater j al truth and falsity in compos ite ideas. Inher-
ently , the composite idea of a winged horse is not any more
materially false than an idea of a triangle. If T view my
idea of a winged horse as representing an existing object,
my idea is materially false, but if I view it simply as repre-
senting a substance, then my idea, is materially true. 45
43,.
HJi I, 237 and 24 7.
4 4
* See Part I of the Discourse. HP I, 81-87. See also
IIP., I, 144-14 5 ,
45
In the same way that Descartes applied his method of
239
Similarly, my idea of a triangle would be materially false
if I interpreted my idea to represent a triangle existing 111
material substance. Every particle of matter
three directions, but the lines making up the
angles have no width.
is extended in
sides of t.ri-
Rel at
i
on ships between
ideas and material truth
.
between analytical clarity
on the one hand, or between
.
analytically clear and distinct
'There is no necessary connection
and distinctness and material tr
analytical confusion and mater
i
uth
,
al
falsi cy , on the other. An analytically clear and distinct
.Ldea can be materially false. Simple ideas are good illustra-
tions we have already discussed. But analytically clear and
distinct composite ideas can also be materially false as the
example I just gave of my idea of a triangle shows.
Similarly , analytically obscure a.nd confused ideas can
be materially true. I could include in the explicit content
of my idea of wax ideas representing contingent properties.
Although analytically confused, my idea is materially true if
1 take it to represent a material substance.
^
VII. DEFINITIONS RELATING TO REPRESENTATIONAL
CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS
analysis to bis idea of wax, he can apply his method to his
idea of a winged horse. He will as a result identify neces-
sary features of winged horses. Among the necessary features
will, of course, be necessary features of matter.
-i
substance
do not take my
however
.
idea to represent an existing material
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When we attempt to define what „e mean by a • represent-
ational clear and distinct idea', we encounter difficulties.
Descartes uses the terms 'clarity' and 'distinctness' and
ooscurrty' and 'confusion' in contexts where it is plain he
is talking about what v.e have referred to as 'material truth'
and 'material falsity '.47 Yet I M r.> 1 can discern no erfort on his
part to distinguish between those ideas chat are representation
ally clear or obscure, on the one hand, and those that are
representationally distinct or confused, on the other. And
tnere seem to be no clear patterns to his usage that would
indicate bow he draws the relevant distinctions. We could
draw these distinctions arbitrarily, but I see no point in
oexng unduly conjectural. Descartes' Rule tells us that what
clea.i.j.y Slid distinctly perceived is true. Even if we can-
not make out the distinction between representational clarity
and representational distinctness, we have accomplished a great
aeul if we can identify the representationally clear and dis-
tinct ideas.
Having defined ’a materially true idea
'
,
H
° I define
'representationally clear and distinct idea' as follows:
Oil 8) a person A has a representationally clear and dis-
tinct idea X X is materially true
An .idea that is not representationally clear and distinct will
7See HP. I, 2 37 and 241
48
See (D17) above, p. 223
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TePresentationally obscure or confused. We will not know
which, but we will know it is one or the other or both. For
the purpose of utilizing Descartes' Rule, however, we may have
all the information we need.
Perceiving with representational clarity and distinct -
ness.. A person who has a representational^ clear and distinct
idea may not perceive it with representational clarity and
distinctness
:
(D19! A person A perceives an idea X with representational
clarity and distinctness =
flf
X is representational^
clear and distinct, and A recognizes that there is
no good reason for doubting that X represents cor-
rect ly
Tii the same way that a person cannot perceive his idea with
analytical clarity and
-distinctness if his idea contains an
infinite analysis, a person may be unable to perceive with
representational clarity and distinctness a materially true
idea be has. He may be unable to prove that there are no good
reasons for doubting that his idea represents correctly. The
proof required, may be so long or so complicated that only God
can supply the demonstration.
lo.r our purpose, however, we do not need to perceive
with, representational clarity and distinctness. What we need
are perceptions that insulate us from the representational
material for error in ideas. We need perception that we can
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call
-minimally representational^ clear and distinct'.
—
- —.
pimal requirement for perceiving with represent-
ationai clarity and distinctness. If I believe that 1 am un-
able to show that an idea I have is materially true, I insulate
myself from error if I refrain from judging that my idea is
as I represented it. I withhold my judgement in this way be-
cause I recognize that, for all I know, my idea misrepresents.
1 could be mistaken, of course, and if I am, I miss out on
the opportunity to make some true judgements 1 would other-
wise be prepared to assent to. But one of Descartes' aims
is to protect us against making any false judgements. And
when we perceive with both minimal analytical and represent-
ational clarity and distinctness, we are in a position to
avoid making such judgements.
I define 'perceiving with minimal representational clar-
i :.v ana drs t j nctness ’ as follows:
(D20) A person A perceives an idea I with minimal repre-
sentational clarity and distinctness ~
.
.. A perceives
I_ with representational clarity and distinctness,
or (.Ex) (EF) [A takes I_ to represent x as having F
,
but A recognizes that he does not know whether there
is a good reason for doubting that x is F, and A
withholds judgement as to whether x is or is not F]
on CD2G } we can perceive with minimal representational clarity
and distinctness ideas that are representational ly obscure
2 4 3
or confused. If Macbeth's idea of his dagger is materially
false, Macbeth can still perceive his idea with minimal repre-
sentational clarity and distinctness if he appropriately with-
holds his judgement.
G^sendi's criticism and representational clari ty and
^iEii^tness. Having given an account of representational clar
1 «^y and distinctness, we can turn our attention r.o Gassendi's
criticisms
. Plainly, Descartes did give Gassendi a method —
the method of doubt for distinguishing representat ionally
clear and distinct from representationally obscure and confused
ideas. Admittedly, this procedure is not mechanical. It
requires thought and may be employed with varying degrees of
success. But even where the method fails to reveal whether
our ideas are materially true or false, we are enjoined
against falling back on subjective conviction. On the contrary
we should witnliord judgement and settle for perception that
is minimally representationally clear and distinct.
Although we avoid errors of judgement if we use the
method of doubt correctly, this method has a psychlogical com-
ponent. People can differ about what constitutes a good rea-
son for doubting. Descartes thinks his idea of matter repre-
sents something that exists. He thinks God would be a deceiver
if it burned out that Descartes was misinterpreting his idea.
This consideration suffices to convince Descartes that he can
conceive of no good reason for doubting that he is representing
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nib idea correctly. But another person might argue that our
errors should not he attributed to Cod. This person, an ideal-
ist, might claim that God in His goodness did not create the
material world, and He gave us adequate mental capacity to
discern that ft^ a ; p, r. -w- T c“* Clia not ' If we misrepresent our idea and.
uiink that the exteTnal wrvr i a d-i
• 7° ld exi 3ts, we are at fault, not.
God.
Descartes adopts this sort of strategy himself in his
discussion of error in Meditation IV. If i make a mist£ko
f-.u_t is mine, not God's. God has given me a will that
can judge before the mind fully understands
.
49
Descartes
thinks we encounter this difficulty whan we believe that our
idea of heat represents a property of material bodies. But.
someone else could counter that our idea of heat is correctly
interpreted. We have a very strong inclination to believe
our idea represents correctly. God allows this strong inclin-
ation to be in us, and He would be a deceiver if as a matter
cf fact our idea misrepresents.
If Gassendi accused Descartes of psychologism, he is
in a sense right. Although each individual has a method that
allov/s him to decide whether to regard his ideas as materially
tr-ue or false, the same method used by someone else could yield
v.ii.i i vr-i e
i
iL conclusions
. Since the method of doubt i.s the. only
me. l. hoc.! Descartes gives us for ascertaining representational
<\ o
' V
}.11R I, 171-179.
clarity and distinctness and since an idea is clear and dis-
tinct only if it is representational^ clear and distinct, „e
have completed one of the major tasks of this dissertation.
We set out to determine whether
from the charge of psychologism
Descartes could be vindicated
He cannot
.
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C H A P T E R VIII
CLARITY AND DISTINCTNESS AND DES CARTE S' RULE
This chapter has two sections. In section I, I define
the terms 'clear idea' and 'distinct idea'. In section II, I
make use of my overall account to give an interpretation of
Descartes' Rule and to explain the sense in which his Rule
can be said to be true.
1. DEFINITIONS RELATING TO CLARITY AND DISTINCTNESS
The second major task of this dissertation concerns our
CjJ.o.r i: to clarify what Descartes means by 'clear' and 'distinct
Because Descartes' definitions were hopelessly vague, we pur-
b uea a strategy of examining how Descartes actually uses these
terms. Although the strategy we adopted has led us to the
distinction between analytical and representational clearness
ano distinctness, it does not accomplish as much as we might
hope. Since we are not able to draw a distinction between
representational clarity and representational distinctness,
we will noc be able to distinguish, between clarity and distinct
ness per so. We can, however, elucidate what it is for an
idea to be clear: and distinct.
(D2.1) An idea X is clear and distinct == x is analytical ly
— d f — 2
and representationally clear and distinct
Having (D21)
,
we can define 'perceiving an idea with clarity
t
l-f
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cmd distinctness' as follows:
^D22) a person A perceives an idea X with clarity and dis-
tinctness =
df A perceives X with both analytical
cmd representational clarity and distinctness
requirement
. Since the analysis of analyt-
ically clear and distinct ideas can be infinite, we introduced
a minimum requirement that would allow us to ascertain which
of our ideas are minimally analytically clear and distinct.
We required that ideas contain explicitly all the essential
concepts and only concepts these entail. Similarly, when we
considered representational ly clear and distinct ideas, we
introduced the notion of perceiving with minimal represent-
ational clarity and distinctness Putting the minimal require
meats together, we arrive at an account of what it is to per-
ceive. with minimal clarity and distinctness:
(D23) A person A perceives an idea X with minimal clarity
and distinctness = A perceives X with minimal
analytical clarity and distinctness, and A perceives
X with minimal representational clarity and dis-
tinctness
Extending clarity and d istinctness beyond the minimal
•equ
j
rement . tve have already discussed how we can increase
analytical clarity and distinctness beyond the minimal require
jTieht
. There is a sense in which we can also increase the
See p. 213 above
representational clarity and distinctness of our ideas. P.epr
sentational clarity and distinctness can vary in degree. One
can take his idea X to represent something that exists, to
represent something that exists in corporeal substance, to
represent something having a corporeal substance as its cause,
and so on. Assuming that X is being interpreted correctly,
it seems reasonable to say that as one adds new interpretive
content to his idea, he increases its representational clarity
euid distinctness.
Since we can increase the representational clarity and
distinctness of our ideas, I think we can say that person A
increases the clarity and distinctness of his perception of
an idea X beyond the minimal requirement provided that A
perceives X with minimal analytical and representational clar-
and distinctness, and either A adds to X's explicit ter-
tiary content concepts X entails or A adds to X's interpretive
contents and A continues to perceive X with minimal represent-
dtional clarity and distinctness
.
II. DESCARTES’ RULE
We have now completed our account of clarity and distinct-
Or- this point Descartes' definition of 'being distinct’is suggestive., I-Ie says, "But the distinct is that which is
to precise and different from all other objects that it con-
tains within itself nothing but what is clear." See HR I.
"" v / • j --escax 1 es remarks suggest that we increase the distinct-
ness of our idea as we increase its interpretive content. His
remarks also suggest that a representationally clear idea has
as its interpretive content a subset of the interpretive con-
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ness, and we can turn our attention to the use Descartes roake3
aild dlstlnct ldeas < He tells us that whatever is
clearly and distinctly perceived is true.
But what is it that Descartes thinks is true when clearly and
distinctly perceived? Narrowing the scone of w,•k) tup i this question
fox us, Frankfurt asks; ts »+ ^1S ldeab or Propositions that Des-
cartes thinks are true?
If he thinks it is idea«s ->v-^ *1^ a 'J tnat are
- true
,
he is using
true' in an unusual sense Frankfurt- - „ • ui.iank..urt considers the possibility
than Descartes msans bv * t rue 1 j , 3
-
Y --luc materially true'. He rejects
this interpretation because he thinks it saddles Descartes
with a "grotesque apriorism" .
' On the analysis I have given
of material truth, 5 Frankfurt is rejecting a bad interpretation
or Descartes' Rule for the wrong reason. We can have unexempli-
tied materially true ideas.
Although Frankfurt 5 s argument is unsound, the conclusion
h~. draws is correct. Descartes' Rule is not meant to tell
us that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is mater-
ially true in the sense in which we have defined a 'materially
true .idea'. Since ideas are clear and distinct only if they
tent of a representational.lv distinct idea. But we have nocine as to v:hat the content of a representationally clear idea
See pp. 83-90 above
Bee p. 90 above
i)See p. 223 above
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are representational ly clear and distinct and since ideas are
representational ly clear and distinct if and only if they are
materially true, Descartes' Rule i* it - e v- is a Rule about material
truth, is pointless. To use Descartes' Rule, we need to find
our ideas' are clear ana distinct, but to find
out whether our ideas are clear and distinct, we have to as-
certain whether they are materially true.
Prankfurt^s interpretation of Descarte s ' Rule
. Frank-
furt '-hulks that Descartes' Rule guarantees the formal truth
of propositions. He holds this view because he thinks that
one has a clear and distinct idea of something only if, for
every necessary feature of that thing, he clearly and dis-
tinctly goroElives that that thing has that property. 6 We
clearly and distinctly perceive an idea only if we clearly
ond distinctly perceive, some proposition about that idea.
On my view Frankfurt is with minor variation giving us
an account of analytically clear perception,' But the point
lie is making is correct, nevertheless. I perceive an idea X
with analytical clarity and distinctness only if, for every
concept included in X s s tertiary content, I clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive that A entails that concept. To perceive an
idea x with, analytical clarity and distinctness, 1 must clearly
t! tee pp. 9 0 S
1
above.
' See p. 206 above.
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and distinctly perceive that j>, where j> is some proposition
about X. But now a new question arises: What is involved
in clearly and distinctly perceiving that E?
— iH^SJvt. There are two types of judge-
ment Descartes recognises, a judgement proper results from
an act of will. One affirms or denies that p. 2 can be ap-
prehended without being affirmed or denied, however. Descartes
distinguishes what he calls inner cognition from the judge-
r.-.i ..al faculty
. I cite below one passage from the Rules and
one from the Replies. In the passage in the Rules. Descartes
is talking about knowing simple ideas by acquaintance. But
the reader will recall that in the Rules Descartes counts what
he calls the common notions — propositions — among his sira-
spie ideas. Regarding these ideas, he says:
Ae that sj- 1 these simple natures are known per se
and are wholly free from falsity. It will be easy" to
snow this, provided we distinguish that faculty of our
un.aei standing by which it. has intuitive awareness of
,
anct knows them, from that by' which *TF‘Judgei~mak
-
ing use of affirmation and denial.
In the Rep lies he says
:
No one can be sure that he knows or that he exists, unless
he ^ knows what thought is and what existence. Not that
this requires a cognition formed by reflection or one
acquiree by demonstration it is altogether enough
or one. to know it by means of that internal cognition
which, always precedes reflective knowledge7~~antr^whichl
when the object is thought and existence is innate in all
men . . . .
L
8HR I, 41-42
9
Emph a s .1 s mine
.
HR II, 241. Emphasis mine. This distinction between
Ibid.
,
p. 4
2 0
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111^ tW° paSSa5eS D—tes recognises two types of know-
je. rhrough. his inner cognition a person can know that p
before he affirms that £ so that the proposition p can be pre-
sent in the mind before the win affirms or denies it. Wc
can say that a proposition p can be perceived before judgement
is passed on it.
Making this distinction, we can talk about clearly and
distinctly perceived propositions and clearly and distinctly
perceived judgements. In the Rules Descartes tells us to
"reduce involved and obscure propositions step by step to those
that are simpler, and then starting with the intuitive appre-
hension oi all those that are absolutely simple, attempt to
ascend to the knowledge of all others by precisely similar
„11Seeps. For the purposes of the analysis I want to give, I
will suppose that a molecular proposition is clearly and dis-
jiidgeTCenta i knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance is recoa-211 zea m Romance languages and in German but not in Englishxn irenen, for example, ’savoir' means 'to know that such aAd
|
tne
.
Ca
!’
G
,
wnila Iconnaitre 1 means 5 to know by acquaint-
; ^ :
-os cartes recognizes this distinction in his most ex-
^
r.ed passage regarding simples. Throughout that oassaaeDescartes reserves for appropriate forms of ’connaitre’ whatilaldane and Ross translate variously as ’ cognrtI^7~~apnrehend •
^
r.now
, discerned', ‘knowledge', 'known per se'
,
and 1 intui-
v.rve awareness !
. When, on the other hand, Dei^artes referslo judgemental knowledge and judgemental knowing, he usesforms of the infinitive ' savoir '
. For his use of ’connaitre',
co.opaie Rules
, pp . 4Q—42 with Rene De.s cartes Les Regies Pour
ri. S J lij L ’ Esprit in Oeuvres et Lettre
s~
TLlbrari
e
Ga.tld.mard, 1352}
, pp. 80 — 82, and for his use of 'savoir' com-
pare his headings regarding both his knowledge of~the external
world and^the relation of mind and body in the Principles,
pp. 254-255 with Rene Descartes, Les Principles
-
De La Philo-
sophle in Oeuvres et Le ttres
, pp .~ 611-612*.
LLHR I, 14.
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tinctly perceived if and only if the simple proposltions
o fclixch it can be reduced, or propositions recognized to be
equivalent to them i
'
drS olearlY and distinctly perceived.
not know which Djro r^o <o'i fi r'iv-,01 poslfclons Descartes takes to be
absolutely simple, however, m Principle x .- 1 x i X, he refers to the
cogito as a proposition and says it "is the fir*-y ~ n st and most
certain which presents itself to those who philosophise in
orderly fashion." 12 But he goes on to indicate that there
are "notions of the simplest hind" whicKmust be known before
philosophising car. begin. 13 Descartes uses the term 'notions'
co refer to both ideas and propositions, however. 11 Of the
examples he gives, only one - "In order to think we must oe"
— is clearly a proposition. But J. do not know why Descartes
considers this proposition to be perfectly simple, and I do
not know what others he. might also consider to be so. Yet
without such information it is difficult to give a perfectly
satisfactory account of what it is to perceive that o clearly
and distinctly.
To offer what is at least a plausible account, I need
to make some assumptions. I assume that Descartes believed
there are simple propositions or equivalents of them that
have a subject-predicate form. This assumption seems to me
i 2
“"HR I f 222.
1 3
' Ibid
.
14 Ibid
.
,
pp. 41-42.
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to be Plausible, and it suffices to give us a partial account
of clearly and distinctly perceiving that p_. if in addition
I as suite that all simple propositions are equivalent to pro-
positions having a subject-predicate form tlicat t , 1 car- give the com-
plete account we want. The view tW annat a11 propositions are
reducible to subject-predicate propositions has a long tra-
rn uhc history of philosophy and is in Russell's view
particularly important for substance ontologists like Dec-
cartes. Descartes may not have held this view, however,
and I am not attributing it to him. On the other hand, for
purpc.-es j.t will be easiest if we suppose that he clid.
But if in point of fact he aid not, then the account I give
is incomplete and needs to be augmented.
Where p is a simple proposition of subject-predicate
form, I arrive at the following:
.^2.) A pv-.i. oon A clear ly and distinctly perceives that
p ’ df ~ Parceives p's subject concept clearly and
distinctly, and A recognizes that p’s predicate
concept is contained in either the tertiary or the
interpretive content of p’s subject concept/’' 6
Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition Of The ph.il-
Si^2P?'3X 91 . .iLe.lbniz (London. George Al.lei'T"T"*Uli^n~Ltd'7‘' T91T7)
p . 1 2 . '
Since A can never ascertain with certainty whether
he is. clearly and distinctly perceiving p’s subject concept,
w- need to add a definition for ’perceiving that p with min-imal clarity and distinctness 1 I omit this definition,
however
.
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(D25) A person A clearly and distinctly judges that P =
dfA clearly and distinctly perceives that p, and A
affirms or denies
p_ on the basis of his clear and
distinct perception that p
Having CD 2 '1 ) and (D25)
,
we can define what we mean when
we say a person knows that p.
(D2S) A person A knows that d A clearly and distinctly
judges that p
nince Descartes would hold that A knows that p only if p i 3
true, we can now give an account of Descartes’ Rule.
’ Rule. Strictly speaking, it is propositions
that are true or false. They are true or false regardless of
whether they are affirmed or denied. Either what they state
“c ur
-'
-*- s case or it is not. In the language we
are using, a proposition that is not a judgement will still
be true or false.
Every clearly and distinctly perceived proposition is
true
,
however. Given assumptions I have made, I clearly and
distinctly perceive that p if and only if I clearly and
distinctly perceive p’s subject concept, and 1 recognize that
p's subject concept contains p's predicate concept in either
its tertiary or its interpretive content. If p's predicate
concept is contained in the tertiary content of p's subject
concept, p is true because it predicates of the object of p's
J -
'
Ibid
.
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subject concept a necessary feature of that object. If D 's
predicate concept is contained in the interpretive content
of E's subject concept, then E is true because there is no
good reason to doubt that E 's subject concept represents cor-
rectly. Every clearly and distinctly perceived proposition
is formally true.
But when Descartes states his Rule, he does not say that
every clearly and distinctly perceived proposition is formally
t"LUe * instead, he says that whatever is clearly and distinct]
perceived 13 true. 18 As Frankfurt points out both concepts
ana propositions are clearly and distinctly perceived. Does
Descartes' Rule mean that both concepts and propositions are
true?
At the very least it is meant to establish the truth
of propositions
. Descartes may have put his Rule loosely,
however
,
because of the close relationship between perceiving
a concept clearly and distinctly and perceiving a proposition
ciearly and distinctly. A clearly and distinctly perceived
concept provides no material for error. We have adopted a
strict sense of 'material truth’. But if we admit a loose
sense
,
we can also say that Descartes’ Rule guarantees the
material truth of clearly and distinctly perceived ideas.
In this sense a materially true idea is one that provides no
material for error. This sense appears in the Fourth Replies
18
HR I
,
158.
2 57
where Descartes mentions 'material falsity'. Here he says,
"Certain ideas are false materially, i. e
. according to my
interpretation, that they supply the judgement with material
for error. ''19 Besides ideas that are representations! ly clear
and distinct and materially true proper, ideas that are anal-
ytically clear and distinct provide no material for error.
They are, in this loose sense, materially true so that we can
say that every clearly and distinctly perceived idea is mater-
5-ally true.
lising this loose sense of 'material truth'
. we can
interpret Descartes' Rule as follows; Every clearly and
distinctly perceived proposition is formally true, and every
clearly and distinctly perceived concept is materially true.
19
.HR IX, 105.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
I will now review the ground we have
together any loose ends that remain
.
covered and null
I
. GEW1RTH
Gewirt.h sets out to defend Descarte
and against a criticism he himself raises
1
advocate. To defend Descartes, Gewirth
s against wasseno.i
in hi.s role as devi
makes use of a dis-
s
tinction between direct and interpretive contents. Although
the article in which Gewirth observed that Descartes recognizes
two types of contents in ideas first appeared in 1943, Gewirth '
s
observation has been virtually ignored.
In part commentators have ignored Gewirth' s distinction
because of the use he makes of it. Thinking he can vindicate
Descartes only if he makes clarity and distinctness consist
in a relation between direct and interpretive contents, Gewirth
developed a cumbersome and false interpretation. As I showed
in my critical remarks in Chapter I, Gewirth ‘ s account fails
for simple ideas. Basically, his account fails because it
relies on the method of difference to tell us whether our ideas
represent correctly or incorrectly. Applying the method of
3.See above Pp 6 7
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difference to simple ideas. Gewirth draws the conclusion that
simple ideas are clear and distinct *
several examples of simple ideas that are
so that his account is inconsistent.
But he himself gives
obscure or confused
Bo account for simple ideas we were forced to abandon
Gewirth' s approach and viewT clari
a relation between direct and int
ty and disti.nctness
erpretive contents.
,
not as
but as
the product of correct analysis and interpretation
.
II. KENNY
Kenny argued that Descartes' account of clearness and
distinctness is incoherent. Although there seem to be three
separate elements in the perceptual situation — the pain,
the perception of the pain, and the judgement about it,-' Kenny
chinks there are really only two — the pain and the judgement
In my chapter on Kenny, I criticized particular arguments
Kenny raised to show that the perception is not a genuine in-
termediary between the pain and the judgment, * and 1 will not
cover the same ground twice. In the light of the interpret-
ation I have given, however, there are some additional points
to be made.
prem i ses in Kenny ‘
s
argument to show that the perception
See p. 6 4 above.
See pp. 64-68 above.
•1
1
For my criticism, see Chapter II, Section II.
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~ -- ***& ^ distinct from the pain. Kenny thinks Des-
cartes is inconsistent because he holds the following:
CD When a man feels great pain, he has a very clear
perception of pain."
(2) We have a very clear perception of pains only if we
restrict our judgement about them and that "this is
a condition most difficult to observe." 5
On the analysis I have given, there is no contradiction here.
In (1), Descartes is saying that we perceive our simple idea
of pain with analytical clarity and distinctness. In (2)
,
he is saying that we perceive our idea of pain clearly only
if we interpret it correctly.
Prem ises in Kenny 1 s argument to show that
.'r.fL®. P&3J - is nor distinct from the judgement,
^he dis motion between the perception of pain
ment about it, Kenny says:
the percep t ion
Criticizing
and the judge-
On the one hand, we learn that 'we are by nature so dis-
pose!.) to give our assent to things we clearly perceive,
that we cannot possibly doubt their truth*. ^ Yet, on
the other hand, does not the whole procedure of methodicdouot suppose tnat one can withhold one's judgement even
about what seems most clear
.
1
One can certainly withhold one's judgement in the sense that
one can turn his attention away from a proposition he lias
5
5 ee p. frb above.
6
.Cited from AT VIII, 21; HR I, 236-
.
?See o. 67 above.
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clearly and distinctly perceived. But he cannot doubt it,
for m doubting it, it is before his mind and if, while it
is before his mind, he clearly and distinctly perceives that
proposition, he recognizes that its predicate concept is con-
tained in either the tertiary or the interpretive content of
tne subject concept. He recognizes that, his proposition is
true
.
un ^ °£ clarity and distinctness
. Believing
ne has argued convincingly that the perception of the pain
is not a genuine intermediary between the pain and the judge-
ment, Kenny gives the following account of clarity and distinct-
ness.* an idea is clear just in case it is manifest and dis-
tinct just in case judgements formed about it are true.
Ii we keep in mind that Kenny intended to give us an
account of clarity and distinctness for just simple ideas, 8
ni s account is in a sense innocuous. On my interpretation
Kenny is not. giving us an account of clarity and distinctness
per se. Instead, he is giving us an account of analytical
clarity and representational distinctness. Every simple idea
is analytically clear because it is itself contained in its
tex t i arv content
.
Regarding distinctness, however, Kenny says an idea is
distinct just in case judgements formed about it are true.
In a loose way he is talking about the representational
' See p 6 3 above
.
26 2
distinctness of an idea. Our simple ideas are distinct if
and only if they are materially true, i.e. if and only if
they are correctly interpreted. Kenny's account of clarity
pertains to analytical clarity; his account of distinctness,
to representational distinctness. Failing to distinguish
these two aspects of ideas, Kenny gives us an interpretation
that is incomplete and confused.
criticism of Descartes; Rule
. Kenny accuses
DescarL.es of arguing in a circle. On the one. hand, Descartes
tells us that what he clearly and distinctly perceives is
true. On the other hand, he seems to be saying that he ident
ij-u-Go his clear and distinct perceptions by ascertaining whe-
, . 9
cjiei wnat. he perceives 13 true.
Strictly speaking, there is no circularity here. If I
clearly and distinctly perceive that £, then £ is true. On
my view I clearly and distinctly perceive that p only if I
clearly and distinctly perceive £' s subject concept. But to
clearly and distinctly perceive £'
s
subject concept, I need
to make true judgements about that concept. I have to judge
that a, where g is not identical with p
.
1 ° So I do not have,
to ascertain that p is true before I can clearly and distinct
perceive that d. There is no circularity.
See pp. 80-81
.
See p. 131 above.
10
..
.
Ashworth makes the same criticism.
Since g is about p ’ s subject concept and not about
subject, g cannot be identical to p.
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Although Descartes is not guilty of arguing in a
circle, we could try to amend Kenny's criticism so that Des-
cartes is caught in a vicious regress. If i have to know that
2 iS true before 1 can cl«“ly distinctly perceive that E ,
then I also have to clearly and distinctly perceive that o.
But, then, I need to judge truly about g's subject concept,
and so on ad infinitum. Let us look at this argument in more
concrete terms. Suppose p is "All bachelors are unmarried."
To clearly and distinctly perceive that p, I must clearly and
distinctly perceive the concept Bachelors. My explicit con-
tent consists of the concepts Unmarried and Men, I use the
method of analysis to ascertain whether my concept Bachelors
is necessarily connected with its contents. Using this
method, I ask myself whether there is a possible state of
affairs involving a bachelor who is married or not male. I see
there cannot be such a state of affairs, and I judge that q:
P s subject concept is necessarily connected with its explicit
content." But is q true?
To find out if q is true, I must clearly and distinctly
perceive that q. I clearly and distinctly perceive that a
only it I clearly and distinctly perceive q's subject concept.
Now J must recognize that r: "My concept of the concept Bach-
elors is necessarily connected with the concept of being nec-
essarily connected with the concepts Unmarried and Men." But
to find out whether r is true, I must perceive that r clearly
and distinctly, and the regress is underway.
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We embark on this regress because we assume that the
only way to perceive a proposition to be true is to clearly
and distinctly perceive it. But Descartes' Rule states a
sufficient
,
not a necessary, condition for ascertaining that
a proposition is true. Stating his Rule in. this way,
Descartes leaves open the possibility that there are other
avenues, besides clear and distinct perception, for ascertain-
ing what is true. 11 Frankfurt explores this possibility when
he discusses the evidential bases in virtue of which one clearly
and distinctly perceives. Among the evidential bases Frank-
furt recognizes are self-evident propositions. But if there
aiv:. sU'^h pi opositions
,
their truth is manifest, and we do
not need to clearly and distinctly perceive them in order to
ascertain that they are true.
III. FRANKFURT
I have already disputed Frankfurt's discussion of material
falsity and his narrow interpretation of Descartes' Rule. J/
What f want to do now is concentrate on his account of cJear
and distinct perception that such and such is the case.
Why Frankfurt 1 s account is itself susceptible to Kenny's
criticism. Frankfurt tells us that we clearly and distinctly
i ]"
'This point has obvious relevance when one considers
the traditional Cartesian circle.
3 2
For Frankfurt's interpretation, see Chapter III,
Section I above. For my interpretation of Descartes' Rule,
see above pp. 255-257.
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conceive a concept if and only if we clearly and distinctly
perceive that <£, some proposition about our concept. 13 we
can now see that Frankfurt and I are using 'clear and distinct
perception that' in different senses: When I talk about
clearly and distinctly perceiving that p, I am talking about
a proposition based on a clear and distinct conception of n's
suoject. concept. When Frankfurt talks about clearly and dis-
tinctly perceiving that c, he is talking about clearly and
distinctly perceiving a proposition on which a clear and
distinct conception of a concept can be based.
In his view we ascertain a proposition a to be true if
and only if we recognize that certain relations hold between
2. and an evidential basis for g. a has an evidential basis e
provided that e excludes all reasonable grounds for doubtina
that and e is self-evident or entailed by a proposition
that is self-evident
,
or e is an experience. 1 ^
But what are the relations that must hold between a pro-
position and its evidential basis? Frankfurt specifies these
relations in his definitions of 'clear and distinct perception
,
1
5
that » A person A clearly and distinctly perceives that g
only if he recognizes that
,
for some e,
(i) e is an evidential basis for cr, and
13 See PP • 90-91 above
,
I. Li See PP* 92-93 above
.
"1 IT
J. See PP • S 4-95 above
Cii) Cri {e entails r if and only if £ contains r>.
16
does A know that (i) and tii ) are true? On Frankfurt'
account he must clearly and distinctly perceive them. But
to clearly and distinctly perceive that (i)
, he must recognize
chat (Eej ) [e
x
is an evidential basis for (i) J
.
Again he needs
<-o ascertain that this proposition is true so he must clearly
and distinctly perceive it as well. To clearly and distinctly
perceive this proposition, he must recognize that there is
an evidential basis for it, and we are embarked on an infin-
ite regress once more.
£ HE to Kenny ' s critic ism . Although Frankfurt's
definitions of 'clarity' and distinctness 1 make Descartes
susceptible to Kenny’s criticism, his notion of an evidential
basis suggests a route we might pursue. An evidential basis
.is either self-evident,, entailed by a proposition that is
self-evident, or an experience. There is nothing in Frankfurt
formulation to suggest that a proposition cannot be its own
evidential basis. To clear 3.y and distinctly perceive that p,
I must: on my view clearly and distinctly perceive p's subject
concept. In turn I must be able to ascertain that some pro-
position a about p's subject concept is true. If I must
clearly and distinctly perceive that c in order to ascertain
that p is true, then I am embarked on an infinite regress.
*^There are further conditions Frankfurt specifies that
I do not enumerate here.
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But if 2 is self-evident and its truth is manifest to me when
I consider a, I do not need to clearly and distinctly perceive
it to ascertain its truth, and the infinite regress is averted
But is
g. self-evident?
When 1
-dearly and distinctly perceive that p where o
is "All bachelors are married," I clearly and distinctly con-
ceive the concept Bachelors, and I recognize that it includes
c,nd is necessarily connected with the concept Unmarried. I
cim making two judgements
t
(q) The concept Bachelors is necessarily connected with
the concept Unmarried.
( .1 ) --he concept Unmarried is contained in the concept
Bachelors
.
in judging chat (q) and that (r)
,
am I judging truly?
---
; nd out, I must clearly and distinctly perceive
-ha*.. C] Slid tnat r, 1 take the first, step in a regress. But
I do not need to clearly, and distinctly perceive these propos-
itions to recognize that they are true. They are self-evident
Every idea I have has an explicit content that constitutes
it to be the idea it is. If the explicit content of my idea
Bachelors is Unmarried Men, r is self-evident. It is equivelai
to the judgement that "The concept Unmarried is contained in
the concept "Unmarried Men," and I cannot deny r while I
understand what it is I am denying.
q is also self-evident. It is equivalent to the follow-
ing: "The concept Unmarried Men is necessarily connected with
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the concept Unmarried." If I understand that q, and I under-
stand what it means for one concept to be necessarily connected
w.-uh another
,
then I cannot sensibly deny q, for if I did
I would be affirming that there is a possible state of affairs
in which what is unmarried is married. Like r, a is self-evi-
dent
.
So far, I have shown that we can clearly and distinctly
perceive that p without having to clearly and distinctly per-
ceive that q, some proposition about p's subject concept.
But in the example I used, p was an analytic truth. What if
£ is a contingent truth?
Let p_ be "I exist." We assume that I clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive that p. This assumption implies that I per-
ceive the concept 1 with analytical clarity and distinctness.
But since this concept is simple, it follows that I include
in .its tertiary content only the idea itself. Consequently,
the concept Existence is not part of my analysis
.
' This con-
cept is included in the interpretive content of my idea, how-
ever. But is my interpretation of my idea right? Is my idea
materially true and representaticnally clear and distinct?
To perceive my idea with representational clarity and
distinctness
,
I must recognize that q;
(q) My idea correctly represents.
J
^Eor Descartes, 'existence' is a predicate. He ranks
his idea of existence among the common simple ideas, ideas
that represent prope rties of both material and spiritual
substance. HR 1 , 41..
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But is a true? And do I have to clearly and distinctly per-
ceive it in order to assure myself that it is? On Frankfurt's
"71 ew
'
a clear and distinct perception is not required. If
I understand a, I cannot doubt its truth because if I doubt
it, I do exist
i:ng, and a is
consider cr its
perceive that
and cr is true. The denial of a is self-defeat"
self-evident. To find out that q is true, I
o.1j., and i do not need to clearly and distinctly
2. or some other proposition about q. There
is no regress.
General assessment of Frank furt *
s
account. My account
differs from Frankfurt
deemphas i ze s the rol
e
’s in important respects. Frankfurt
of clear and distinct conception becau
he recognizes that we clearly and distinctly conceive concepts
only if we perceive propositions about these concepts to be
true. Concentrating on the notion of clearly and distinctly
perceiving that such and such is the case, Frankfurt makes
clear and distinct perception that £ consist in a relation
between p and an evidential basis for p. Although he does
not rule out the possibility that, p is its own evidential
basis, p's evidential basis will typically be something other
than p. On my account clear and distinct perception that p
ic quite a different matter. The relations that must hold
are not between p and its evidential basis but between com-
ponents of p, its subject and predicate concepts.
I cannot say that my interpretation is right and
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Frankfurt's is wrong. In Chapter III I pointed out that Frank-
furt's interpretation leaves Descartes vulnerable to Gassendi's
vj.xt.cjsm. iy account does little better, however. It does,
of course, avert the infinite regress we have been discussing.
Cut beyond these considerations, I think my account is more
true to the spirit of Descartes 1 writing. Descartes thinks
we understand the complex in terms of the simple. Propositions
are complexes, and I understand them if I understand the parts
making them up. It seems to me characteristically Cartesian
t.o think that I clearly and distinctly perceive that p only
if I clearly and distinctly perceive parts of p.
But Frankfurt's account reverses Descartes’ usual ap-
proach. In Frankfurt's view I clearly and distinctly conceive
a concept only if I clearly and distinctly perceive a pro-
position about it. And I clearly and distinctly perceive a
proposition by seeing whether certain relations hold between
it and an evidential basis for it. Evidential bases are
propositions or experiences. They are not concepts, and I
do not have to clearly and distinctly conceive in order to
clearly and distinctly perceive that p. On Frankfurt's
account one wonders why Descartes mentions clear and distinct
ideas at all.
ir
Yet the clarity and distinctness of ideas occupies Des-
cartes much more than the clarity and distinctness of
-^See pp. 104-105 above.
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propositions or judgements. On my account Descartes' interest
m ideas is manifest. Ideas are either simple or reducible
to simples, and when we understand these, we are then in a
position to clearly and distinctly judge. Not before.
IV. ASHWORTH
Ashworth's criticism of Descartes' account of clarity
c,nd distinctness. Ashworth thinks Descartes confuses sensa-
tions and concepts. As a result of this confusion, Descartes,
Ashworth believes, equivocates on his usage of 'clarity' and
distinctness*. When predicated of sensations, 'clarity' and
distinctness have one sense; when predicated of concepts,
1 9
another. ‘ Clear perception of a sensation is in Ashworth's
view "some kind of immediate awareness 1'^ -- a function of
the intensity of sensation. 21 A concept, on the other hand,
is clearly perceived only if we can give a full definition of
a term expressing that concept. Considering 'distinctness',
Ashworth contends that Descartes holds a concept to be distinc
2 7
onry r f it is complete, ~ and it is complete only if it con-
tains all cind. only concepts representing defining characteris-
tics of the object of our idea. 24 A sensation, on the other
±
' See pp . 106-108 above.
20 lhid • / P.
21 Ibid
.
,
p. 118.
22 Ibid.
,
p. 107
23 Ibid
-
/
PP- 119-120.
24 IDid .
,
p. 124.
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hand, is distinct only if it is complete and provides
grounds for judgement."''
In my view Ashworth, makes too much of Descartes
adequate
confusion
between sensations and concepts. I
tai oCs is guilty of this confusion.
am not denying that Des-
What I am denying is that
he equivocated on his use of
’ claritv
’
and 'distinctness* as
a result.
Ashworth supports his view by arguing that Descartes'
account of obscure and confused sensation differs from his
account of obscure and confused fictional ideas. ^ Although
I would not put the matter quite in this way, Ashworth's
point jo in a sense right. But he draws the wrong conclusion
from his observation. Emphasizing Descartes' confusion be-
tween sensations and concepts. Ashworth fails to see that Des-
cartes treats ideas of sensation differently from fictional
ideas because the former are simple and the latter complex.
Had Ashworth seen that the crucial distinction was between
simple and complex ideas rather than between sensations and
concepts, he would have been in a position to develop -the
interpretation I have given, and he would have better under-
stood the. facts he thinks require explanation.
Ashworth '
s
criticism of Descartes 1 Buie. Besides ac-
cusing Descartes of the circularity which Kenny
^Ibid., pp. 119-120.
26ibid., p. 107.
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27discusses, Ashworth also argues that Descartes has no was-
te justify his rule of evidence. The interpretation 1 have
g-tven provides such a justification, however. Once we
understand what Descartes' Rule asserts, we cannot reasonably
ooubt that his Rule is true. A clearly and distinctly per-
carved proposition d is onp ah->+-
- e that uas a subject concept that
i-> analy Licallv cJear anrJ d -j o •*- -j —> +. _ -j
-
o aisanct and materially true and
that includes in either its tertiary or its interpretive con-
tent p's predicate concept. If E 's predicate concept is in
the tertiary content of p's subject concept, then p is anal-
yticaliy true. if n’o ^ ,
P- - P1£diCa>-e concept is m the interpret-
ive content of p's subject concept, then p's predicate con-
cept is included in an idea that correctly represents. In
either case p is true.
V, GASSENDI
Gassendi asked Descartes for a method for ascertaining
when we are clearly and distinctly perceiving. Descartes
responded that he had provided the. method Gassendi required
•in its place, where I first discarded all prejudices, and
tnen enumerated all the principal ideas and distinguished
those, which were clear from the obscure and confused." 28 in
Chapter V, J. examined two interpretations of Descartes' reply
27A criticism I have just discussed.
^ See p . 149 above
.
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One is Gewirth's. He thinks that the place to which Descartei
1S referring Gassendi is the first three Meditations and that
the method Descartes has in mind.
But this method is never used or
itation
„
is the method of difference,
mentioned m the First M^d—
if the method of difference sufficed to distinguish the
clear and distinct from the obscure and confused ideas, we
would not quibble with Gewirth over whether Descartes was re-
ferring to rhe Second and Third Meditations or to the first
three.
-But the method of difference is not adequate; it can-
nor tell us whether simple ideas are clear and distinct, and
then e are substantial reasons for questioning' Gewirth's
account
.
Against Gewirth’s account, we posed an alternative in-
c-erpre tat ion of Descartes’ reply to Gassendi. This interpret—
afi'.iH ia consistent wi tli Descartes’ remarks • On this inter-
pretation Descartes is referring Gassendi to Meditation I,
but the only method mentioned or used in this Meditation is
the method of doubt. This method is also problematic, however,
Descartes does clarify his ideas of God and matter in Medit-
ations II and III, but the method he uses is the method of
difference, not the method of doubt.
Whether we adopted Gewirth's interpretation or the rival
account, of Descartes* reply, we encountered difficulties.
Retreating from this dilemma, we adopted a strategy that had
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us examine the corpus of Descartes' work. The result of
this effort is Chapters VI, VII, and VIII, where I gave
my account of Descartes' notions of clarity and distinctness
and how we ascertain them. But having offered this account,
we can now give what I believe is the correct interpretation
of Descartes' reply to Gassendi.
Gewirth was right. Descartes is referring Gassendi
tc- the first three Meditations and to the method of difference,
or, what I have called, 'the method of analysis'. But Des-
cartes is also referring Gassendi to the method of doubt,
“he method used in Meditation I. Descartes' method for
ascertaining clarity and distinctness is a combination of
both methods. An idea is clear and distinct if and only if
it is analytically and representationally clear and distinct.
To find out if it is analytically clear and distinct, we use
the method of analysis. To find out if it is representation-
ally clear and distinct, we use the method of doubt.
VI. REMAINING CHALLENGES
In Principle XLV, Descartes defines 'clarity' and
'distinctness'. The key defining expressions he uses are
'being present', 'being apparent', and 'being attentive 1 .
A1 though I have offered an account, of clarity and distinct-
ness that adheres closely to what Descartes says about clarity
and distinctness throughout the corpus of his writing, 1 am
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no closer to being able to offer a coherent interpretation •
ot what Descartes says in Principle XLV. One obstacle in the
way of providing such an inte-Dre^Hnn ;
.
-u.t ^pretation ns my incomplete
account of rsrirssfintai'i c,-.-, .. n -> . ,ep e e at onal clarity and distinctness. I was
unable to distinguish representational clarity from represent-
ational distinctness and representational obscurity from
representational confusion. If such an account could be
provided, we might have at our disposal all the elements
-lO^ar.c to give a coherent reading to Principle XLV. But the
problem of providing such a reading is one I air. not now
sole to resolve, and I defer the problem for future consider-
atiou „
BIBLIOGRAPHY
2 77
**"*' Charles fUld Milha"0 Golard (ear,,). r,^:carte s
. cor-
responciance
,
8 vols. Paris : Pe'Hx
Univers itaires de Prance, 1336 - 1963
.
adam, Charles and Tannerv
, Paul h>dq ’i r
~ '
U
-L ' cas *U Oeuvres as Descartes.
x?* VOAS * Paris
:
Leopold Cerf
, 1897 - 1913
.,
Ansconbe, Elizabeth snd Geach, Peter Thomas (transs.), Dee-
—yJ£22E*ilSSi Writings. Edinburgh: Thomas
Mels on & Sons
r Ltd., 1954
.
Ashworth
,
E.
,7
. "Descartes
' Theory of Clear and Distinct
Tdeas/ '
-iri K * J
- Butler <ed.), Cartesian Studies.
fork: Barnes and Noble, 1972, pp. 39 - 105.
Attr, A. J. "’i Think, Therefore I Am'," in Willis Doney
iedm)t h 91 critical Lssays.
*3cU con city, New York; Anchor Books, 196"’. pp. go ~ 37
.
Bo..-./
,
eInert G. A. .Cartesian Studies , New York: Colamb La
U;n ivers i tv Press, 1 9 5
1
.
Beet, L. J. The ^taphysics of Descartes : A study of the
-IS. :• L:± ;
-hi
*
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.
—
*
-TJhd of Doscarres: A Study of the Re^ulae.
Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1952.
Descartes, Lend, Oeuvres efc Lettres. Librarie Gallimaid,
195 2
278
Frankfurt, Harry. Demons, Dreamers
, and Madmen : The Defense
— -SS522 in Descartes- Meditations. New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970.
Gewirth, Alan. "The Cartesian Circle," The Philosophical Re-
/ L (July, .1941)
,
368 - 385.
• "Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes/’ in
Wnlis Qoney (ed.)
, Descartes- A Collection Of Critical
Garden City, New York: Anchor Books,
.1967,
pp. ^ BO - 277. See Also Philosophy
, XVIII (April,
1943)
,
17 - 36.
Haldane, Elizabeth S. and Ross, G . R. T
.
(eds.). The Phil-
gILQgk.ica l Works of Desca rtes , 2 vcls. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1968.
Hart land-Swann, John. "Descartes 's ' Simple Natures'," Phil-
osophy
,
XXII (July, 1947)
,
139 - 152.
Keeling, S. V. Descar tes
. London: Oxford University Press,
19 61.
Kenny, Anthony. De scartes: A Study Of His Philosophy. New
York : Random Uouso, 1968.
La), com, Merman . "Dreaming and Skepticism" in Willis Doney
( cd
. ) , Descartes ; A Co 1 1
e
ction Of Cr itica 1 E s s ays.
Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967, pp. 58 - SI.
Russell, Bertrand. A Critical Exposition Of The Philosophy of
. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967.Le 1 fcn
z
I2 79
' it OSi *~le-tcrn Philosophy ., New York:
and Schuster, 1945,
Norman Kemp (trans.). Descartes 1 Ph ilosophical
London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1952.
—
-
:!o™ Studies in the Philosophy of Descarte s:
as Pioneer
. London: MacMillan & Co,,
d inion
Writ-
Des”
Ltd., 1952.

